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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This volume is a collection of three studies which develops and 
tests a theory of how capital gains and losses affect production and 
finance decisions. That this work was carried on within the discipline 
of agricultural economics is largely an historical accident. The organi­
zation of U.S. agriculture in small closely held businesses which 
combine, under one management investment, production and finance 
decisions and the farmland capital gains and losses of recent years have 
forced farmers, the makers of farm policy, and agricultural economists to 
be aware of the potential link between land price changes and management 
choices. When capital gains and losses are a small part of the returns, 
the usual microeconomic theory which assumes that all inputs are consumed 
in the production process and that the firm is only interested in current 
income from production may be an adequate approximation. But, when 
capital gains are as large as current returns, as they were in U.S. 
agriculture during the 1970s (Melichar, 1979, p. 1086), that approxima­
tion can be called into question. It seems reasonable that producers 
take into account the fact that some inputs are not consumed in the 
production process and may be sold for more than their purchase price 
after use. 
The concern about the impact of farmland capital gains and losses is 
not limited to the U.S. in the twentieth century. For instance, Brannon 
has hypothesized that the low rate of investment in agricultural 
equipment and inputs in Uruguayan agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s was 
due to land price increases which made it more profitable for landowners 
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to invest in more land than in more intensive use of their existing land. 
Work by agricultural historians provides evidence that farmland price 
changes and expected capital gains had an effect on the rate and the form 
of development of land resources on the U.S. frontier (A. Bogue, 1985; 
M. Bogue, 1959; Swerenga, 1968; Gates, 1973). 
The potential for capital gain and loss effects is, however, not 
limited to agriculture. It can happen wherever there are inputs that are 
not consumed in the production process or are consumed relatively slowly. 
For instance, does the pattern of price change on urban real estate 
affect how land is developed? Capital gain and loss effects may also 
occur in a consumption context. For instance, antiques or art works may 
be thought of as producing esthetic services, but they may also appreci­
ate in value. Will individuals hold a greater quantity of antiques or 
art if their price is rising than if they held these items solely for 
esthetic reasons? Was the boom in the demand for antiques in the U.S. in 
the 1970s related to increasing esthetic awareness or was it a function 
of the price appreciation potential? Similarly, residential housing can 
be thought of as providing housing services — shelter, location, 
comfortable environment, etc. Will the demand for residential housing 
change if home prices are rising? Can the desire to earn additional 
capital gains explain some of the real estate market behavior in the 
U.S. in the 1970s? Are such diverse phenomena as condominium conversions 
and the entry of unmarried, childless individuals into the housing market 
related to capital gains? Will some people who would ordinarily be 
content to rent housing desire to buy if appreciation potential is large? 
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These studies do not answer all these questions, but they provide a first 
step toward a better understanding of the role of capital gains and 
losses in economic decisions. 
The capital gain and loss effect identified here differ from pure 
speculation activity in that the assets acquired have some legitimate use 
in the firm or the household. Farmers normally use land in their produc­
tion process. Individuals need residential housing. The question here 
is how price changes affect the choice to hold and use the appreciating 
or depreciating asset. 
Some researchers have argued that capital gains and losses are 
discounted changes in future Income and cannot be analyzed as a separate 
form of returns (Fischer, 1930, p. 25). In this view, a model which 
Includes both the capital gain or loss and the income stream from the 
asset earning the capital gain or loss is potentially double counting 
some income. The identification of capital gains and losses with changes 
in future Income depends, however, on perfect capital markets. With 
heterogeneous expectations, imperfect information, and transactions cost, 
the direct link between these two forms of return may be severed. For 
instance, the farmer who anticipated the low farm Income and declining 
land prices of the mid-1980s could have sold land in 1981, the high point 
in land prices, for the same price as a farmer who anticipated a future 
of strong farm income and continued rise In land value. The capital gain 
realized would be independent of the farmer's own view of the future. 
Similar arguments can be advanced about the value of unrealized 
capital gains. The value of unrealized capital gain as collateral will 
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depend on the lender's view of the future, but it does not necessarily 
depend on the borrower's. The individual who anticipated price declines 
can borrow against accrued capital gains to the same extent as a person 
who expects increases, though the use of the loans may be different. If 
the consumption decision depends on wealth, then consumption may be 
affected by a capital gain even if the individual believes that the 
future income increase anticipated the market will never occur. For 
example, land owners in the 1970s may have changed their consumption 
patterns to reflect increased wealth in the form of farmland, even if 
they did not believe that income from land would continue to rise. 
Using the common microeconomic assumption that the decisionmaker 
cannot affect the prices of inputs or outputs, current Income and capital 
gains can be treated as two separate sources of returns. Some future 
research may completely specify the relationship of income and capital 
value under varying degrees of expectational heterogeneity, imperfect 
information, and transactions cost, but these studies adhere to the 
simplifying assumption that the decisionmaker is a small part of the 
input and output markets and does not affect prices. 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
The organization structure of this disseration is three separate 
studies which build upon each other. The original research for the 
writing of these papers was done solely by the author. In the first 
study, a theoretical model of how capital gains and losses affect produc­
tion and finance is constructed. This is developed in the framework of a 
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modified Vickers model; first with a static approximation and then with a 
more conçlete dynamic model using optimal control theory techniques. The 
second study extends the theoretical model to an environment which 
includes limitations on land availability, adjustment cost, equity 
investment contrained to retained earnings, and land price risk. The 
third study is an exploratory empirical test of the theoretical framework 
developed in the first two studies. It was a discrete, deterministic 
dynamic programming model based on data for central Iowa during the 
period 1970-1984. The policy implications of the three papers are 
discussed in the last section of the third study. Â brief statement of 
summary and conclusions follows the third paper. 
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PART r  
BASIC THEORETICAL MODEL 
Statements in the media and the professional economic journals 
indicate a widespread belief that farmland price changes have important 
impacts for farm production and finance. Media accounts of the current 
financial stress of some producers frequently attribute a large part of 
Che probicui to falling land prices which reduce the farmer's net worth 
and curtail the borrowing power of the farm business. Agricultural 
economists have suggested that land price changes may have a wide variety 
of impacts. Castle and Hoch (1982) said that farmland capital gains may 
reduce incentives to adopt "land saving practices and technologies" 
(pp. 16-17). They indicate that farmland price increases may help 
explain the increase in acreage per farm, the use of larger machinery and 
the relatively low growth of land productivity in the 1970s. Economists 
have often hypothesized that farm expansion and capital gains are related 
because the appreciated value of land holdings provides a base for addi­
tional purchases (Lins and Duncan, 1980, p. 1025; Plaxico, 1979, p. 1089; 
Raup, 1978, p. 303; and Robinson, 1979, p. 906), It is suggested that 
the preferential tax treatment of capital gains has exacerbated the farm 
expansion trend by offering high income land owners additional incentives 
for purchasing more land (Davenport, Boehlje and Martin, 1982, p. 17-18; 
Raup, 1978, p. 305). Lins and Duncan indicate that the impact of 
farmland capital gains on farm financing goes beyond increasing the 
borrowing capacity of the farmer. They suggest that rising prices 
encourage greater reliance on debt financing. In an attempt to reap the 
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benefits of capital gains, farmers buy sooner and go into debt further 
than they would in a stable price environment (p. 1051). 
In spite of the many hypotheses, little research has been done on 
the intact of capital gains and losses on production and finance 
decisions. Current firm level microeconomic theory does not provide a 
well-developed framework for such research since it usually assumes that 
the firm is only interested in current income and that inputs are 
consumed in the production process. In most industries, these assump­
tions may be adequate, but in U.S. agriculture capital gains and losses 
have been very important concerns. Melichar (1979) indicates that in the 
1970s real capital gains were roughly equal to current income from 
agricultural production (pp. 1085-1086). In the 1950s and 1960s, capital 
gains were about one-third as large as current income. In the 1920s and 
early 1930s, and again in the early 1980s, capital losses were large in 
some areas. Because of the dominant position of land in the farm asset 
structure, most of the capital gains and losses stem from farmland price 
changes. On the individual asset or project level, the impact of capital 
gains and losses is well-known, for instance through the salvage values 
incorporated in net present value or internal rate of return calcula­
tions, but the asset or project level analysis does not capture the firm 
level impacts that have to be hypothesized. Similarly, the impact of 
capital gains and losses on purely investment decisions is well-known; 
investment models frequently assume that return can be either in the form 
of current income or capital gain. But the pure investment approach does 
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not provide an adequate framework to analyze choices which also include 
output levels, enterprise choice and financing production. 
A better understanding of the interrelationship of capital gains, 
farm size and financial structure would be useful on the microeconomic 
level in analyzing farm business decisions and on the macroeconomic level 
in considering the effect of tax and price support policies. As an 
initial step in understanding this relationship, this study develops a 
simple model of the farm firm which includes land price changes. The 
model uses the common microeconomic assumption that the firm is small 
enough so that it has no inçact on input or output prices. The inter­
action between producer decisions and farmland prices is an important 
subject, but it is not the primary focus of this research. The financing 
of the farm firm is considered as a constraint in the manner outlined by 
Vickers. 
Both a static and dynamic version of the model are developed. The 
following section reviews previous research on farmland capital gain and 
loss impacts. Subsequent sections detail the static model, which assumes 
that variables are constant throughout the planning horizon and that the 
land price path is linear, and the (fynamic model allows wider variety of 
land price paths and varying input and financial asset levels. The 
dynamic model is examined under several hypotheses about the value of 
unrealized capital gain and loss, and under various tax regimes. A two 
generation model is also developed. The final sections exmaine the 
enterprise choice decision and provide a brief look at the implications 
of the model. 
9 
Previous Research 
Research which has explicitly examined the inçact of capital gains 
on production and finance choices is rare. The research on breeding 
livestock capital gains does not generalize to the case of farmland 
capital gains because breeding livestock capital gains are primarily a 
result of tax rules which allow the costs of raising these animals to be 
written off as a current e^qpense, but considers the proceeds from the 
sale of raised breeding stock to be capital gain. Ordinarily, the 
capital gain calculated for tax purposes on breeding stock includes 
little price appreciation. A study by Vandeputte and Baker (1970) which 
did consider the intact of farmland capital gains on the input mix and 
enterprise choice found that the gains and how they are taxed had 
inçortant effects. In a linear programming example, they show intensive 
hog production in the optimal solution when capital gains are fully 
taxed, but land ownership and crop production when the partial exemption 
of capital gains from income taxes was included in the model (pp. 526-
527). The analysis did not include financial activities and, the authors 
note, "were credit specifications also to be included, the differences 
might be still greater because of the credit consequences of assets 
accumulated under the capital gains provisions of the tax laws" 
(p. 526). 
An important precedent for this research is the debate in agri­
cultural economics literature over the last three decades concerning the 
value of unrealized capital gains. In the traditional methods of 
analyzing the individual purchase decision, capital gains have not been 
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recognized until they are realized. Because land is often held for long 
periods before it is sold, the net present value of the gain at the time 
it occurs may be small even if the gain is substantial. Some researchers 
have, however, argued that unrealized gains have value because they add 
to the wealth position of the owner (Boyne, 1964; Crowley, 1974; Grove, 
1950). Bhatia (1972) argued that in a world of perfect capital markets 
and equal taxes on all types of income, unrealized capital gains would be 
a perfect substitute for current income in the wealth of the individual, 
and hence there is justification for including at least a part of the 
capital gain in the current income stream of an individual. Flaxico and 
Kletke (1979) formalize this approach by recognizing a fraction of 
capital gain as income, while deferring the remaining gain and the taxes 
on the gain to the end of the holding period. They emphasize that the 
fraction of the gain which can be considered a perfect substitute for 
current income depends on the cash flow problems of the owner and on 
whether the gains are viewed as permanent. The recognition of a portion 
of unrealized capital gains or loss as a substitute for cash income is 
denoted as the wealth approach (Plaxico and Kletke, 1980, p. 264; Bhatia, 
1972, p. 868) because unrealized capital gain substitutes for income in 
determining wealth. 
A. second approach to the value of unrealized gain is to argue that 
the unrealized gain is a substitute for equity in the financial negotia­
tion (Plaxico and Kletke, 1979, p. 238). Unrealized gain increases the 
financial base for acquiring credit and reduces risk for borrower and 
lender. In this approach, the value of unrealized gain is the extra 
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income earned because of the added borrowing capacity and increased 
financial flexibility. The fraction of unrealized gain that would be a 
perfect substitute for equity in the financial negotiation is primarily a 
function of the lender's view of those gains as security for the loan. 
The second method of valuing unrealized capital gains and losses is 
denoted as the income approach (Plaxico and Kletke, 1980), p. 264) 
because the focus is on the income or earning capacity generated by 
accumulated capital gains and losses through their effect on borrowing 
power. Because of the long period of generally rising real land prices 
from 1940 to 1980, much of the research on farmland price changes is 
formulated exclusively in terms of captial gains. In most cases, the 
extension of the arguments to capital losses is straightforward, 
involving mainly changes in the tax impact because capital gains and 
losses are not treated symmetrically in the U.S. tax systems. 
Theoretical Framework 
The basic theoretical framework of this study was developed by 
Vickers (1968). The approach is to determine the optimal input mix and 
financial structure that maximizes the present value of the firm's income 
subject to a money capital constraint. The Vickers* model is concerned 
primarily with long run planning of investment, finance and production, 
hence all asset levels and even enterprise choice is considered variable 
(p. 43). Wealth maximization is chosen as the appropriate objective 
function in the Vickers model because it allows consideration of the 
timing of the income stream, and through the risk premium in the discount 
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rate, it allows the owner's risk preferences to be expressed (p. 7). The 
net present value maximization also approximates utility maximization for 
cases in which utility is primarily a function of the level of money 
income and the owners may borrow against or save cash returns to achieve 
the desired consumption pattern. In its simplest form, the Vickers model 
maximizes: 
V = the present value of the strean of income from the firm, 
TT = the expected income per period, 
P = the discount rate, and 
K = invested equity. 
This simple form of the present value of the firm can be derived using 
either a discrete or continuous time model assuming a stream of returns 
over an infinite planning horizon: 
(1) 
where 
TT -pt 
(2) V=--K = ;^e dt - K 
or 
-- K = I — 
P tio (l+p]C 
- K 
Convergences to the simple static form (2) requires that the income term 
(•"^ ) be independent of time. The difference between the two models is in 
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the definition of ir and p, but with appropriately defined variables both 
should yield the same solutions. The discount rate used in this study is 
assumed to be based on the yields of alternative investment opportunities 
with risk levels similar to those encountered in agriculture. The simple 
static form of the objective function in equation (1) assumes that input 
levels, debt use and equity investment are set initially and remain 
constant throughout the planning horizon. 
In the agricultural context where most firms are sole proprietor­
ships, the infinite life firm can be reinterpreted to be a family farm on 
which the farm family intends to go on farming indefinitely passing the 
farm business from generation to generation. The idea of an infinite 
life family farm fits well into the traditional view of the family farm 
that underlies much of the public debate on farm policy, but it abstracts 
away from the distinct entry and exit pattern of U.S. farming. 
The IT in the Vickers* model is specified to be price times quantity 
minus the cost of inputs used in the production process and the interest 
on debt: 
(3) IT = P • f(X, L) - ï^X - Y,L - r(^)D 
where : 
P = the price of output, 
L = farmland, 
X = composite input which includes everything but land, 
D = debt. 
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7^, Yg " [he current cost of inputs used, 
f( x ,  l) = a strictly concave production function with: 
^X» ^ ^XX» ^LL ^ ® 
r(-â = the debt supply function with: 
r* > 0, r" > 0. 
In Vickers* (1968) general model price is a function of the quantity of 
output, but for much of agriculture the assumption that the firm is a 
price taker is realistic. The gammas are the costs of inputs actually 
consumed in the production process. For example, in the case of depreci­
able property, the gammas define the value of wear and tear, regular 
maintenance, and replacement costs (p. 128). In the case of farm real 
estate, the gamma coefficient would be primarily composed of property 
taxes, insurance and the depreciation on buildings, fences, tile lines 
and soil conservation structures. In this simple model, the current 
costs y2) are assumed to be constant throughout the planning 
horizon. Vickers suggests that the supply of debt capital and the cost 
of credit can be modeled as a function of the leverage ratio (pp. 67-68). 
The argument is that the interest rate will rise as the leverage ratio 
increases because the lender must assume more risk in the highly lever­
aged firm. The income term will be independent of time and the objective 
function will converge to the simple static farm (2) if input, debt and 
equity levels are set at the initial time and remain unchanged. 
The money capital constraint on the maximization is of tne form: 
(4) (k + D -  ax -  Bl) = 0 
where: a, B = the amount of capital absorbed by each input. 
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The financial constraint (4) must be satisfied at all points in time, but 
in the static case it is enough to satisfy the constraint at the initial 
time because input, debt and equity levels are not changed during the 
planning horizon. The capital absorption coefficients (a, 3) differ from 
the current cost terms For example, if a tractor is purchased 
with cash, the capital absorbed is the cash outlay. The current costs of 
using that tractor are the fuel, maintenance, repairs and depreciation. 
Alpha and beta may reflect special financial arrangements that are only 
available with a specific input, but for simplicity this analysis will 
assume that a and 3 are equal to the prices of the input. 
The basic Vickers* model is the maximization of the present value of 
the income stream (1) subject to the financial constraint (4). The basic 
model was modified in several ways to fit the special characteristics of 
farm firms. The wealth approach to the value of unrealized gain was 
modeled by including a fraction of the capital gain or loss in the 
current income expression (3). The income approach was examined by 
including a fraction of the unrealized capital gain in the denominator of 
the argument of the debt supply function. Because of the distinct entry 
and exit pattern of much of U.S. agriculture, a terminal horizon model is 
examined. Analysis of the static model is primarily through examination 
of the first order conditions for maximization and through formal compar­
ative statics- (Henderson and Ouandt, 1980, pp. 25-27, pp, 80-81). The 
dynamic models relax the assumption that input, debt and equity levels 
remain constant over the planning horizon. Analysis of the dynamic 
16 
models is through examination of the necessary conditions for maximiza­
tion and through explicit control equations for the change in input use 
and financial structure. 
Wealth Approach 
The wealth approach model combines (2), (3), (4) a capital gains 
term and taxes in a Lagrangian expression: 
(5) Max Z = — ([Pf(X, L) - Y,X - Y,L - r[^]D] (1-t) 
(I-T)P 
+ *8L} - K + X(K + D - ax - PL) 
where: iji = the portion of unrealized gain that is a perfect substitute 
for income, 
6 = the change in the land price per acre per rod, 
T = the average tax rate, and 
^ = the Lagrangian multiplier. 
The capital gain term (<p8L) represents the capital gain or loss that is 
recognized as a substitute for cash income or loss in determining wealth. 
The convergence of the objective function to the simple static form (2) 
is maintained because the land price increase (8) is independent of time. 
The land price path is assumed to be a linear function of time: 
=  g  +  e t  
where: = the land price at time t. 
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Only the land price at the initial time (3) is relevant for the financial 
constraint in the static model because land is acquired only at the 
beginning of the planning horizon. Thus, the capital abosrbed by land 
does not change though the land price changes. For simplicity, the model 
uses a constant tax adjustment factor (l-x), however, it should be 
remembered that this ignores the impact of tax rate progressivity. The 
average tax rate is used because the whole farm business is the subject 
of analysis here, not just the marginal asset or project. The tax 
adjustment of the discount rate assumes that the alternative investment 
opportunities on which the discount rate calculation is based are fully 
taxed. The model does not include the effects of inflation; it is 
assumed that all prices and costs are in real terms. The price and other 
parameter values may be thought of as expected values used in long range 
planning. 
Optimization of the Lagrangian expression (5) is a straightforward 
calculus problem. The decision variables are land (L), nonland inputs 
(X), debt (D) and equity capital (K). The first order conditions for the 
static model are: 
- .X . 0 
(6.2) II = + 8 *] - BA = 0 
(*-3) If " ~ (I-t)p ^'@3 (i-T) + X = 0 
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(*'4) H = (i_T)p r'(|)^(l-T) - 1 + X = 0 
3Z 
(6.5) ^=K + D-aX-BL = 0 
The second order conditions (SOC) are satisfied if the Hessian 
matrix of second derivatives of the objective function is negative for 
all changes which satisfy the constraint; hence, the second order 
conditions will certainly be satisfied if the Hessian is negative 
definite for all possible changes. The Hessian is a block diagonal 
matrix of the form: 
(7) H = 
"A Fl 
0 c 
where A is the 2x2 matrix of second derivatives of the production 
function multiplied by the constant P/P. 0 is a conformable null matrix 
and C is: 
(7.» 
D 
K 
D 
K 
For H to be negative definite the condition is: 
h h 
(7.2) h'Hh = (h^ h^) A(^l) + (h^ h^) < 0 
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for all h#0. The term in A is negative definite for all h by the 
assumption of a strictly concave production function. The term in C ran 
be expanded and rewritten as: 
(7.3) (hj h^) C[^^) = - (2r+r* 
Hence, the term in C is negative semidefinite for all h under the assump­
tions of a convex debt cost function (r*>0, r">0) and the second order 
conditions are satisfied. 
The financial structure of the optimal solution can be characterized 
by solving equation (6.4) for X, substituting the \ value into equation 
(6.3) and sinçlifying, yielding: 
(8) p - = r + r'^ 
The left hand side of equation (8) is the marginal cost of equity capital 
and the right hand side is the marginal cost of debt capital. Equation 
(8) indicates the common financial result that in the optimal financial 
structure the marginal cost of all sources of capital is equal. In 
theory, equation (8) could be solved for the optimal leverage ratio as a 
function of the discount rate. Capital gains do not affect the financial 
structure of the model if equity is variable and the wealth approach to 
the value of unrealized gain is used. Taxes also do not affect the 
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financial structure in this case. This occurs because of the assumption 
that the investment alternatives which are used to develop the discount 
rate are fully taxed- Tax terms would appear in equation (8) if alterna­
tive investments were partially or totally tax exempt. 
The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of land for other inputs can 
be found by substituting (6.3) into (6.1) and (6.2), and solving: 
(9.1) ^ = 
^x + a(r+r'^)](l-T) 
L [^2 + ^(r+r'-^)] (1-T) - <t>0 
As is typical of the Vickers' formulation, the MRS is equal to a factor 
cost ratio which includes the cost of capital absorbed by the input. 
Unlike the usual Vickers' model, the denominator of the factor cost ratio 
includes a land price change terra (#8). If capital gains are occurring 
(0>O) and part of those gains are subst itutable for current income (<j>>0), 
then the capital gains will tend to offset the current cost of owning 
land. Under those conditions the factor cost ratio, and hence the 
optimal MRS, will be larger than in the usual microeconomic model which 
ignores capital gains. The increased MRS indicates that when capital 
gains are taken into account the optimal solution includes more land in 
the input mix than it otherwise would (Figure 1). Capital losses have 
the opposite effect; they tend to increase the cost of land ownership, 
reduce the factor cost ration and hence reduce the farm size in the 
optimal solution. In an environment of capital losses, the decision 
21 
L 
X 
Figure 1. If capital gains are not considered in the model the input 
mix would that described by point like A. However, if 
capital gains are considered the MRS is higher and the 
optimal input mix is described by some point like B. In 
addition to shifting along the isoquant, capital gain and loss 
effects may also force changes in the output level. 
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maker approximated by this model would tend to economize on land use to 
avoid the capital losses. The impact of the land price change on input 
use is increased if the capital gains or losses are larger or if a larger 
percentage of the gains or losses can be substituted for current income. 
It is important to separate the effects of the land price level and the 
rate of change of land prices. If land price is at a constant high 
price, the financing cost will be large, and less land is used in the 
input mix than at a lower land price. The land price change can, 
however, either offset or add to the cost of land ownership, depending on 
whether the price is rising or falling. 
The model suggests that at least part of the increase in farm size 
since World War II may be a result of the almost continuous capital gains 
that occurred during that period. It also indicates that, all other 
things being equal, if capital gains during the period had been smaller 
or if those unrealized gains had been less substitutable for wealth, 
farmers would have invested in more nonland inputs, such as labor, 
fertilizer, pesticides, improved seed, irrigation or improvements to land 
they alreacfy own. Of course, the "ceteris paribus" condition of this 
simple static model does not hold. Many forces work simultaneously 
changing agriculture. These forces may reinforce or counteract each 
other. For example, the presence of large capital gains may reinforce 
the trend toward larger farming units brought about by technological 
change. It should not be inferred from this study that land price change 
is the only force changing farm decision making, but rather that land 
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price changes have wide ranging intact on farm decisions and merit 
further attention. 
Equation (9.1) suggests that farm size and use of nonland inputs 
will be affected if government policy changes the expected rate of land 
price change or the substitutability of capital gains for current income. 
For instance, a major land price formation hypothesis suggests that land 
prices are the capitalized value of expected future income from land 
ownership. If this expected future income is rising, capital gains are 
likely to occur. If a price support program increases the rate at which 
future income from land is expected to rise, the model suggests that 
there will be a tendency for farm size to increase and for land use to 
become more extensive. Conversely, a weakening of government price 
support commitment which reduced income expectations and resulted in a 
lower rate of land price change would tend to reduce the optimal farm 
size and encourage more intensive farming. 
Similarly, policy which affects the substitutability of capital 
gains for current income can affect farm size and input use. Plaxico and 
Kletke (1980) argue that the proportion of capital gain which is a 
substitute for current income is affected cash flow problems. 
Unrealized gain cannot be used to meet cash requirements, hence if cash 
flow is a problem the proportion of unrealized gain which substitutes for 
current income will be reduced. If a government program reduces output 
price fluctuations or otherwise reduces the possibility of cash flow 
problems, the proportion of capital gain which is substitutable for 
current income will be increased. The model suggests that an indirect 
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effect of the government stabilization program would be larger farm size 
and more extensive land use. The model suggests that the weakening of 
government programs which tend to decrease the substltutablllty of 
capital gains for current Income, would, all other things being equal, 
tend to reduce farm size and encourage more intensive farming. 
In cases where the parameters 8 and (j) are large, the model indicates 
that the optimal MRS might even be negative, implying that the producer 
would acquire land to the point where extra land reduced current income, 
but was still profitable in terms of capital gains. A more complete 
model would include the option of renting out land so that the marginal 
current revenue of land would be bounded below by the rental rate. 
Renting out land becomes a viable option when the output price times the 
marginal product of land Is less than the rental rate. If large capital 
gains substltutable for current income were occurring and a family had 
access to enough equity to acquire more land than they could effectively 
work, they could rent that land to a lower equity producer with a lower 
MRS, and still enjoy the capital gains accruing to the land. Before the 
mechanization of U.S. agriculture, it was relatively common for prosper­
ous farmers to own rental land, while In the 1980s it is relatively 
uncommon for producers to rent out land. This may be an indication of 
how mechanization changed the production function. In a horse drawn 
agriculture, the marginal product of land probably declined sharply 
beyond some relatively modest farm size, while research indicates that on 
modem farms the marginal product of land is relatively constant over a 
wide range (Miller, Rodewald and McElroy, 1981, pp. 15-17). 
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Fixed equity 
For many farmers the amount of equity capital available for invest­
ment in Che farm business is limited; adequate equity capital may not be 
available to achieve the optimal land and nonland input mix. In a static 
model this limitation can be approximated by assuming that equity is 
fixed. This approximation probably overstates the impact of the equity 
limits, because additions to equity from retained farm and nonfarm 
earnings are often possible, but it allows a relatively simple static 
model to be defined which shows the impacts of the equity constraint. 
In the fixed equity model, the equation (6.4) is eliminated and the 
optimal debt load is dependent on the production function relationships, 
output prices and costs. A constant optimal leverage ratio cannot be 
defined. The optimal land and nonland input mix can still be charac­
terized by the MRS equation (9.1), but analysis is difficult because 
changes in land and nonland input use affect the optimal amount of debt, 
and hence the marginal cost of debt in the factor cost ratio. 
The fixed equity model satisfies the second order conditions. In 
the Hessian, the submatrix C is reduced to a scalar. 
7.1') 
The fixed equity objective function will be negative definite if: 
7.2') (h^  h^ ] + hy^ c < 0 
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Inequality (7.2') holds for all h under the assumption of a strictly 
concave production function and the negativity of c. Hence, the second 
order conditions are satisfied. 
Changes in input and debt use for changes in the capital gain or 
loss, or changes in the substitutability of capital gains and losses for 
current income can be examined by conçarative static analysis of the 
system: 
(10) A 0 
0 c 
(-=,-6) 1 y  
3X r° 
3L = 
—0 
P(l-T) 
3D 0 
3X 0 
9(j) — ^  98 1 
P(l-T) 
By Cramer's rule, the change in land use for a change in 9 is: 
8L . (l-T)p^ - «iZr'-fr-g/K] > 0 
(10.1) âô" -36 |bhl 
which is always positive under the assumptions of the model and the 
negativity of the determinant of the bordered Hessian, denoted [|BH|]. 
The determinant iBH 1 can be written; 
2 
IBH 1 = - — ~ ~ 1-° X^X ~ ^ "^ X^L ® 
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and must be negative under the assumptions of the model because the first 
term in brackets is the determinate of the Hessian (H) of the strictly 
concave production function which is always positive and the second term 
in brackets is a quadratic form in H which must be negative under the 
assumed concavity. Equation (10.1) suggests that the tendency identified 
in the variable equity model for farm acreage to change in the same 
direction as the land price is carried over into the fixed equity 
version. Similarly, the effect on farm size of changes in the substitut-
ability of capital gains for current income is the same as identified in 
the variable equity model. By Cramer's rule: 
[pfyy - a^(2r'+r"^)/k] 
(10.2)11.(1:1)2' " 3* |BH| 
Equation (10.2) is always the same sign as the land price change, 
suggesting that if land prices are increasing (decreasing) farm size will 
be enlarged (reduced) even more if the substitutability of capital gains 
(losses) for current income is increased. 
When equity is fixed, the change in nonland input use for a change 
in the rate of capital gain (loss) or the substitutability of gains 
(losses) for current income is ambiguous. By Cramers's rule the changes 
in nonland inputs are: 
" * [pfrr. - 2|(2r'+r"#)] 
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— 8 r _ _ o3 
2 [pfxl - 2%(2r'+r"4;] 
(10-4) = [bhI 
The sign of both (10.3) and (10.4) is ambiguous. It depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the change in productivity of nonland inputs as 
acreage is changed and the change in the marginal cost of debt as debt 
use changes. Over the range of operation of commercial agriculture the 
change in productivity of nonland inputs for a change in acreage ( f^ ] 
will probably be positive. Hence, as capital gains increase (decrease) 
or the substitutability of capital gains for income increases (decreases) 
the productivity effect will tend to increase (decrease) nonland inputs 
along with acreage: 
- *pf -
 ^or > 0 for 6 > 0 2 2 
(l-T)p |BHI (l-T)p |BH 
But the productivity effect is offset by the increasing cost of debt: 
(2r' + r-J] or (Zr* + r"^ ) < for 9 > 0 O 6 i. I t y J Vt Vk ^ Vj ^
(l-T)p K|BH I (l-T)p K|BH ' ~ 
When capital losses occur, the productivity effect will tend to pull 
nonland input use down along with acreage, but this may be offset by the 
reduced debt cost as the farm business uses less cpaital and reduces 
leverage. 
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The change in debt use for changes in land appreciation rate is 
always positive if the productivity of land and nonland inputs is 
positively related ( f^  > O) . The change in debt use for a change in the 
substitutability of capital gains (losses) for current income is of the 
same sign as the land price change for f positive. By Cramer's rule: 
C10.5) If = |BH| > »• °  
——— 
(10.6) 
a* fBH] 
Equations (10.5) and (10.6) suggest that if equity is limited debt use 
will tend to increase (decrease) as farmers attempt to acquire (reduce 
use of) the appreciating (depreciating) asset. The fixed equity model , 
suggests that the increased debt use by U.S. farmers in the 1970s may 
have been in part a response to the large capital gains. It also 
suggests that the financial problems of some producers in the early 1980s 
may be in part problems of adjusting their debt use to the declining land 
prices of that period. The financial structure which was optimal in the 
period of rising land prices, may no longer be optimal in a period of 
stable or falling land prices. Government policies may affect debt use 
through the land price change (8) and substitutability of capital gains 
or losses for current income (<|)) parameters. Price support or other 
programs which increase (decrease) capital gains or the substitutability 
of those gains for current income will tend to increase (decrease) debt 
use. 
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The Lagrangian multiplier (X) may be interpreted as the value of the 
marginal unit of equity. The impact of a change in 0 on the value of 
additional equity is positive for f^  > 0. The change in the marginal 
value of equity for a change in the substitutability of capital gain or 
loss for current income is of the same sign as the land price change. 
(10.7) — = 3 • [2r'+r"^ ] [f^ B - = f T?/1 BE | > 0 
30 p [I-T)K 
(10.8) — = 2 [2r*+r"^ ] [fy^ B - = fTyJ/lBH | 
3* P [I-T)K 
Equations (10.7) and (10.8) suggest that as capital gains increase more 
equity capital would be attracted to agriculture. If total returns in 
agriculture are high relative to the rest of the economy, it is reason­
able to suppose that some of that equity would come from outside the farm 
sector. Hence, it should come as no surprise that during the 1970s some 
nonfarm corporations, pension funds and other nonfarm investors found 
agricultural investments attractive. 
Finite Planning Horizon 
For most U.S. farm families, the infinite life assumption is 
probably not very realistic. At a minimum, an explicit choice must be 
made by each generation as to whether or not to continue agricultural 
production. Even if younger family members decide to pursue farming 
careers, it is common for them to establish separate operations from 
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their parents. Hence, a finite horizon model in which the land is sold 
at the end of the planning period may be a more adequate description. Â 
more complex model might assume that at least part of the farm assets are 
passed on to the next generation, but if it is assumed that the the next 
generation would carry on conventional, commercial agriculture the farm 
asset market value at the terminal date is probably at least a rough 
measure of their value to the next generation. The finite horizon model 
may also be used to model the situation of the investor who wishes to 
sell the land and realize the gain or loss after a fixed period of time. 
In the finite horizon case, the objective must be to maximize the 
sum of the net present value of current income and the terminal or 
salvage value: 
(2») V = To e'^ T^Tdt - K + S 
= ^  l-e"^ "^ ) - K + S 
where: 
S = salvage value and 
T = terminal time. 
If it can be assumed that the farm assets are sold without liquidity 
losses the salvage value may be written as the present value of the 
equity capital returned to the owner when the farm business is dissolved 
and that of the capital gain or loss. In the wealth approach, a propor­
tion (4> ) of the capital gain or loss is recognized as current income. 
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hence a proportion (1-4)) is left to be recognized upon sale. Under U.S. 
law, realized long term capital gain is partially taxed and long term 
capital losses may be partially deducted. Because land is normally held 
for long periods, it will be assumed that all capital gains and losses 
are long term. For simplicity, it is assumed that no depreciation has 
been taken on the real estate and that the tax treatment of soil conser­
vation e^ qpense does not change the tax status of the capital gain or 
loss. In the finite horizon case, capital gains and losses must be 
modeled separately because capital gains and losses are not treated 
symmetrically in the U.S. tax system. In the case of capital gain, the 
salvage value can be written; 
(11.1) S = 
where: 
= the average tax rate at the terminal time and 
i> = the proportion of the capital gain that is taxable. 
In the case of capital losses, the limitations on use of capital loss 
deductions must be acknowledged: only one-half of the loss is deduct­
ible, if there is no short term loss the maximum annual deduction is the 
lesser of $3,000 or taxable income over the zero bracket amount and there 
is no carryback provision for capital losses on farmland. If it is 
assumed that taxable income is at least $3,000 more than the zero bracket 
amount throughout the period after the farm business is dissolved and 
that the individual lives long enough to use all the deductions, value of 
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the capital loss deduction can be modeled in continuous time as the net 
present value of the stream of deductions.. The upper bound on this 
present value calculation is the proportion of total capital loss deduct­
ible divided by the annual deduction. Hence, the salvage value would 
be: 
£ = the annual deduction limit and 
5 = proportion of the loss deductible. 
In the case of capital gains, definition (11.1) can be substituted 
into equation (2'). The objective function is then maximized subject to 
the financial constraint (4). The first order condition for land 
becomes: 
(11.2) S = + TeL(lH>) + / q ds] 
= e"P(l"'')^ [K + T9L(l-<i>) T0LS/e^ j 
where: 
+ e 
-P(1-T)T, 
( l-<j)-i|;t^)0t - bx = 0 
and the other first order conditions (6.1-6.5) are unchanged. The second 
order conditions are unchanged, except for the discounting term because 
land enters the terminal value linearly. 
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The MRS between land and nonland inputs becomes: 
(9.2)  ^= 
f {Yj+a[r-h:*|-]}(l-T) 
P(1-T)T ,1-1 
-l] 
In the denominator of the MRS (9.2), the exponential term converts the 
after tax value of capital gain realization at time T into a stream of 
payments. The exponential term is always positive. For an environment 
of land price increase (8>0), the sign of the realization term in the 
denominator depends on the tax parameters and the substitutability of 
unrealized gain for current income. As the proportion of unrealized gain 
that can be substituted for current income approaches unity, the primary 
inçact of the sale of land will be the tax liability, which would 
increase the cost of owning land and tend to offset the capital gain. 
The impact of the tax term will depend on the taxable proportion of 
capital gain (Tp) and the tax rate at the terminal date. If the exemption 
level is higher, taxes will be smaller and capital gains will tend to 
have a greater inçact on land use. If the proportion of unrealized gain 
which can be substituted for current income is small, the realization 
term tends to be positive for most parameter values and the impact of 
capital gains on land use is larger than it would be in the infinite 
horizon case. The impact of realization is always larger when the 
horizon is smaller. There may be important planning horizon differences 
between various classes of land owners. For instance, it is probable 
that for the decisions modeled here, nonfarm investors would have a 
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shorter planning horizon than a family farmer. This would be true 
because of the investor's institutional structure and liquidity needs. 
In that case, the tax parameters will have a larger impact on the 
investor than on the family farmer. It should be noted that the overall 
capital gains impact is always nonnegative and is only zero if no 
unrealized gain is substitutable for income (<j'=0) and the taxes are 
confiscatory (#T^ =1). 
The model suggests that the tendency of capital gains to encourage 
extensive land use exists under a wide variety of tax regimes. The 
effect is reduced if capital gains are fully taxed (#=1), but not 
eliminated. The effect also persists for a wide range of parameter 
values if capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis. Accrual taxation 
of gain can be modeled by dropping the tax term in the terminal value and 
subtracting from current income the accrual tax liability, the current 
capital gain multiplied by the average tax rate, (0LT). In the accrual 
case, the MRS between land and nonland inputs is: 
(g 2) fx [lf2-Hx(r+r' |)](l-T) 
["*• 2^+B(r+r*'^) ] (1-T)-8(<j)-T)-p (1-T)[e~^  ^8T(l-$] 
The tendency.of capital gains to encourage extensive land use persists as 
long as the combined value of unrealized gains substituted for current 
income and realization of gain is larger than the taxes: 
(12) <|) + pt(l-*)(l-t)[e*(^ - l]~^ > t 
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Capital gains can reduce farm acreage with accrual taxation of gain if 
the substitutability of unrealized gain for current income is small or 
the tax rate is high. 
A fixed equity version of the finite margin model can also be 
defined. The conditions for maximization are the same as for the 
variable equity model, except first order condition (6.4) is omitted and 
the second order conditions are as shown in expressions (7.1') and 
(7.2'). For the fixed equity model, the effect of the capital gains rate 
(0), the substitutability of unrealized gain for current income (<|i) and 
the taxability of capital gains (t) can be examined with formal compara­
tive statics. The system is of the same form as (10), but the second 
element on the right hand side becomes : 
13) d<J) 
-[•[ l-e"" /p (l-td9 
The changes in the decision variables for changes in these parameters are 
of the same form as equations (10.1-10.8); the first term in each expres­
sion is merely replaced with the appropriate term from (13). 
The signs of the changes with respect to changes in the capital 
gains rate and the substitutability of unrealized gain for current income 
are the same as in the infinite horizon case. The square bracketed term 
in the change in the rate of capital gain expression is the sum of two 
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noting that the term approaches a minimum of zero as the planning horizon 
becomes very short. For longer planning horizons, the term is always 
positive because the exponential term becomes small at a faster rate than 
T increases. 
For each of the decision variables, the sign of its change for a 
change in the taxability of capital gains (^ ) will be the opposite of the 
change in the tax parameter. If the exemption is increased, hence tax­
ability decreased (d^ <0), more debt and land will be used, fewer nonland 
inputs will be applied and the value of the marginal unit of equity will 
be higher. 
The case of capital losses can be examined substituting equation 
(12.2) into the objective function (2') and maximizing given the finan­
cial constraint. The first order condition for land becomes: 
. -P(1-T)T 
The other first order conditions are unchanged for (6.1-6.5). The second 
order conditions are satisfied. This can be seen by noting that the 
Hessian matrix will of the same form as (7), except that the second 
derivative of the land equation (6.2") will be the sum of the second 
derivative of the production function with respect to land and a 
nonpositive term of the form: 
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E = _^RP(L-T)TP(I_T)(86T)2 GF(L-T)8TL5/E^2 
The objective function will be negative definite if: 
(7.2') h'Hh = (h^ h^ ) a(^ ) + h^ E + h^  C < 0 
Inequality (7.2') is always satisfied under the assumptions of the model 
and hence the second order conditions are satisfied. 
The basic implications of the capital loss case can be seen by 
forming the MRS between land and nonland inputs: 
fx [y2+a(r+r'^ ) ](1-t) 
Y j+6( r+r '^ ] ] ( 1-T )-8*-( e'^  ^ ^^ -1 ) ~^ 0t( l-t-ST^ e^  ^ )T0L6/e^  
As in the infinite horizon case, the total factor cost of land is 
increased and the MRS is decreased by capital losses but the capital loss 
exemption tends to offset some of the intact of capital losses. When 
capital loss deductions are allowed the tendency of land use to become 
more intensive during periods of capital loss is reduced. The impact of 
the deduction provision depends on the annual deduction limit, the 
proportion of the loss that is deductible and the tax rate after the farm 
business is sold. If the family farm operator retires and sells his 
land, the tax rate in the retirement period is likely to be small unless 
other income producing property is owned, hence the impact of the 
39 
deduction provisions on the family farmer is likely to be small. The 
investor, on the other hand, may have a relatively high tax rate after 
selling the farm because of subsequent investment on other projects. For 
the investor, the deduction provisions are likely to be more important. 
For all decisions makers, an increase in the annual deduction limit or 
the proportion of the loss that is deductable increases the value of the 
deduction and hence tends to further offset the tendency of capital 
losses to encourage intensive farming. 
For the fixed equity case, formal comparative statics can be used to 
analyze the impact of the tax and capital gain parameters on the 
decisions variables. The system is of the same form as matrix equation 
(10), except that the second element in the second row of the Hessian 
contains term E and on the right hand side the second element is: 
13') -9 [( 1-^ "" /P ( 1-t d» 
( 1-T)IJ( ( 1-T)TL95/.J J 
-te"" 'tstt ' 1"' 1-h> ( 1-t )t9a /e ) 3 6 
. („ ( 1-x 
The signs of the changes in the decision variable depend on the signs of 
the multipliers of the differential terms in (13'). The multiplier of d<{i 
is the same as in the increasing land price finite horizon case. The 
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multiplier of d6 differs from the increasing land price finite horizon 
case because of the difference in the tax impact. Nonetheless, the 
multiplier of d6 is positive for all plausible parameter specifications. 
This can be seen by rewriting the d6 multiplier as: 
14) . e-» 
.here: „ . ( ]3e . 
Because the land price change coefficient (6) is negative, W is always 
less than or equal to one. The first term in (14) is always nonnegative 
because: 
e"^ (l"^ )T[l-p(l-T)T] < 1 for T < 
and 
- e"P^ "^^ ^^ (l-p(l-T)T) > 0 for T > 
The second term is always positive under the assumption that the tax rate 
is less than one and at most the capital loss is 100 percent deductible. 
Hence, the impact of change in the substitutability of capital losses for 
current income and the change in the rate of land price change have the 
same implications as in previously derived models. 
The sign of the multiplier for d5 depends on the magnitude of the 
capital loss, the deductibility of the loss and the limit on annual 
deductions in the term: 
1 + p(l-T)T0L6/e 
If the deductible capital loss is large conçared to the annual deduction, 
the multiplier term can be negative. This occurs because when the 
proportion of the capital loss which is deductible is increased, not only 
is the total tax deduction increased but, given a limit on annual deduc­
tions, the stream of deductions is stretched further into the future. 
Therefore, the deduction generated by the marginal unit of land or using 
the marginal unit of debt is further in the future and less valuable. 
The objective function is always increased by increasing the deduc­
tibility of losses, but the use of land or debt is not always increased 
because the optimal solution depends on the value of the marginal deduc­
tion and that may be reduced by a change in the deductibility 
proportion. 
The multiplier of dE is unambiguously positive, because the only 
negative parameter, the land price change, is squared. This implies that 
all other things equal, the optimal farm acreage and debt use will be 
higher when the annual loss deduction limit is larger. The use of 
nonland inputs relative to land is reduced when the limit is raised. The 
farm becomes a more attractive equity investment when the limit is 
increased. It should be noted that in the limit, when no annual 
constraint on deductions is imposed, the multiplier of dô is also 
unambiguously negative because the second term in goes to zero, 
indicating that an increase in deductibility has the same effect as an 
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increase in the level of exemption for capital gains (l-t|;). Because of 
discounting, the overall capital loss deduction effect is likely to be 
small; not only is the loss realized at the end of the period, but 
realization of the tax benefits of the loss is pushed even further into 
the future ly the annual limit on deductions. 
Income Approach 
The income approach to the value of unrealized capital gains is 
essentially a dynamic concept; it is hypothesized that the debt cost and 
the borrowing power of the farm firm are dependent on the accumulated 
unrealized gain at any point in time. The financial condition of the 
firm changes as capital gains accumulate. A static approximation to the 
income approach model can, however, be defined by assuming that the 
financial negotiation takes into account the gain to be realized over the 
entire period, that is the sum of accumulated and anticipated gains at 
any point. If the land price path is known, and asset levels are chosen 
initially and maintained throughout the period, the total capital gain to 
be realized in the period is known. Hence, if the debt cost function 
depends on the total unrealized gain, the integral in equation (2) can 
converge to a compact static form dependent on the initial asset levels. 
This approximation probably overstates the impact of capital gains 
because the Impact of anticipated unrealized gains is likely to be small. 
Nonetheless, the model offers insight into the Income approach implica­
tions without the mathematical complications of control theory. 
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In general, the income approach can be modeled by redefining the 
argument of the debt cost function to be debt divided by the sum of 
equity and some proportion of the unrealized gain. In terms of the 
textbook discussion of agricultural finance, the equity variable (K) can 
be thought of as net worth when assets are valued using book values, 
while the sum of equity (K) and a proportion of the unrealized gain can 
be viewed as net worth when conservative market values are used (see for 
instance Lee et al., 1980, pp. 143-144). The proportion of unrealized 
gain which is recognized in the market value net worth estimate will 
depend on selling cost, capital gains taxes and uncertainty about whether 
or not the gain will actually be realized. The views of lenders and 
their expectations about the future will have an important impact on the 
proportion of unrealized gains recognized as a substitute for invested 
equity. If the proportion of unrealized gain that is recognized is 
denoted by w, then the debt cost function can be written: 
(15) r = 
The argument of the modified debt cost function will be referred to as 
the market value leverage ratio. A pure income approach model can be 
defined by substituting debt cost (15) into the finite horizon objective 
function (2') and setting the proportion of unrealized gain substitutable 
for current income to zero (<i>=0). Mixed income and wealth approach 
models can be defined and are probably a better approximation of reality 
44 
than the pure versions, but for eigository convenience the pure income 
approach will be examined here. 
i 
In the income approach static model, the first order condition for 
land becomes: 
-p(1-T)T 
- ex - e 8T(1-*T) = 0 
The other first order conditions are unchanged except for the substitu­
tion of the modified debt cost function into equation (6.3) and (6.4). 
The second order conditions for the income approach problem may be 
examined by noting that the Hessian matrix may be partitioned and written 
as the sum of a matrix of production function derivatives and a matrix of 
debt cost derivatives: 
(7') ° H  rr t Q' C 
where: 
r = -
-p(l-T)T 
^ p(k+wetl) ^ + r' K+0)6TL 
0 
0 • DuQT i2 
k+wetl-' 
-P ( 1-T )T 
^ ~ ~ I- p(K-Ha0TL) ^ ^ ] k+w8t1/ _ ( DU0T 1 ( DCO0T f D 1 
^ K+a)0TL'^ ^ K+O30TL'' ^ K+to0TL'^ 
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The matrices A and C are as previously defined for the finite horizon 
variable equity case, except that the modified debt function argument is 
substituted into C. The matrix of production function derivative is 
negative definite under the assumption of strict concavity. The debt 
cost function matrix will be negative semidefinite if: 
(7.2'> (h^hj) r(^) 4. c(^3) < 0 
for all h is not equal to zero. 
The inequality (7.2') can be expanded and written as: 
~ ^  p(K-H«)0TL) ^   ^K+toeTL^  ^^ 2 K+wBTL ~ ^ 3 
4^ K+<u0TL^  — ® 
In equality, (7.3*) always holds under the assumption of a convex debt 
cost function. Thus, the second order conditions are satisfied. 
The optimal financial structure in the variable equity case can be 
characterized by using the first order conditions for debt and equity to 
derive an expression similar to (7): 
(8.1) P - = r + r* K+wQTL 
In theory, equation (7') could be solved for the optimal modified lever­
age ratio as a function of the discount rate. This optimal leverage 
46 
ratio would not change with changes in the rate of land price change (8) 
or in the proportion of unrealized gain that is recognized as a permanent 
addition to net worth (w), through there would be changes in the optimal 
allocation of net worth between invested equity (K) and unrealized 
capital gain. These changes in the net worth term cannot be further 
characterized without a more complete specification of the functional 
forms and parameter values. The complexity of the bordered Hessian, with 
interactions between the production function and debt cost function sub-
matrices, makes sign determination in formal conçarative statics at this 
level of generality very difficult. It can be shown that land and debt 
use rise with increases in the rate of land price appreciation or the 
recognition of unrealized gain as a permanent addition to net worth, but 
the sign of the change in equity is ambiguous. Hence, the question of 
the changes in the allocation of net worth between invested equity and 
unrealized gain in response to parameter changes cannot be explored 
without a more complex model. 
The optimal input use can be characterized by solving equations 
(6.1), (6.2") and (6.3) for the MRS between land and nonland inputs: 
(9 5) 'k+wstl^ ] ( 1-t ) 
' [^2 'kh-wbtl^-wgtr'(](1-t) 
P(l-T)[e*(l"^ )^ ' - l]"^  8T(1-*T) 
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The reduction in debt cost term: 
"etr'^rhôëtl^ 
plays the same role in equation (8.4) as the substitutability of 
unrealized capital gain for current income term (*8) played in previously 
derived MRS expressions. The reduction debt cost due to the recognition 
of unrealized capital gain in net worth offsets the costs of land owner­
ship and hence the optimal MRS is increased, indicating that more land 
tends to be used in the input mix. The income tax rate plays a more 
important role in the income approach model than in the wealth approach 
case, because the extra earnings due to reduced debt cost are taxed at 
the full rate, while unrealized gains that are substitutable for current 
income are not taxed until realization. The impact of the debt cost 
reduction due to unrealized gain is reduced by taxation. The impact of 
deferral and partial exemption of capital gains from taxation is 
unchanged from the wealth approach model. 
The fixed equity income approach model can also be defined. It can 
be analyzed with formal comparative statics on the system: 
(9') 
* f —Ot-x 
a + :& q (_«) 
* 
C 1 
[-a—3) 1 0 
0 
3X 0 
3L 
3D 
= 
3X 0 
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where: 
* 
C 
* Q = 
^ ^  vjj.ifltt j K-HoeiL'' 
-p (1-T) 
[lis- ] r'/ei 
For relatively modest amounts of total unrealized gain, unambiguous signs 
can be determined for the changes in land and debt use in response to a 
change in the amount of unrealized gain recognized as a permanent 
addition to net worth. By Cramer's rule: 
The change in land for a change in the proportion of unrealized gain 
recognized as an addition to net worth is always positive under the 
assumptions of the model when the original land price is greater than the 
capital gain multiplied by the leverage ratio: 
(16) e  > 
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Because agricultural lenders are often reluctant to lend more money to a 
farm business than the owner has invested" in it (Barry, Hopkin and Baker, 
1983) it is unlikely that the planned leverage rates would be greater 
than one. Thus, inequality (16) implies that equation (10.1') is usually 
positive for cases in which the land price does not more than double 
during the planning period. Equation (10.1') may be positive for larger 
amounts of capital gain. Only the multiplier of in the second term 
can become negative with large amounts of gain. But clear sign determin­
ation is not possible for large amounts of unrealized gain without 
additional specification of functional forms and parameter magnitudes. 
The determinate of the bordered Hessian can be written: 
and is known to be negative for all parameter values under the assumption 
of a strictly concave production function. This is because the first 
term in second derivatives is the Hessian determinate for the production 
function and the second term in production producton function second 
derivatives is a quadratic expansion of the same Hessian; both terms in 
the production function derivatives must be negative under the assumed 
concavity. 
d0t • 
k+w0tl' 
d0t ^ 2 
K+weTL-' 
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The change in debt use for a change in the proportion of unrealized 
gain recognized as net worth is also positive for modest amounts of gain. 
By Cramer's rule: 
~ k-wbil^ ~ rfûërl^^xl 
+ - *gfxl]}/|bai 
Equations (10.1') and (10.5') suggest that in many ways the impacts of 
recognizing a portion of unrealized gains as additions to net worth are 
like those of substituting a portion of the unrealized gain for current 
income. In both cases, the effective cost of land ownership is reduced, 
more land is used and in the fixed equity case the firm becomes more 
highly leveraged to acquire that land. The signs of changes in nonland 
input use and the marginal value of equity 0^ ) cannot be clearly 
determined without further functional form and parameter magnitude 
specifications, but for a wide range of parameter values the tendency of 
capital gains to encourage extensive farming and to increase the value of 
equity capital is maintained. Because 9 and always appear together in 
the comparative statics of changes in the rate of land price appreciation 
are of exactly the same form as expression (7'), (10.1') and (10.5'), 
except that equations in (10.1'), (10.5') and the right hand side of (7') 
are multiplied through by w/8. An income approach model for capital loss 
environment could also be defined in which the unrealized losses offset 
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the investment equity capital and reduce the denominator of the debt cost 
function argument. In that case, the loss would increase the cost of 
land ownership ly increasing the cost of debt. The capital losses would 
tend to result in smaller optimal farm size and less debt use. 
Two Output Static Model 
A yet unanswered question is does the presence of capital gains have 
an intact on the choice of outputs. In its sinçlest form, this question 
may be examined by modifying the Lagranglan expression 5) to include a 
second concave production function g(X, L) representing an alternative 
enterprise. Let be variables related to the original produc­
tion function and Pg, X2 » 2^ variables related to this new production 
function. It is assumed that input use for the two enterprises is 
Independent; the same input cannot be used for both enterprises. The 
Lagranglan expression becomes: 
(5') Max Z - Lj + P^ S^ X^ , L^ ) - (x^  + X^ ) 
- + l^) - r(^) d] (1-t] 
+ oelfl^+l^]} + x[k + d - =[x^ + x^] - b(l^ + l^)] 
The first order conditions for maximization of this problem are of the 
same form as before, with two added equations because of the allocation 
of inputs between outputs. The second order conditions are also 
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satisfied ly this model. The Hessian is a block diagonal matrix with a 
third negative definite submatrix along the diagonal. 
The significant implication of this two output model can be seen in 
the marginal rates of substitution of the inputs for both outputs. 
Because the input costs are the same for both outputs, the MRS must both 
be equal to the factor cost ratio: 
Sx {^1 +-[r + r' |]} (i-t) 
(9.6) — = — = 
^^2 "*• + r' -^]} (1-t) - *8 
Both the marginal rates of substitution for the f and g production 
functions, MRSf and MRSg, will be larger than is traditionally the case 
because of the presence of capital gains. If one production function has 
a lower marginal product of land, the output and use of land in the pro­
duction of that commodity will be curtailed relative to the production 
and acreage of the other commodity, when capital gains are recognized in 
the decision making process. For instance, assume g describes the pro­
duction of fruit and vegetables such that at some relatively small amount 
of land g becomes small conpared to g , that is the marginal product of 
land becomes small compared to the marginal product of other inputs such 
as equipment, labor, pesticides. Assume f describes the production of 
grain; the marginal product of land in grain production can remain 
relatively high even if substantial amounts of land are already in use. 
Under these conditions, MRSg would be equal to the factor cost ratio at 
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some low level of land input, but a much larger level of land input would 
be required to equate MRSf and the factor cost ratio. 
As capital gains increase, the factor cost ratio increases and the 
output which lends itself to land extensive production assumes a larger 
share of the output mix. It may be the case for some levels of capital 
gain and some production functions, that the land input for g must be 
made so small to achieve equality (9.6) that for practical purposes the 
production of output 2 drops out of the model. It should be noted that 
the model does not suggest that the most land extensive output is always 
favored. It does not suggest that high capital gains would lead cornbelt 
farmers to seed their fields to grass and graze sheep. Rather it 
indicates that the favored output in the presence of capital gains is one 
in which the production process is relatively land extensive and the 
marginal product of land remains relatively high even when the firm uses 
large amounts of land. For capital loss, the opposite effect occurs and 
enterprise choice tends toward land intensive options. 
The two output models may partially explain the movement away from 
land intensive crops in Midwest farming. For example, at the turn of the 
century Iowa was a major producer of fruits and vegetables, but today the 
amount of these products grown in the state is miniscule, even though 
economic research indicates that the current returns from producing such 
products exceeds returns from common grain crops (Calkins and Weimar, 
1984, pp. 29-30; Kirschling and Sullivan, 1979). The explanation in 
terms of the model presented here is that fruit and vegetable production 
is not part of the optimal solution for most Iowa farmers because its 
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land intensiveness reduces the possibility for earning capital gains. 
For instance, if a Midwestern producer with a given amount of equity and 
labor resources could choose between a 300 acre grain farm and a 40 acre 
fruit and vegetable operation, and both options had the same current net 
income from production, the grain farm would be favored because it has 
the greater potential for capital gains. As a result of the capital gain 
pressure for extensive farming, fruit and vegetable production occurs 
primarily in those locations, such as California, where climate, soil 
type, transportation cost and other factors allow productivity large 
enough to overcome the capital gains advantage of extensive farming. The 
model suggests that the interest shown in intensive crops by some 
Midwestern farmers and farm groups or agencies may be related to the 
falling farmland prices. 
Dynamic Model, Wealth Approach 
If the level of input use and financial structure is allowed to 
change over time, the integral equation (2) no longer converges to a 
contact static form and optimization requires use of dynamic mathematical 
methods, such as optimal control theory. In addition, the mechanism of 
input and financial adjustment become important in a dynamic environment. 
In particular, the model must be modified to show new investment and 
retained earnings. For most U.S. farmers, the equity invested in the 
farm firm will change primarily because of retained earnings, further 
investment by the farmer from nonfarm sources or withdrawals by the 
farmer. This route for changing equity can be incorporated into the 
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model by subtracting an investment term from the current after-tax 
return. Let this term be denoted u^^. When u^^ is positive and less 
than current income, it indicates retained earnings which reduce income 
flow to the owner for the period. When u^^ is greater than current 
income, the net stream to the owners is negative indicating net 
investment in the business by the owners from nonfarm wealth. When u^^ 
is negative, dissaving is occurring. The simpliest model does not place 
restraint on u^^; the rate of investment or dissaving may be any real 
number. A more complex model would allow the owners to maximize their 
net worth by attracting outside partners or investors, but since this 
would involve issues of timing the outside investment and the return to 
those investors, it is omitted from this simple model. 
The land purchase and sale transactions could be modeled in several 
ways. The most realistic model would allow land to be sold at any time 
and a major part of the optimization problem in that case would be the 
optimal selling time. Such a model would pose a major recordkeeping 
problem. The purchase price and area acquired in each increment would 
have to be recorded separately to calculate the capital gain or loss. 
Part of the selling problem might include the order of tract sales; for 
instance, for tax purposes it might be best to sell the land with the 
least accumulated capital gain first. Such a model would be very complex 
and unwieldy for analytical purposes. To simplify the situation, the 
static model assumption that land is sold only at the end of the planning 
period is used in the dynamic model. This reduces the recordkeeping 
problem because only the cumulative capital gain has to be known at the 
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end of the period, not the gain at each increment. This assumption 
implies that no land is sold during the planning period, but additional 
I 
land may be acquired. In a deterministic model with no unexpected finan­
cial reversals, the exclusion of land sales is probably not an unrealis­
tic approximation of farmland ownership behavior. The basic dynamic 
model can be thought of as the situation of the family farmer who buys 
land with the intention of holding it at least until retirement. This 
model is a traditional view of farmland ownership motives, in that it 
excludes purely speculative land buying. The basic model will concern 
itself with only one generation; all the land will be sold at the end of 
the period. A later section will show how the model can be extended to 
the multigenerational case and to include more speculative activity. 
This formulation avoids the question of optimal selling time and selling 
order of tracts, but still captures many important aspects of U.S. 
farmland markets, in which farm entry and exit transactions are a major 
part. 
Because land prices are changing the financial constant must also be 
modified. The amount of capital absorbed by land is no longer the market 
price multiplied by the area (BL), but rather the sum of the purchase 
prices. The difference between the current market value of the land and 
the sum of the purchase prices is the unrealized capital gain; hence, the 
capital absorbed by land can be expressed as the difference between the 
current market price and the unrealized gain. 
The financial constraint then can be written: 
(4*) - ax^ - = 0 
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where: = accumulated unrealized capital gain or loss. 
The t subscript is used on variables - and parameters that may change 
over time. The same constraint can be expressed as the time derivative 
of equation (4*) and the initial conditions on the levels of the input 
and financial variables. 
(4") - aXj. - 6^1^ - = 0 
Kq = K(0), DQ = D(0), XQ = X(0), LQ = L(0), G^ = L(0) 
The dot notation is used to indicate the derivative with respect to time. 
In this section, the land price path is assumed to be smooth and non-
decreasing with continuous first and second derivatives. The general­
ization of the model to other land price paths will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. For expositional convenience, it is assumed that 
the only parameter which changes over time is the land price. Models in 
which additional parameters change are notationally more complex but 
conceptually identical to the model developed here. Under the assumption 
that no land is sold during the planning period, the change in unrealized 
gain is: 
(17) O, -Vt 
By substituting term (17) into equation (4") and solving for , the 
constraint can be expressed in a form convenient for the control theory 
problem: 
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(4"') + aXj. -
The control problem for the wealth approach in the case of 
increasing land prices can be expressed by subtracting the investment 
control variable from the current income term and defining control 
variables for the change in land use (ug^) and the change in nonland 
inputs («3^]: 
(2") Max Z = /J 
d 
- - r[—(1-T) - dt 
+ (l-<),-tt)g^] - kq + e 
A 
't 
-P (1—T )Tr 
S.t. 
( 2 . 1 )  
(2.2) l^=u2, u2, >0 
(2.3) 
(2.4) + augc " «it 
(2.5) Gj. = 
Kq = K(0), DQ = D(0), LQ = L(0), Xg = X(0), = G(0) 
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The Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
(18)  h = lj - yjxj. - t^lt " \] (1-^) 
+ ^ ,.(6 4tl»c"2c * ""st 
where = the adjoint variables 
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Because the control variables enter linearly, the solution to this 
problem will entail some mix of bang-bang and singular control. When the 
control variables enter linearly, the usual Pontryagin necessary 
conditions do not provide information about the optimal control because 
no control variables appear in the optimality conditions and hence it is 
not possible to solve for the optimal control in the usual way. The 
problem is called singular because the matrix of second derivatives of 
the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variables is a singular; null 
matrix. To cope with this problem, several researchers have examined the 
second variation of the singular problem for further necessary and 
sufficient conditions. This study will make use of the Generalized 
Legendre-Clebsch necessary condition developed by such researchers as 
Kelley, Kop and Moyer (1967), and Goh (1966). Several sufficiency 
theorems have been developed for specific subsets of the singular control 
problem (Jacobson and Speyer, 1971 or McDanell and Powers, 1971), but 
general sufficiency theorems which include the case of mixed bang-bang 
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singular control are not well-developed. Arguments for the optimality of 
the controls suggested by the necessary conditions are presented below. 
Nonnegativity constraints on the state variables , 
Gj.) have not been explicitly imposed because of the complexity of 
optimality conditions with pure state variable constraints, and because 
the singular control results used in this study have not been extended to 
the case of pure state variable path constraints. For many control 
problems, not only singular problems, it is often more efficient to 
initially solve the problem without the nonnegativity constraints and to 
implement them explicitly only if they are violated in the optimal 
solutions (Kamien and Schwartz, p. 215). 
The usual necessary conditions are (Kamien and Schwartz, p. 133): 
(19.1) ||- = (1-T) 
(19.2) [(Pf^-Yz) (!-?)+&[+*] + 
(19.3) ||-= [Pf^-Yj)(l-T) 
(19.4) ||-= (r+r'^](l-T) 
t t 
61 
^ " ^31: * °^4t - ° 
with the transversality conditions that as time approaches the terminal 
time the following conditions must hold: 
(20 .1)  
(20.2) x^t = 0 
(20.3) = 0 
(20.4) X,^ = 0 
4T 
(20.5) X^^ = (1-4)-# 
The optimal control scheme implied by these necessary conditions is bang-
bang and singular: 
- " i f  +  X ^ ^  -  <  0  
(12.1) ^ singular if + X^^ - X^^ = 0 
+ « if - V > ° 
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" " St " \\t < 0 
(12.2) = < singular if = 0 
* - " st " Wt > 0 
if < 0 
(12.3) u^^ = < singular if Xg^ + aX^^ = 0 
+ " if X^j. + aX^^ > 0 
The adjoint variables can be interpreted as the value of the 
marginal unit of the state variable (Kamien and Schwartz, 1981, p. 125). 
they can be characterized by integrating equations (19.1-19.5) and 
evaluating the constants with the transversality conditions. The adjoint 
variable for equity capital (X^^) can be written as: 
St = -•'5 (l-T)ds 4. c 
s 
where: s = variable of integration. 
Using the transversality condition (20.1), the constant can be 
evaluated: 
C - ijj •» /J (l-T)ds 
8 
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and hence the adjoint variable can be characterized as the discounted 
value over the remaining time horizon of the marginal reduction in 
interest payments due to an additional unit of equity, plus the 
discounted value of the capital withdrawn from the farm business at the 
end of the planning period: 
(22.1) = /J r'C&)^ (l-T)ds + 
s 
Using the same procedure the adjoint variables for land, nonland input, 
and debt can be characterized: 
(22.2) x^t = /t [(pf^-y^jcl-t) + bg+]ds 
+ _ g J (l-*-*T) 
(22.3) = ft (Pf^-Yj)(l-T)ds 
(22.4) X^^ = - /c + r'^] (l-T)ds 
s 
The adjoint variable for land can be characterized as the discounted 
value of the current marginal value product of land over the remaining 
horizon plus the after tax value of selling the land at the end of the 
horizon. Under the assumptions of the wealth approach, the current 
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marginal value product of land includes both income from production and a 
portion of the capital gain. The adjoint, variable for nonland inputs can 
be characterized as the discounted value of the marginal value product of 
nonland inputs over the remaining horizon. The adjoint variable for debt 
can be characterized as the discounted value of the marginal cost of debt 
over the remaining horizon. The adjoint variable for unrealized capital 
gain can be characterized by noting that equation (19.5) indicates that 
it is a constant and the transversality condition shows that the constant 
is 
(22,5) (1-4»-#) 
Equation (22.5) shows that the marginal value of unrealized capital gain 
in the model is simply its addition to the terminal value. 
By substituting equations (22.1) and (22.4) into (21.1), it can be 
seen that the investment decision depends on whether or not the marginal 
cost of added equity is greater than or less than the marginal cost of 
debt over the remaining horizon for the candidate investment path: 
^-p(l-T)t _ ^-P(1-T)T _ JT ^-P(l-T)s (^A)2 
s 
I [r + r'^) (l-T)ds 
s 
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If either inequality holds at any point the rate of investment or dis­
investment approaches infinity and instantaneously adjusts the level of 
equity to the point where the quality can hold. The inequalities will be 
relevant only in the initial instant of the problem; if the starting 
value is not at the optimal levels they will be instantaneously adjusted. 
After that initial adjustment, the change in investment and all other 
changes in the model are driven fay the change in land prices. In this 
model with a smooth land price path, the path of investment will also be 
smooth and singular after the initial adjustment. The singular control 
paths for all the state variables are derived below. 
By substituting equations (22.2) and (22.4) into (21.2), it can be 
seen that the land purchase decision depends on whether or not the 
marginal return from land over the remaining horizon in terms of income 
from production and capital gain is greater or less than the financial 
cost of owning that marginal unit of land: 
If the marginal return from land is greater than the financial cost of 
ownership, the rate of land acquisition will approach infinity and the 
level of land ownership will instantaneously be brought up to the level 
which enables the marginal returns over the remaining horizon to exactly 
match the marginal financial cost. In determining the initial adjustment 
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marginal returns along optimal singular and bang-bang arcs are used. 
Under the assumptions of the model land purchases will be zero if the 
marginal returns from land are less than the financial cost. As in the 
case of investment, the instantaneous adjustment will apply only at the 
initial instant. After the initial adjustment, changes in land use will 
be a smooth singular control path driven by the land price change. 
By substituting equations (22.3) and (22.4) into (21.3) it can be 
seen that the nonland input acquisition decision depends on whether or 
not the marginal return from nonland inputs is greater or less than the 
financial cost of using those inputs over the remaining horizon: 
jt i ojt . ri)(l-t)ds 
S 
Like the investment decision, the nonland input acquisition will be 
characterized by an initial instantaneous adjustment to the optimal 
level, with a smooth singular path thereafter. 
Expressions for the singular optimal control paths can be derived by 
repeatedly differentiating with respect to time the derivatives of the 
Hamiltonian with respect to the controls (Bryson and Ho, 1975, Chapter 
8). The differentiation with respect to time is repeated until the 
control variables appear explicitly. These time derivatives can also be 
used to derive expressions showing the financial and input structure of 
the optimal solutions. The financial structure can be characterized by 
differentiating equation (19.6) with respect to time and substituting in 
equation (19.1) and (19.4): 
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(8.2) (1-T)  (P -
— r - r 
This condition implies that along the optimum singular path equation (8) 
holds and the marginal cost of equity equal the marginal costs of debt. 
If the debt cost function were specified, equation (8.2) could be solved 
for the leverage ratio as a function of the discount rate. 
Optimal singular controls 
The fixed leverage ratio implies that along the singular arc equity 
investment and acquisition of new debt stand in a constant relationship. 
This relationship can be shown by differentiating the leverage ratio with 
respect to time: 
The derivative of the leverage ratio with respect to time must be zero 
because the leverage ratio is a constant. By solving equation (23.1) 
simultaneously with equations (2.1) and (2.4), it can be shown that the 
capital requirements of new land and nonland input acquisitions are 
divided between debt and equity according to the optimal debt and equity 
proportions: 
D 
(23.2) u 
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t t 
The marginal value product of land along the singular arc can be 
characterized by differentiating equation (19.7) with respect to time, 
and substituting in equations (19.2), (19.4) and (22.5): 
(24.1) Pf (1-T) = H-+[S^-E^(L-E"P^^"'^^^^~'^^)/P(L-T)](R+R'^)}(L-T) 
L /  T- C 
In defining the marginal value product, the integral in the expression 
for the cost of debt adjoint variable (20.3) has been solved as: 
r4 
X = [ Ç_] [i_g-P(l-T)(T-t)T 
4t p J >• J 
This solution is possible because of the constant leverage ratio. 
The right hand side of equation (24.1) is simply the cost of using 
land and thus this expression is a version of the conventional economic 
result that at the optimum the after tax marginal value product should 
equal the after tax cost of using the input. The cost of using land is 
affected by the capital gains through the reduction in finance costs by 
buying now instead of later: 
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i, (1 _ (, » r'fçj/p 
t 
the capital gain that is substitutable for current income and the 
realized gain term: 
Under model assumptions in an environment of capital gain these terms 
reduce the costs of land ownership. The impact of capital gain on the 
cost of using land is enhanced if a higher proportion of gain is substi­
tutable for current income (<)>), the capital gains tax exemption (1-t), is 
greater, or the decision maker is nearer to the terminal date. 
The marginal value product of nonland inputs along the singular arc 
can be characterized by differentiating equation (19.8) with respect to 
time and substituting in equations (19.3) and (19.4): 
D 
(24.2) Pf^(l-T) = [t^ + a(r + r' ^ )](1-t) 
By dividing (24.2) by (24.1) an expession for the marginal rate of sub­
stitution of land for nonland inputs at each point on the singular arc 
can be derived: 
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(9.7) 
dr 
)](r+r '^)}(1-t) 
t 
The MRS is of the usual Vickers' form including the financial costs of 
ownership. The MRS of the dynamic wealth approach model differs from the 
static model MRS (equation 9.1) in that it includes the reduction in land 
cost achieved by buying now instead of later. This strengthens the 
impact of land price increases on the input mix. As in the static model, 
the MRS will be larger when capital gains are larger, indicating that 
more land will be used and farming will be more extensive when capital 
gains occur. 
The dynamic model, like the static version, is sensitive to the size 
of the proportion of capital gain that can be substituted for current 
income (*). If that proportion is small, the capital gain effect will be 
smaller. The realized gain effect can occur, however, even without the 
substitutability of capital gains for income. If the decision maker is 
relatively close to the terminal time or if the discount rate is small, 
the realization of gain at the end of the period can have a substantial 
effect. If the model is viewed as representing the career of a single 
farmer, it suggests that age may have a significant impact on the input 
choices. As the terminal time grows nearer, the impact of capital gain 
realization grows larger and more land is incorporated in the input mix. 
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This is consistent with the observation that a high proportion of 
farmland is in the hands of older, established farmers. The age effect 
will be examined further in the multigenerational model, but is should be 
noted that if the problem (2") is seen as a representation of several 
generations of a farm family and the terminal date is far in the future, 
then the MRS approaches its static form and gain realization has no 
effect. The time to the terminal date affects the impact of the capital 
gain exemption. If the realization gain is relatively close, the exemp­
tion can substantially increase returns to land and increase the optional 
land use. As T becomes large the exemption becomes less important. The 
impact of government programs and other factors that may affect the 
proportion of gain that is substitutable for income is the same as in the 
static model. 
By differentiating (24.1) and (24.2) with respect to time and 
substituting in equation (2.2) and (2.3), two equations in the land and 
nonland input control variables are derived: 
(25.1) fLL'^2t ^LX"3t^ (1-"^) - ^(l-<{i-ipT) 
^ ( l  -
+ b^[[r+r'fçj[l+e-p(l-?)(t-t)(l-t)-p(l-t)e-*(l-t)(t- = 0 
t 
C25.2) - P[£^„3^ . (1-T) = 0 
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Solving equations 25.1) and (25.2) simultaneously for the control 
yields: 
(17) u^^ = F[ê^M - BJ.N] 
where: 
F =  
p(l-t)(f^^f^-f^ ) 
m = [(r+r'fl)[l+e-p(l-t)(t-c))_pe-»(l-t)(t-t)(l-4_$t)](l_t) 
kt 
(r+r'^l] 
n = $ + + 1- [l_e-p(l-t)(t-t)] 
"3t - ^  "2t 
Equation (26.1) indicates that land will be purchased only if the change 
in the return to land ownership, composed of the part of the capital gain 
that is substitutable for current income, the gain that is recognized 
upon realization and the reduction in financial cost, is greater than the 
change in the financial cost. The second term in M and all of term X 
represent the benefits of capital gains. The first term in M reflects 
the increased financial cost of and ownership when the land price rises. 
The multiplier (F) of the land use cost and return term is always 
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negative under the assumptions of the model because the denominator is 
simply the determinant of the matrix of second derivatives of the produc­
tion function multiplied by the after tax return price of output. Under 
the assumption of strict concavity this determinant must be positive and 
the second derivative of the production function with respect to nonland 
inputs must be negative. The after tax price of output will usually be 
positive. Land acquisition requires the difference in brackets in (26.1) 
to be negative; clearly this is more likely if the land price is 
increasing at an increasing rate . 
Like the decision on the level of land use, the land purchase 
decision is sensitive to the proportion of capital gain which can be 
substituted for current income. If the parameter (tj)) is larger, the 
change in returns to land ownership are larger and purchase will be 
larger. However, even if the parameter (<^) is zero, capital gains can 
have an effect. Likewise, if the capital gain exemption(l-'p) is larger, 
the value of realized gain will be larger and the rate of land acquisi­
tion will be larger for a finite terminal date. Equation (26.2) 
indicates that the nonland input purchase decisions depends on how the 
productivity of those inputs changes with increased land area per farm. 
If the marginal product of nonland inputs increases rapidly as land 
increases, acquisition of nonland inputs will be greater. It should be 
noted that because all the costs and returns of nonland inputs are taxed 
equally, the tax rate does not directly affect the nonland input purchase 
but only through the land purchase decision. Taxes are, however, an 
important factor in the land purchase decision primarily because of the 
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capital gain exemption and the fact that unrealized gain is not taxed. 
The effect of the tax rate is complex because it appears in every term in 
the land purchase equation and in some terms more than once, but it is 
clear that a higher tax rate increases the importance of the capital gain 
exemption in the land purchase decision. 
Junction conditions 
According to the work on junctions between singular and nonsingular 
arcs by McDanell and Powers (1970), the junction between the initial 
adjustments and the singular control arc should be discontinuous for 
equity debt and nonland input controls, and for the case in which the 
nonsingular land control is positive. Their theorem 3 states that if the 
second time derivative of H (the derivative of the Hamiltonian with 
u 
respect to the control variable) is not equal to zero on the nonsingular 
side of the junction, then control must be discontinuous (p. 166). 
Because it is likely that equations (25.1), (25.2) and the time deriva­
tive of financial structure equation (8.2) will be nonzero during the 
initial adjustment when state variables are changing rapidly, the 
conditions of this theorem will be met in most cases. This theorem does 
not require the control on the nonsingular side of the junctions to have 
well-defined derivatives and therefore applies to the case of instantan­
eous adjustment on the nonsingular side. Hence, the discontinuous 
control path described earlier, in which the control is at one instant 
approaching negative or positive infinity and at the next instant is part 
of a smooth, finite singular control path, fits the theoretical 
requirements for optimality. 
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In Che case of the land control at its lower bound either at the 
initial instant or otherwise, McDanell and Powers (1970) suggest that the 
junction may be either a jump discontinuity or continuous with a 
continuous first derivative (p. 165). This result is based on their 
theorem 1 which requires the control to be differential around the 
junction. The continuous junction is likely for most plausible parameter 
specifications. This is true because the MRS in equation (9.7) 
characterizes the optimal level of land and nonland inputs and it changes 
smoothly with land price changes. The control equations (26.1) and 
(26.2) are simply the relationships which will maintain the optimal MRS. 
If the MRS cannot reach the optimal level, because the initial level of 
land holding was above the optimal level or for some other reason, the 
MRS will change smoothly because the land price, which is the only 
parameter which changes in Che MRS equation, changes smoothly. If Che 
MRS is not optimal, but is approaching optimality it will approach it 
smoothly; ac Che juncCion poinC the time derivative of Che denominaCor of 
Che MRS will be zero and Che singular conCrol equaCion will take over 
smoothly. This scenario might occur if the capital gain in the early 
part of the planning period was small and the initial land holding was 
relatively large, but later in the planning period large capital gains 
occur. In this case Che MRS (9.7) would indicaCe a relatively modesC 
land holding during Che firsC pare of Che planning period, perhaps 
smaller than the initial holding, so no land acquisitions would be made 
at first. Later, when the capital gains increase, a larger land holding 
may be justified and land purchases would be made. 
76 
It should be noted that after the initial adjustment when no land 
purchases are being made the MRS between land and nonland inputs is a 
constant defined at the relationship which allows equation (24.2) to hold 
for the fixed land level. Essentially, the model is optimizing the use 
of nonland inputs for a given acreage in this case. Because the 
parameters of equation (24.2) are constant, the chosen nonland input 
level is maintained until the acreage changes. In addition, because 
input levels are not changing equations (23.2) and (23.3) suggest that 
debt and equity levels are unchanged while no land purchases are being 
made. 
The ordinary Legendre-Clebsch necessary condition which requires the 
matrix of second derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to the 
controls to be negative semidefinite for maximization is satisfied 
trivially throughout the problem. The second order matrix is everywhere 
a null matrix because of the linear entry of the controls- The 
generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition is meaningfully satisfied. Tliis 
condition requires that the matrix of the derivatives of equations (25.1) 
and (25.2) and the time derivative of equation (8.3) with respect to the 
control be positive semidefinite (Bryson and Ho, p. 258): 
h 2 0, for all hjÉ 0. 
In this problem, equation (27.1) take simple form because terms including 
the control variables cancel out of the time derivative of equation 
(8.3) along the singular path. For this problem, the generalized 
(27.1) h' 
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Legendre-Clebsch condition is: 
(26.2) h* 3 
3^ 
h = h' 
0 0 
0 -A 
h > 0 
The matrix A is as defined in the static model except that the discount 
term (p/p) is replaced by [p(1-T)e"^ A must be negative semi-
definite under the assumption of strict concavity. Hence, the general­
ized Legendre-Clebsch condition is satisfied everywhere along the 
singular arc, including the endpoints. 
Argument for optimality of the necessary conditions 
Because formal mathematical sufficiency arguments for the mixed 
singular and bang-bang control problem are not well-developed, an 
informal argument for the optimality of the control scheme suggested by 
the necessary conditions will be presented. It will be based on the 
subject matter reasonableness of the control solution. A common formula­
tion of the control theory sufficiency condition states that if the 
Hamiltonian is concave when evaluated at the optimal adjoint and control 
varaibles, then the necessary conditions are also sufficient. Concavity 
of the Hamiltonion requires the matrix of second derivatives with respect 
to the state variables to be negative definite. Except for the discount 
terms the matrix of second derivatives can be partitioned and written in 
the same form as the static model Hessian (7.1). Thus, the concavity of 
the Hamiltonian can be shown by the arguments of the same form as those 
used for sufficiency of the simple static model. 
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The problem is then reduced to questioning the optimality of the 
singular control scheme. The bang-bang controls fit well into usual 
sufficiency conditions. If the control variables were more tightly 
bounded and the parameters and functional specification was such that the 
entire control path was bang-bang, such a control scheme would be 
considered to satisfy the sufficient conditions for optimality. For the 
singular control scheme to be optimal, it must at least maintain the 
equalities in equations (27.1-3). Given the optimal adjoint variables 
there is only one singular control solution that satisfies this require­
ment, the solution given by equations (23.2, 26.1-2). 
The alternative to the singular control would be some sort of 
solution that allowed the controls to "chatter" between the upper and 
lower bounds. Based on knowledge of the farm operations and economic 
reasoning this "chattering" solution is an unlikely candidate for 
optimality. For instance, in the case of nonland inputs a chattering 
solution would mean that large quantities of inputs would be acquired in 
one instant and disposed of the next instant, and this pattern would 
continue through extended periods. Though in the absence of adjustment 
cost a chattering solution cannot be entirely ruled out, it is hard to 
see any economic rationale for such a solution. The overall control 
solution is made more plausible by the fact that it brings the state 
variables to levels at which the marginal costs of all sources of capital 
are equal and the marginal return from inputs is equal to their marginal 
cost, and then maintains those relationships inasmuch as that is possible 
with the assumption of no land sales. The fact that the costs and 
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returns include capital gains and effects over time goes beyond the usual 
static results, but is not inconsistent with them. Hence, the control 
scheme defined here is a promising candidate for optimality. A numerical 
solution of the problem is being conducted with dynamic programming that 
will further test the optimality of the proposed control solution. 
The multigenerational problem 
If it is assumed that each generation solves a problem like (2") 
given some initial endowment passed from the previous generation and the 
objective is to maximize the net present value of income, then an overall 
solution can be analyzed using dynamic programming arguments. The 
dynamic programming principle of optimality states: 
The best path from A to B has the property that, whatever the 
initial decision at A, the remaining path to B starting from the 
next point after A, must be the best path from that point to B 
(Dreyfus, 1965, p. 3). 
The principle of optimality is implemented by maximizing the sum of the 
present periods returns and the present value over the remaining horizon 
given the choices in the present period. In this context, the recurrence 
relation would be problem (2") plus the optimal solution for all the 
generations after the one being considered given the level of assets 
passed from the generation being considered to the next one. 
Essentially, this means that the terminal value term must be modified to 
account for the value of the terminal assets to future generations. For 
expository purposes, a two generational model will be considered. More 
generations would simply mean a more complicated terminal value term 
added to problem (2"). With a positive discount rate and relatively long 
generational period, the two generation model will capture almost all of 
the net present value information. 
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Under the assumptions of problem (2") all assets were sold at the 
end of the generation's planning period and equity capital was returned 
to the owner of the farm business. With these assumptions the genera­
tions are independent; no assets are passed on to the next generation and 
hence the value of terminal assets have no importance for the decisions 
of the future generations. If this assumption is changed so that only a 
portion of the terminal assets are sold after the first generation, then 
the terminal value function could be written: 
(28) g-P(l-T)C{^^ + uG^d-i»-#) + V[(1-UK^, (l-vJ)D^, 
(l-«)3t^, (l-^)l^, (l^)g^]} 
where 
u = the proportion of assets retained by the first generation and 
V(*) = the present value of the assets passed on to the next 
generation. 
The proportion (u ) could differ between asset types, but for simplicity 
the same proportion is used for all assets. The proportion is assumed to 
be a constant that depends on the desire of the decision maker to make a 
bequest to the next generation. The exact functional form of V(*) will 
depend on the forms specified for the production and debt cost functions, 
but the first derivatives of V(*) can be defined. These derivatives 
simply express the marginal value of each asset at the initial point of 
the second generation and are equal to the adjoint variables for the 
second generation evaluated at that initial point. If the terminal value 
function (28) is used in problem (2") the necessary conditions remain 
unchanged and the transversality conditions become: 
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(20.1') + (1-u) e-P(l-T)s ^,[%2 (l-T)ds 
IT T, '•K 
• 1 s 
-P(1-T)T 
+ e 
(20.2') = (1-u) {// g-p(l-t)s + 4gg]ds 
1 L 2' 
-P(1-T)T 
+ e (B - 6 )(l-*-*T)} 
^2 ^1 
(20.3') ^3^ = (1-u) e 2 -p ( 1-T ) s (Pf^-Yj)(l-T)ds 
(20.4') = - (1-u) g-P(l-T)s + r':^] (1-T)d£ 
-P(1-T)T -P(1-T)T-
(20.5') Xç^ = u(l-*-*T) e ^ + (l-u)(l-*-*T)e 
where: 
= the terminal time for the first generation and 
= the terminal time for the second generation. 
This formulation assumes that the land is sold in such a way that the 
amount of the capital gain realized is the same proportion of total 
unrealized gain as the land sold is a proportion of the total land owned 
at the terminal date. In addition, it is assumed that the first genera­
tion's income tax basis for the land passed on to the heirs becomes the 
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basis for the second generation. This model omits the question of estate 
or gift taxes and their effect on the income tax basis. The transvers­
al ity conditions could then be used in defining the optimal adjoint 
variables for the multigenerational problem. For instance, the adjoint 
variable for land becomes: 
(22.2' + gg*]ds 
+ (1-u) jj- _Y ](!_?) + ]ds 
" fl 2^ 
—p ( 1—T ) T. 
+ u(l-$-#T)(g -6 ] e 
h 
-P(1-T)T  
+ (l-u)(l-$-$T)(6 "8 J e 
-P(1-T)T  
+ (l-*-fr)[B -6 J e 
^2 ^1 
In the multigenerational model, both current income and capital gains 
from the second generation affect the input choices in the first. When 
the adjoint variables defined with equations (22.1'-22.5') are 
substituted into the control expression (21.1-3), the optimal combination 
of bang-bang and singular control is affected. 
The impact of succeeding generations is not great along the singular 
arc. The MRS and land purchase equations (9.7) and (26.1) take almost 
the same form in the multigenerational model as they do in the single 
generation problem. The only change is in the realized capital gain 
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term. In the multigenerational case part of the capital gain is 
discounted back from the end of the second generation, so the realized 
gain is likely to have a smaller impact. The primary impact of events 
in the second generation is on the optimal combination of bang-bang and 
singular arcs. For example, consider the case of land prices rising at 
an increasing rate throughout the first generation and stable land prices 
in the second generation. The model suggests that the optimal farm size 
is larger for the first generation than for the second. If all of the 
assets of the first generation are passed on to the second (o=0), then 
the acreage passed to the second generation would be larger than the 
optimal farm size if the first generation followed the single generation 
optimal solution for period 0 to T^, and returns would be reduced in the 
second generation by larger than optimal farm size. In the multigenera­
tional model, the marginal losses in the second generation would be felt 
in the first generation and the land acquisition control variable may be 
set to its lower bound where it would be positive in a single generation 
model. 
The impact of capital gain realization is likely to be reduced in 
the multigenerational model. Because of discounting, the first genera­
tion gain that is not realized until after the second generation is less 
valuable than it would be in a single generation model. The larger the 
discount rate, the time period, or the percentage of property passed to 
heirs, the larger the reduction in capital gain impact will be. 
The impact of the proportion of capital gain that is substitutable 
for current income has the same impact in the multigenerational model 
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that it has in the static and single generation dynamic models. When the 
proportion goes up the impact of capital gains on input choice increases 
and more land is included in the input mix. 
Â version of the multigenerational model could also be used to 
examine activity that is more speculative. Instead of viewing the time 
periods as generations, they might be viewed as holding periods. For 
instance, the investor may wish to realize some capital gain every five 
years by selling some proportion of the land. The same necessary 
conditions hold as in the multigenerational model. Again, the exact 
impacts depend on how the parameters change between selling times, but 
the impact of the proportion of capital gain substitutable for current 
income would be the same as in the static model. A larger value for ($) 
would tend to increase land holding. Capital gain realization would have 
a larger impact in the investor model than in the family farm model 
because realization occurs earlier. Consequently, the capital gain 
exemption would be more important. A tax exemption that is only a few 
years in the future in the investor problem has a greater impact than the 
exemption that may be 30 or more years in the future in the traditional 
family farm optimization problem. 
To modify the single generational problem for declining land values, 
the capital gain terminal value should be replaced with the capital loss 
terminal value (11.2). The necessary conditions will be unchanged and 
and the transversality conditions (20.5) becomes: 
20.5') = e-p(l-t)t[i_*_t^5p(l-t) t j 
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The optimal control is bang-bang and singular, as it was for the 
increasing land price case. The optimal control is described by 
equations (21.1-3) with equation (20.5") used in defining the adjoint 
variables. The optimal financial structure is unchanged. Using 
equation (20.5") the MRS along the singular arc: 
9.8 lA = 
3 
[y^-a(r+r^]](l-t) 
^ (tz'f ®t"®t^ (l-t)(t-t))yp(i_^)j (r+r^) ( 1-t) 
-bj<|.-e-p 1-<1>-t^6^ ] 
In an environment of declining land price, the marginal cost of land 
use is increased by the capital losses. The optimal solution is now to 
economize on land holdings and use more of the nonland input in the 
farming operations to avoid capital losses. When capital losses are 
larger, the denominator of the MRS will be larger indicating a larger 
optimal marginal product of land and/or a smaller optimal marginal 
product of nonland inputs at any time. The impact of capital losses on 
the input mix is sensitive to the same variables as the impact of capital 
gains. If a higher proportion of losses are recognized as current 
earnings, the impact is greater. If the planning horizon is longer, the 
impact tends to be reduced because the discounted value of the realized 
loss is small. Increasing the capital loss deduction limit or the 
proportion of losses deductible would tend to reduce the impact of the 
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losses by increasing the value of the tax benefits, but the effect is 
likely to be small because the tax benefit occurs only at the end of the 
horizon. 
Along the singular arc land purchases are described by an expression 
similar to (26.1) except that the capital gain realization term (l-<j)-t|)T) 
is replaced by a capital loss realization terra. Land purchases can occur 
in the declining land price case if lower financial cost of the new 
acquisition is enough to outweigh the losses due to additional land 
ownership. For instance, this might occur if larger capital losses are 
occurring during the initial part of the planning period, but the land 
price stabilized later in the period. Initially, the optimal input mix 
as defined by (9.8) would include a relatively small amount of land. 
Later, in the period a larger land input can be justified with a smaller 
capital loss rate. 
The multigenerational model does not need to be changed substan­
tially for the declining land price case. Realized loss terms replace 
realized capital gain terms in equations (20.1*-20.5') for periods in 
which the land price declines. Because capital loss deductions are not 
passed on to succeeding generations, the capital loss situation does not 
add greatly to the complexity of the model. If land price declines 
continue over more than one generation, the tendency of the model to whom 
smaller farm size and more intensive farming is likely to be increased 
because losses in the second generation will tend to further reduce land 
holdings in the first. 
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The situation of the investor requires a somewhat more complicated 
model because capital losses in one period can be used to offset farm 
income during the following period in the same investor's career. This 
might be modeled by defining a capital loss deductions account, denoted 
CLD^, which is carried into a period and a control variable to allocate 
the deductions. The change in the capital loss deductions account would 
be the negative of the control variable. The average tax rate multiplied 
by the control would be added to current income in the objective 
function. The control variable would be bounded by zero and $3000, the 
current maximum annual deduction. With a constant average tax rate, 
control would be completely bang-bang for the capital loss deductions; 
the maximum deduction of $3,000 would be taken as long as the account is 
positive. The implications of declining land prices for the investor 
would be the same as for the other models; land holding would be smaller 
and farming more intensive with larger price declines. The tax implica­
tions are likely to be greater for the investor. Because losses are 
realized earlier, the present value of the capital loss deduction is 
greater. The size of the maximum deduction would tend to be more 
important for the investor than for the other models. In the investor 
model, the deductions will tend to offset income that is taxed at a 
higher rate than the retirement income assumed in the other models. 
The model might also be used to examine mixed increasing and 
decreasing land price patterns. In the model, one period may use the 
increasing land price formulation while the next period uses the 
decreasing price definitions. Because the length of the periods is 
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arbitrary and they do not have to be of equal length, the periods can be 
chosen to fit the periods of increasing and decreasing land price. For 
instance, sharply rising land prices might characterize the first part of 
a farmer's career, while land price declines occur in the second part. 
If the single generation model assumption of no land sales until the end 
of the career is maintained, knowledge of future land price declines will 
tend to decrease land holding during the initial period of capital gain. 
If midcareer sales are allowed, the impact on initial period decisions 
would be minimized because land holdings could be reduced at the end of 
the first period to the level adapted to the conditions of declining land 
prices. The model suggests that contraction of the farm business by 
selling land and other assets upon entering a period of declining land 
prices can be a rational, wealth maximizing move that should not be 
viewed with alarm by farmers or lenders. In the absence of adjustment 
costs, the model suggests contraction of the farm business upon entering 
a period of declining prices may be rational even if the declining price 
period is short and followed by another period of rising prices. For 
example, the land price pattern might be characterized by an initial 
period of rising prices, a second short period in which prices fall and a 
final period in which prices rise and exceed the terminal price of the 
first period. If midcareer sales are allowed, the model indicates that 
the optimal input mix will include more land at the end of the first 
period than at the beginning of the second, and that optimal land 
holdings will rise again upon entering the third period. Of course, 
adjustment costs, uncertainty about parameter values in the future and 
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other factors complicate actual economic decisions, but the point remains 
that farm business contraction or perhaps ceasing production altogether 
may be the wealth maximizing course of action when coming out of a period 
of capital gains into a period of capital losses. 
Dynamic Model, Income Approach 
In the dynamic model, a more realistic version of the income 
approach model can be considered. The total capital gain term in the 
modified debt cost function (15) is replaced by the accumulated capital 
gain [g^ ). A pure income approach dynamic model can be defined by 
setting the proportion of capital gain substitutable for current income 
to zero ($=0) and replacing the debt cost function in problem (2") with 
equation (16). The necessary conditions (19.1-4 and 16.6-9) are 
unchanged. Equation (19.5) becomes: 
The transversality conditions are not changed and the optimal control 
scheme is still described by expression (21.1-3). In the pure income 
approach model, the adjoint variables become: 
(22.1') + e"^^^"''^^(l-^t) 
s s 
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( 2 2 . 2 ' )  
(22.3') = /je~^^^~^^®(pfjj-yj)(l-t)ds 
(22.4') x^^ = ;te-p(l-t)s[r+r.(___!__)] (i_t)ds 
S s 
(22.5') Xg^ = ;te-p(l-t)cwr,[^ )^(1-T)ds + e""^ ^""'^ (^I-t t^) 
s s 
where: v=variable of integration. 
In the adjoint variable for land, the value of unrealized gain 
substitutable for current income has been replaced by the debt cost 
reductions due to the marginal unrealized gain: 
The adjoint variable for unrealized gain now includes both the value of 
gain realization at the end of the period and the effect of unrealized 
gain on interest costs. 
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By substituting the above equations into expression (21.1-3), it can 
be seen that the optimal control is still.characterized by an initial 
adjustment of asset levels and largely singular control thereafter except 
for the case of no land purchases. The optimal singular arc can be 
characterized by the method of differentiating conditions (19.6-8) with 
respect to time that was used for the wealth approach. The financial 
structure under the income approach can be characterized by differenti­
ating equation (19.6) with respect to time and substituting in equations 
Equation (8.3) implies that along the singular path the marginal cost of 
debt will equal the marginal cost of equity, as in the wealth approach 
model. For a constant discount rate, equation (8.3) can in theory be 
solved for the optimal leverage ratio, which is constant over the 
planning horizon. The constant optimal leverage ratio implies that along 
the singular arc equity investment, new debt acquisition and the change 
in unrealized capital gains stand in a fixed relationship. This 
relationship can be shown by differentiating the leverage ratio with 
respect to time: 
(19,1' and 19.4): 
(8.3) - r - r'(^-^)] = 0 . 
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By solving equation (23.1*) simultaneously with constraints (2.1, 2.4-5) 
it can be shown that equity investment and new debt depend on land and 
t 
nonland input purchases and on appreciation: 
K -HUG D 
"it " * ""st " 
(23 3') "t -
The optimal accumulation of unrealized capital gains is defined by the 
optimal land holding through constraint (2.5). Equation (23.2') suggests 
that at any point along the singular arc equity investment will be 
reduced if the rate of capital gains is increased because of the negative 
term in acreage and land price change. Equation (23.3') indicates that 
at any point along the singular arc the acquisition of new debt will rise 
as the capital gains rate increases because of the positive term in 
acreage and land price change. The behavior suggested by the dynamic 
income approach model is similar to that identified in the static model. 
It suggests that the increased debt use by U.S. farmers during the 1960s 
and 1970s may have been at least partially in response to the large 
capital gains. The magnitude of this impact depends largely on the 
equity substitution parameter (w). If lenders are willing Co accept a 
large proportion of appreciation equity, the equity investment will be 
reduced and debt use increased. This is apparently what happened in the 
1970s. After the 1973-74 commodity boom, the mood of farmers and 
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agricultural lenders was optimistic. There was an expectation of 
continued high demand for farm products and of continued land price 
increases. Real estate appreciation was viewed as a relatively solid 
asset. Under such conditions, the equity substitution parameter would 
tend to be large. The model suggests that new debt acquisitions would be 
large and savings would stagnate. 
Unlike the wealth approach model, equations (23.2') and (23.3') 
indicate that the financial structure can be changing even when no change 
is occurring in the input levels. For example, if the rate of land price 
change is constant and input levels have adjusted to that rate, the model 
suggests that land and other input acquisitions would be zero. But 
equations (23.2') and (23.3') indicate that as the land price increase 
continued additional debt would be acquired and equity would be withdrawn 
from the business; dissaving would occur as unrealized gain substituted 
for equity in the financial process. 
An income approach MRS can be defined by differentiating equation 
(19.2) and (19.3) with respect to time, substituting in the adjoint 
variables (22.1") (22,2") and (22.3") and simplifying: 
9.9) t 
t t 
S s 
e 
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As in the wealth approach model, increasing land prices tend to 
encourage the use of more land in the income approach model input mix. 
The denominator of the factor cost ratio is decreased by the impacts of 
capital gains: the financial benefits of buying now instead of later in 
the finance cost term, the reduced interest cost because of the substi-
tutability of unrealized capital gains for equity, and the after tax 
value of realized gain at the end of the period. The capital gain exemp­
tion has the same effect in the income approach model as the wealth 
approach model. A larger exemption enhances the capital gain impact. In 
the income approach, the equity substitution factor (w) has an impact 
similar to that of the proportion of gain substitutable for income (<f>) in 
the wealth approach model; a larger adjustment factor will tend to 
increase the benefits from unrealized gain and encourage larger farm size 
and more extensive farming. 
As in the wealth approach model, equations (19.7-8) can be differen­
tiated twice with respect to time and explicit equations for the control 
variables can be derived. The nonland output control is unchanged. The 
land purchase control variable is described by a system similar to (26.1) 
but with the substitution of unrealized capital gain term ($ 8) replaced 
by a term reflecting the debt cost reduction due to additional unrealized 
capital gain. Again, after the initial adjustment land will be acquired 
only if the change in the returns to land ownership is larger than the 
change in the financial costs of ownership. The rate of land acquisition 
will tend to be greater if more unrealized gain is substituable for 
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equity, if the capital gains tax exemption is larger, and if the decision 
maker is closer to the terminal date at which gains will be realized. 
The income approach model can be extended to the multigenerational 
case, to allow more speculative activity, to permit declining land prices 
and to the multiple enterprise problem in the same manner as the wealth 
approach model and with the same results. In addition, the income 
approach does not have to be used in its pure state. The two approaches 
can be combined and this is perhaps the most realistic model. 
Sufficiency arguments for the income approach 
The arguments of the optimality of the control scheme defined for 
the income approach are very similar to those advanced for the wealth 
model. All the necessary conditions are satisfied by the income 
approach. The Legendre-Clebsch is satisfied trivially everywhere. The 
generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition is unchanged from the wealth 
approach model and is satisfied. The form of the matrix of second 
derivatives of the Hamiltonian is affected by the income approach 
modifications because the unrealized gain variable enters the 
Hamiltonian. The matrix may be partitioned and written: 
ao 0 
0 C E* 
0 E*' I 
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where matrices A and C are as defined under the wealth approach with the 
market value leverage ratio as argument of the debt function and E and I 
are: 
E* = e -p(l-T)t (1-t)[ r"»t 2r' 
I = —e -P (l-T)t (1-T)[ 
(k «g/ 
Concavity requires for all vectors h: 
1 (h^hg) a( + [hg h^ h) C E* 
*: 
E I 
(h») < 0 
A is negative definite by assumption. The terms in C, and I, can be 
factored and written: 
-e 
-P(l-T)t r"D 
wd 
2r' 
2 k^+wg^ •] [- h, 
+ h, _ + h ^ 4 k^-hjg^ 5 k^-wg^ 
97 
Which is negative definite for all h=0 under the assumptions of the 
model. Hence, the Hamiltonian is concave•under the income approach 
modifications and the informal optimality arguments advanced for the 
wealth approach model can be applied to the income approach case. The 
optimality of the proposed control plan is not proven, but all available 
information indicates that it is the most likely candidate for 
optimality. 
Limitations of the model 
In an effort to simplify the model, numerous assumptions have been 
made and complications ignored. The primary limitation of the model is 
that it ignores the optimal selling time for land. In modeling the 
traditional idea of a family farm, this assumption does not cause major 
problems. In this traditional view, the farmer does not intend to sell 
the land, at least not before retirement. The assumption is, however, a 
limitation in examining activity in which a speculative motive is 
present. Another important limitation is that uncertainty does not enter 
into the model. Several important constraints on farmer behavior have 
been neglected. Ordinarily, the farmer does not face an unlimited supply 
of land that will fit into the farming operation, is within a reasonable 
distance, and is for sale at the market price. Only a small percentage 
of the land in the U.S. is offered for sale each year. Usually, farmers 
do not have unlimited supplies of nonfarm equity capital to draw on. 
Their equity investments are often limited to retained earnings. 
The assumption of a fixed equity discount rate was made to improve 
the mathematical tractability of the model and allow clear determinations 
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of signs in the comparative statics of the static model. Variable 
discount rate models seem to have implications similar to the fixed 
discount rate models presented with the variable discount rate 
accentuating the financial influences already present in the model 
through the debt supply function. The implications are not the same, 
however. For example, the separation of financial and production 
decisions in the dynamic wealth approach model does not occur if the 
discount rate is a function of the leverage ratio. In a more complete 
model, the fixed discount rate assumption might be relaxed, but only if 
the production and debt supply functions are more completely specified so 
that all second order conditions can be determined. 
An additional limitation of the analysis is that is focuses on the 
microeconomic impact of land price appreciation. The ties between the 
individual buyers who make up the land market and market behavior are 
left unexplored. The model certainly has implications in that direction 
that could be the subject of further research. For example, in the case 
of the two period model in which land price rises in the first period and 
falls during the second period, the model suggests that the optimal 
choice is to sell land at the end of the first period to reduce holdings 
to the level justified in an environment of capital losses. If many land 
owners followed this plan, large amounts of land would be dumped on the 
market at the end of the period in which land prices were rising and 
prices in the second period would decline further and faster than they 
otherwise would. Further research might show that a part of land price 
decline in the mid-1980s was caused by a glut of farmland marketings as 
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land owners adjusted their holding to an environment of smaller capital 
gains. 
Another question is the impact of the capital gains effect on 
overall efficiency. Do capital gains tend to push the decision maker 
toward greater overall efficiency? Macroeconomic analysis of land appre­
ciation should also consider the social costs and benefits associated 
with farm size and intensity that do not appear in the calculation of the 
individual producer. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study developed an optimization model of the impact of farmland 
price changes on the production and finance choices of a wealth maximiz­
ing decisionmaker. The model allows for both capital gains and losses, 
and the possibilities that some proportion of the unrealized capital gain 
or loss may be substituted for current income or recognized in the finan­
cial negotiation as collateral. The model offers a rigorous theoretical 
foundation for the hypotheses on the impact of capital gains that have 
been informally advanced by agricultural economists and it allows prelim­
inary analysis of the impact of individual parameters under broad assump­
tions on their signs and magnitudes. In general, the model suggests that 
in an environment of large capital gains farmers will tend to enlarge 
farm acreage and incur higher debt loads in their attempts to take 
advantage of the farmland appreciation. These effects are found in both 
dynamic and static versions of the model. If equity is a constraining 
factor, the model suggests that farmers will tend to use more highly 
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leveraged financial structures when land prices are rising. Over a wide 
range of parameter values, the model suggests that capital gains encour­
age extensive farming. Capital losses have the opposite effect of 
capital gains. The magnitude of these effects is an empirical quesion, 
but it should be noted that the model is broadly consistent with the farm 
size expansion and greater debt use that occurred during the period of 
farmland capital gains in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The model also 
offers an explanation for the virtual disappearance of fruit and vege­
table production from the Midwest in the same period and the renewed 
interest in horticultural crops that has been shown by some Iowa farmers 
during the recent period of declining farmland prices. 
An important insight offered by the model is that the impact of 
capital gains on farm decisionmaking is not purely a result of tax rules. 
The effects of land price changes on finance and production choices are 
likely to show up under a wide variety of tax planning. The model 
suggests that the present tax rules tend to enhance the impact of capital 
gains by deferring the taxation until realization of the gain and 
exempting 60 percent of the capital gains from taxes. Accrual taxation 
of the gain would reduce the impact of the capital gain on decisionmaking 
and for some parameter values it may even reverse the effects by making 
the tax liability larger than the gain. With the current tax system, the 
impact of capital gains on farm size and debt use is positive for all 
plausible parameter values. In the case of capital losses, the deduct­
ibility of the loss tends to offset the negative impact of the loss, but 
the impact of these tax deductions is sharply limited by the tax rules 
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which only allow half of Che loss to be deducted, limit the annual 
maximum deduction and only allow losses to be deducted when they are 
realized. 
The model may be used to describe either the traditional farm family 
or the long term planning decision of an investor. If the planning 
horizon of these two decision makers differ the model suggests that the 
tax impacts of on farm size and intensiveness will differ. For instance, 
if the investor's institutional structure and need for liquidity require 
more frequent realization of gain than the farm family, then the capital 
gain tax rules will have a larger impact on the investor than the farm 
family. In the limiting case of the farm family which intends to pass 
its land from generation to generation, the income tax rules have no 
effect. Hence, the model suggests that advocates of the moderate size 
family farm should push for elimination of the capital gains tax exemp­
tion for farmland. The exemption encourages larger farm size and more 
extensive farming; the opposite of the family farm ideal. In addition, 
if it is true that investors tend to realize the gain more frequently 
than family farmers, then elimination of the exemption would tend to have 
a far greater impact on investor choices than on family farm decisions. 
The model also suggests that government price support and other 
programs may have indirect impacts on farm size and debt use through 
their effect on capital gains or the substitutability of unrealized gains 
for income. If a price support program raises expectations about future 
income to land or increases the certainty of that income, the value of 
capital gains to the decisionmaker is likely to increase. With higher 
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capital gains a higher level of unrealized gains that are substitutable 
for current income, the model suggests that farm size is likely to expand 
and the debt load is likely to increase. Weakening an existing program 
which increases capital gains or the certainty of those gains, is likely 
to reduce farm acreage expansion and reduce debt use. The Implication of 
the model is that price support and other programs which are ostensibly 
developed to protect the moderately sized family farm may have indirect 
effects through capital gains that are the opposite of the desired 
protection. 
Decisions by public and private lenders also can affect the impact 
of capital gains. The income approach model suggest that by increasing 
the proportion of unrealized gains that they are willing to accept as net 
worth in the financial negotiation, lenders tend to increase total 
returns to land and offer incentives to increase farm size and debt 
load. 
If the model describes a long term planning process in which 
parameter magnitudes are expected values, then it is useful to think of 
revisions of the plan that would occur if new information were acquired. 
For instance, in going from a period in which capital gains were expected 
to continue indefinitely to a period of capital losses, the model 
suggests that there may be large adjustments in debt use, farm size and 
production decisions. The financial structure that is appropriate for a 
period of rapid capital gains may be too highly leveraged for a period of 
losses. Because of the adjustment costs that are not treated in this 
model the reality of these changes in asset use and financing is likely 
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to be a wrenching experience for many farmers. Because of the lumpiness 
of many farm assets and liquidity losses changing the scale of production 
may be difficult. The model suggests that the economic distress of many 
farmers in the early 1980s can be at least partially explained by 
difficulty in making the adjustments required to adapt to a period of 
declining, or at least more stable land prices. 
In general, the model indicates that the capital gains which made 
farming an attractive career for farm families in the 1970s also helped 
create the conditions which undermine the family farm structure. Capital 
gains on land create economic pressures which force farmers away from the 
family farm ideal of the small, intensively managed farm. The additional 
debt that is likely to be acquired in periods of capital gains makes 
farmers vulnerable in recessionary periods. Certainly, capital gains are 
not the only force changing agriculture. Technological change, the 
development of export markets and other factors have played major roles, 
but this model allows the identification and understanding of another 
force behind the historic changes in farming. 
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PART II 
EXTENSIONS OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
A recently developed model of farm production and finance decisions 
suggests that farmland capital gains tend to encourage larger farm 
acreage, greater debt use and the choice of land extensive enterprises 
(Lowenberg-DeBoer, herein). The model indicates that capital losses 
tend to have the opposite effect. These results were derived assuming 
that the decision maker could purchase an unlimited supply of farmland at 
the current market price, that there were no adjustment costs in expand­
ing farm sizes, that the producer had access to enough equity capital to 
achieve the optimal asset levels with the optimal financial structure and 
that the farmland price path was known with certainty. These assumptions 
allow a relatively simple model to be developed, but they leave something 
to be desired in terms of realism. The supply of farmland that would fit 
into a producer's operation is usually limited. Not only is the total 
supply of farmland relatively inflexible, but producers generally desire 
additional land to be within a certain distance of the existing farm and 
they may require specific types of land. The simple model assumes that 
there is nonfarm wealth available for investment in the farm business, 
but the amount of equity available to U.S. farmers is often limited to 
retained earnings and savings from off-farm earnings. This occurs 
because in the structure of U.S. agriculture most farm equity is 
supplied by the operators and on-farm equity sources are generally 
undeveloped. Hence, for some enterprise choices the availability of 
equity may be a binding constraint. Land prices are not known with 
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certainty. The unexpected land price boom of the 1970s and the largely 
unforeseen land price drop of the early 1980s have emphasized land price 
risk. Plans made in the 1970s based on continued farmland capital gains 
resulted in financial problems in the 1980s for some producers when the 
expected land price path was not realized. Hence, it is reasonable to 
ask whether land price uncertainty affects the impact of farmland capital 
gains and losses on production and finance plans. 
The goal of this study was Co extend the previously developed model 
of farm production and finance decisions to cases in which the supply of 
land is limited, adjustment costs exist, the sources of equity are 
constrained to retain earnings, and the land price is uncertain. This 
research utilizes the modified Vickers model for dynamic conditions 
specified by Lowenberg-DeBoer. The problems considered are inherently 
dynamic and no static approximations are defined. The optimization in 
the presence of land market limits, adjustment costs, and equity 
constraints is a straight forward extension of the optimal control theory 
used in the derivation of the basic model. The examination of land price 
uncertainty utilizes the stochastic optimal control methods outlined by 
Dreyfus and solves the resulting partial differential equations to derive 
analytical expressions for the "first best choices" assuming that the 
decision maker maximizes expected net worth. 
Previous Research 
Lowenberg-DeBoer reviewed the previous research on the impacts of 
farmland capital gains on production and finance decisions. He found 
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that while agricultural economists have suggested many hypotheses about 
the impacts of farmland price changes at the firm level, rigorous models 
and empirical tests of the effects were scarce. Research on breeding 
livestock capital gains does not generalize to the farmland case because 
livestock capital gains occur primarily because of the tax rules which 
allow the costs of raising breeding stock to be written off as current 
expenses, but consider the proceeds from the sale of that livestock to be 
capital gain. In contrast, farmland capital gains and loss are not a 
simple product of tax rules. The effects of capital gains and losses at 
the individual asset level are well-known through the salvage value in 
the net present value or internal rate of return analysis. The impact of 
capital gains and losses is commonly included in analysis of pure invest­
ment decisions. But the individual asset and pure investment models do 
not capture important parts of the agricultural decision maker's problem. 
For example, the financial structure reflected in the weighted average 
cost of capital discount rate may be sensitive to capital gains and 
losses. Or the ability to borrow against unrealized capital gains may 
affect both the supply and the cost of debt capital. In an environment 
of large farmland capital gains, it may be more profitable to farm a 
large acreage haphazardly, than a smaller acreage carefully, because the 
added capital gains with the larger acreage could more than offset the 
losses from such less intensive management as practices less timely field 
operations and use of lower quality seed. The usual present value 
decision framework would not encompass such choices. In addition, the 
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farm decision maker must often make both investment and management 
decisions. The farm decision maker has greater flexibility in reorganiz­
ing production and finance to maximize capital gains or minimize losses 
than is usually assumed in analysis of investment in common stock. For 
agriculture, Che capital gains and losses have not been just a minor part 
of the asset purchase decision, as is the case for most nonfarm 
industries, but a major planning choice. 
The stochastic control method used in this study has not been 
frequently used in agricultural economics and has only occasionally been 
utilized in other areas of economics. The primary reason for this is the 
difficulty of solving the partial differential equation that is derived 
in the optimization process. There are many other techniques for dealing 
with stochastic problems that have been more widely used. Numerical 
techniques have often been used by agricultural economists. Those 
methods include: Monte Carlo simulation (see for instance: Held and 
Helmers, 1984; Richardson and Condra, 1981; Skees and Reid, 1984), 
stochastic linear programming (see for instance: Rae 1971 or Johnson et 
al., 1967), quadratic or other programming methods in connection with 
specific assumptions about the nonlinear form of the utility function 
(see for instance: How and Hazel, 1968), stochastic dynamic programming 
(see for instance: Burt, et al. 1980), approximate solutions to 
stochastic control problems (see for instance: Rausser and Hochman, 
1979, Chapter 5) and approximate solutions to adaptive control problems 
(see for instance: Rausser and Hochman, 1979, Chapter 9). The impact 
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of farmland price variability on farm firm survival was recently examined 
by Reid and Skees with a Monte Carlo simulation model of Illinois corn 
and soybean farms. They found that the farmland price risk substantially 
increased the total risk of failure and that the risk was increased more 
for larger farms than for smaller farms. Numerical techniques have 
offered useful insights into the impact of uncertainty in specific 
situations, but they may be difficult to generalize because in a model of 
any complexity it is usually impossible to consider all of the possible 
parameter permutations that may be encountered in other situations than 
the one being studied. 
Ideally, a model should offer both analytical insights and a direct 
route to empirical tests. In practice, the inherent characteristics of 
the system being modeled and the ultimate use of the research results 
play an important part in the choice of technique. While many methods 
have been used to derive analytical results for dynamic stochastic 
problems, they tend to fall into two groups: either the objective 
function is multiplied by a probability density function and the expected 
value is optimized with deterministic control techniques (see for 
instance: Rausser and Hochman, 1979) or the equations of motion are 
specified in terms of stochastic difference or differential equations and 
stochastic control techniques used (Merton, 1969). Direct empirical 
application of the first methods generally requires estimation of 
probability density functions. Because the second method employs dynamic 
programming arguments, a dynamic programming approximation is probably 
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the most direct route to empirical application in most cases. Again, the 
choice of techniques depends on the system studied and research needs. 
The Basic Model 
The basic model proposed by Lowenberg-DeBoer maximizes the net cash 
flow from agricultural production plus the capital gain effects over a 
finite horizon. This study will consider only one planning period; the 
model can be adapted to multigenerational or multiperiod problems with a 
dynamic programming arguments (Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985, p. 74). The 
capital gain or loss effects may enter the model in three forms: the 
terminal value of selling the land at the end of the horizon, the 
substitutability of at least a portion of the unrealized capital gain for 
current income in the wealth of the individual (wealth approach) and the 
substitutability of some portion of unrealized gain for invested equity 
in the debt supply function (income approach). The last two capital gain 
or loss effects are based on arguments advanced by Plaxico and Klekte 
(1979). Most of the work in this study is with the pure wealth approach 
model because it is analytically simpler; all of the results derived for 
the wealth approach model hold for the income approach model though the 
mathematical details become more cumbersome. The simplifying assumption 
that capital gains and losses are treated symmetrically is used in this 
study. Hence, the proportion of capital gain that is taxable will be the 
same as the proportion of capital loss that is deductible and no annual 
limit is imposed on capital loss deductions. For economy of exposition, 
analysis of the model will be primarily in terms of an environment of 
113 
rising land prices. It should be remembered the impact of capital losses 
is a mirror image of the capital gain effect. The objective function for 
the pure wealth approach model can be written as: 
(1) z = Lj - TjXj. -
d 
-r(—)d^] (l-x) - + B^L^*}dt 
^e-P(l-T)T[^ + (1-<I>-+T)G^] 
where: 
T = terminal time, 
P = discount rate, 
T = average tax rate, 
P = product price. 
= nonland inputs. 
= land, 
f(") = strictly concave production function, 
= current cost of using an input, 
= debt, 
= invested equity, 
r(*) = strictly convex debt cost function, 
Uj^^ = investment, 
= the proportion of unrealized gain that is substitutable for 
current income, 
6^ = land price. 
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4» = the proportion of capital gain that is taxable or of capital 
loss that is tax deductible, and 
= accumulated unrealized capital gain. 
Only the land price parameter, state variables and the rate of 
change of state variables are assumed to vary over time; they are 
designated with t subscripts. Straightforward extensions of the model 
could allow other parameters to vary. The land price path is assumed to 
be smooth with continuous first and second derivatives. The dot notation 
is used to denote the time derivative of a variable or parameter. It is 
important to note that the gamma terms are defined following Vickers as 
the current cost of using the input in production. For items used up in 
production, such as fertilizer or seed, this is their whole cost. For 
durable nonland inputs, the gamma parameter includes the repairs, 
maintenance and depreciation. In the case of land, the gamma parameter 
is primarily composed of property taxes, insurance and repairs, 
maintenance and depreciation on real estate improvements. 
The constraints on the maximization of the objective function (1) 
are: 
(2.1) kj. = u^^ 
(2.2) = «2, 
(2.3) 
(2.4) - Ujj 
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(2.5) = Lj.3j. 
( 2 . 6 )  >  0  
where : 
a = the capital absorbed by nonland inputs, 
Ug^ = land purchases and 
= nonland input purchases. 
and the initial conditions on the state variables X^, L^, , K^, and G^. 
Constraint (23.4) and the initial conditions impose the financial 
constraint of the Vickers' model that equity plus debt must be equal to 
the capital absorbed by the inputs. It is derived by differentiating the 
usual Vickers* constraint with respect to time. It is assumed here that 
the capital absorbed by land is its price, though a more complex model 
could examine the effect of special financing arrangements and other 
factors that would make the capital absorbed different than the price. 
The land purchase constraint (2.6) is imposed in an effort to define a 
relatively simple model. If land sales during the planning period are 
permitted the model must deal with the questions of the timing of 
individual sales and the calculation of capital gain on specific tracts, 
which would require a more complex model. The model may be viewed as 
covering the career of a family farmer who may sell the farmland at 
retirement, but does not intend to sell before that, or it may be seen as 
the situation of a more investment oriented decision maker who wishes to 
hold the land for a fixed period before realizing the capital gains or 
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losses. Equation (1) and constraints (2.1-2.6) define an optimal control 
problem with the controls being: and 
Limited Availability of Land 
The simplest method of analyzing the impact of the limited avail­
ability of land is to impose an upper limit on land purchases at 
anytime: 
An upper limit on land purchases might be generated in various ways; 
through legal limits, social pressure or lender concern about rapid 
expansion. The limit might vary over time depending on the amount of 
land on the market and other economic conditions, but this study will 
consider only the simplest case of the constant limit. 
The Hamiltonian for the control problem formed by the maximization 
of equation (1) subject to constraints (2.1-2.7) is unchanged from 
Lowenberg-DeBoer's basic wealth approach model: 
(27) u 2t -< ç 
h = e-p 
d 
(3) {[Pf(x^, Lj - YjXj. - r(:^ )](l-T) 
"it + ^t^t*^^ + st"lt + ^ 2t"2t + ^3t"3t 
where = the adjoint variables, i = 1, . . . 5. 
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Because the control variables enter linearly, the optimal control will be 
bang-bang and singular: 
- " if < 0 
(4.1) u^^ = ^singular if ~ ^ 4 ~ ® 
-p(l-T)t 
+ » if > 0 
° If "Zt + *["4; < 0 
(4.2) u^j. = ^singular if X^^ + B^X^^ = 0 
cc if "2; + *ta4t > 0 
- = if X_ + aX, <0 
3t 4t 
(4.3) u^^ = /singular if X^^ + aX^^ = 0 
+ » if X^^ + aX^^ > 0 
This control scheme differs from the basic wealth approach solution only 
in the upper bound on the land purchase control. The adjoint variables 
are defined by the necessary conditions: 
(5.1) 
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(5 3) = H- -
t 
(5.4) = ii- = 
(5.5) -xjj = ||_ . 0 
and Che tranversality conditions: 
(6.1) = e-p(l-t)t 
(6 .2 )  =  0  
(6.3) x^t = 0 
(6.4) x, = 0 
4T 
-0(1—t)t 
(6.5) ^5T ~ (!-<#-#) e 
Sufficiency conditions for totally singular optimal control problems are 
not well-developed, but the conditions (4.1-4.3), (5.1-5.5) and (6.1-6.5) 
form the most promising set of candidate optimal controls for this 
problem. The problem satisfies known conditions for optimality including 
the concavity of the Hamiltonian in the state variables and the 
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generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition. In addition, the candidate 
would entail a "chattering" solution, in which the controls would 
continuously alternate between the upper and lower boundaries. 
Investment and purchasing behavior of this type is not observed and there 
are no apparent economic forces which would generate such behavior. The 
mathematic details of the sufficiency argument are found in Lowenberg-
DeBoer. An introduction to the solution of singular optimal control 
problems can be found in Bryson and Ho, 1975, Chapter 8. 
Equations 5.1-5.5 and 6.1-6.5 can be solved for the optimal adjoint 
variables: 
controls are highly plausible. The primary alternative set of controls 
(7.1) r ^ ( l - T ) d s  +  e  -P(1-T)T 
(7.2) . ;tg-p(l-t)s [(pf^- + gg*]ds 
^(8? - b;j(l-*-*t) + e -p (1-t )t( 
(7.3) (pf^- Y^)(l-T)ds 
(7.4) 
d 
(r+r (1-T )ds 
s 
(l-<j)-*T) 
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The adjoint variables (7.1-7.5) represent the marginal cost or return 
from each of the state variables over the.remaining horizon. By-
substituting (7.1) and (7.2) into expression (4.1) it can be seen that if 
the marginal benefit of an extra unit of investment is less than the 
marginal cost of debt along a candiate path then investment will instan­
taneously drop until the marginal benefit of investment is equal to the 
marginal cost. Likewise, if the marginal benefit of investment along the 
candidate arc is greater than the marginal cost of debt then investment 
will instantaneously increase until the singular equality holds. 
Financial structure 
The financial structure along the singular arc can be characterized 
by noting that if the singular equality: 
holds over time then the time derivative must also be zero. Equations 
(5.1) and (5.4) can be substituted into that time derivative and the 
resulting expression simplified to yield: 
D 
ci 2 (9) P + r 
K, t 
The left hand side of equation (9) is the marginal cost of equity invest­
ment and the right hand side is the marginal cost of debt. This 
condition must hold at every point along the singular arc. Given a 
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constant discount rate equation (9) could in theory be solved for a 
constant optimal leverage ratio that is not affected by capital gains or 
by the limit on land availability. The constant optimal leverage ratio 
is a result of the effectively unlimited supply of equity capital which 
allows an optimal ratio of debt and equity to be used in financing every 
asset level. It is assumed that nonfarm welath can be pulled into the 
far business if needed. 
The optimal investment and debt acquisition rates can be character­
ized by differentiating equation (9) twice with respect to time and 
solving for: 
"it ° * ""sJ 
The term in brackets in (10.1) and (10.2) is the capital required to 
finance new land and nonland purchases. The changes in optimal debt and 
equity over time given by (10.1) and (10.2) indicate that the capital 
required for new purchases will be financed to maintain the optimal 
leverage. Because the change in equity investment is unconstrained the 
singular path can be maintained indefinitely. New debt and equity merely 
respond to the capital requirements of the optimal assets levels. If the 
land and nonland acquisition controls are continuous, the debt and equity 
time paths will also be continuous. 
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The land and nonland input use can be characterized by similar 
methods. By substituting adjoint variable equations (7.3) and (7.4) into 
expression (4.3) it can be seen that if the return from the marginal unit 
of nonland inputs along the candidate path exceeds the current and finan­
cial cost then nonland inputs are instantaneously acquired until the 
singular equality can hold. Similarly, if the return from the marginal 
unit of nonland input along the candidate path is less than the current 
costs and financial cost, nonland inputs will be decreased until the 
singular equality can hold. If the singular equality: 
(11) x + oa = 0 
3t 4t 
is to be maintained through time, then the time derivative of (11) must 
also be equal to zero. By substituting conditions (5.3) and (5.4) into 
the time derivative of (11) and simplifying, it can be seen that along 
the singular arc the marginal value product of nonland inputs must be 
equal to its marginal cost: 
D 
(12) pf^ = + a(r+r'^) 
The marginal cost of the nonland inputs follows the usual Vickers formu­
lation of including both the current cost of using the input and the 
financial cost, which is the capital absorbed multiplied by the marginal 
cost of capital. 
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Input use 
The optimal control for nonland inputs along the singular path can 
be found by differentiating the singular equality (11) twice and solving 
for U3^: 
(12) "2: 
The optimal nonland input purchases are some proportion of the land 
acquisitions, where the proportion is always positive under model assump­
tions and depends on the current level of land and nonland input use. 
Like the debt and equity time paths, the time path of nonland input use 
will be characterized by an initial adjustment to a level which allows 
the equality of the returns from the marginal unit of nonland input and 
its costs and singular adjustments thereafter which allow that equality 
to be maintained. 
The optimal controls for land use are complicated by the existence 
of the upper and lower bounds. By substituting adjoint variables (7.2) 
and (7.4) into expression (4.2), it can be seen that if the returns to 
the marginal unit of land along the candidate path is greater than the 
marginal current and financial cost of land ownership then land acquisi­
tions will be at the upper bound until the singular equality is reached. 
Similarly, if the return to the marginal unit of land along the candidate 
path is less than the marginal current and financial cost of land 
ownership the land acquisition will be zero until the singular equality 
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can hold. Along the singular path land use can be characterized by 
noting that if the singular equality: 
(14) - 0 
is to hold over time then its time derivative must be zero. Because it 
is necessary to frequently refer to the value of the left hand side of 
equation (14), it will be denoted as Q^. By substituting conditions 
(5.2) and (5.4) into the time derivative of (14) and simplifying it can 
be seen that along the singular arc the marginal cost of land ownership 
must be equal to the marginal value product of land: 
(15) Pf^(l-T) -
The marginal cost of land ownership in (15) is reduced by the capital 
gains effects the substitution of unrealized gain for current income 
, the realization of gain: 
and the capital cost saving of buying now rather than later: 
6 (i-^-»(l-^)(t-'=))(„^.^)/p 
^ ^t 
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Because the capital gains tend to offset the cost of land ownership, the 
optimal marginal value product of land will be lower than it would be if 
capital gains were ignored, and the farm acreage will be greater. 
When both land and nonland inputs are on the singular arc, the 
optimal relationship between the inputs can be characterized by dividing 
equation (11) by equation (14) to yield the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) between land and nonland inputs: 
D 
f [yi+a(r+r'-^)](l-t) 
(16) ^ ^ 
Because the factor cost ratio on the right hand side of (16) is increased 
by the capital gains term in the denominator which offsets the ownership 
costs of land, the optimal MRS will be larger than it would otherwise be 
if capital gains were ignored and the input mix will tend to include more 
land. This suggests that capital gains provide incentive for extensive 
land use. Lowenberg-DeBoer shows that enterprise choice in the presence 
of capital gains tends toward land extensive production. When the land 
use control path is at one of its bounds, the choice of nonland inputs 
becomes optimization of the nonland input given a certain acreage. In 
this case the tendency toward extensive land use is not necessarily 
maintained. 
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The optimal control along the singular path can be characterized by 
differentiating (14) twice with respect to time and solving for the 
control: 
(17) U2t = F[StM - 3*j.N] 
where: 
F -
( r+r • 
n =* + g-p(l-t)(t-t)(^_^_^) + 5- [l_e-p(l-t)(t-c)] 
The variable F is always negative under the assumption of strict 
concavity. The first term in M reflects the increasing financial cost of 
land ownership when the land price is rising. The second term in M and 
all of N represent the benefits of capital gains: the substitutability 
of unrealized capital gains for current income, the realization of gain 
and the capital cost reduction due to buying now rather than later. Land 
will be acquired if the capital gains effects outweigh the increasing 
capital cost. The singular control is defined for purchases between zero 
and Ç. The combination of singular and bang-bang controls is determined 
by expression (4.2) and it may be difficult to identify because the 
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return to the marginal unit of land depends on the control path 
that is being determined. Regardless of the optimal control for land the 
previously defined debt, equity and nonland input controls hold when the 
appropriate land purchase control is defined. If land purchases are zero 
the other controls are also zero and debt, equity and nonland use are 
constant. If land purchases are at the upper limit, nonland input will 
change to maintain the optimal land, nonland input relationship and debt 
and equity changes will allocate the financial cost of increased land and 
nonland use to maintain the optimal financial structure. If the land 
control has a jump discontinuity, the other controls will also show jump 
discontinuities. 
Two special cases 
Though the exact combination of bang-bang and singular controls is 
difficult to identify for the general case, it is useful to note that the 
land availability constraint may either dampen or exaggerate the impact 
of capital gains. This can been seen by examining the characteristics of 
the land use path for two special cases: the producer who begins the 
period with a small farm acreage in an economic enviornment in which a 
large farm acreage is optimal, and the situation in which land prices are 
relatively stable during the initial part of the planning horizon, but 
large capital gains occur during the final portion of the period. 
The first case might be seen as the situation of the beginning 
farmer or of the small farmer in a community where land is tightly held. 
In the model, large optimal farm size may occur for several reasons; high 
capital gains, low land ownership costs and production function 
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characteristics. In the basic model in which land and equity avail­
ability are not constrained, the land use.path would be generally charac­
terized by an initial adjustment from the small farm acreage up to the 
optimal acreage and a singular or no acquisition path there. In the 
basic model, the initial adjustment would be instantaneous, because the 
rate of land acquisition may approach infinity. The land use path for 
the model with constrained land availability also is generally composed 
of an initial adjustment and a singular or no acquisition path there­
after, but the initial adjustment period may occupy a major portion of 
the planning period. If the constraint is tight relative to the differ­
ence between the initial and optimum acreage, the adjustment period may 
extend through the whole planning period and the full impact of capital 
gains on farm size and the tendency toward extensive farming operation 
may not be observed. This may be the case, for instance, in much of 
Western Europe where relatively little land is bought or sold and land 
transactions are often subject to strict legal limits. 
The examination of the second case will concentrate on the 
possibility that the land availability limit may encourage "buying ahead" 
to avoid the constraint and hence exaggerate the impact of capital gains 
in the form of larger farm size in some periods. To clearly distinguish 
this situation from the first case, it is assumed that the initial 
acreage is at the stable land price optimum in the sense that equation 
(14) holds at the initial farm size. To simplify the analysis, it is 
assumed that equation (17) holds throughout the planning horizon for the 
unlimited land availability model (?->"). For most parameter 
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specifications, this requires the land price to be increasing at an 
increasing rate in the second part of the planning horizon (Figure la). 
Along the singular path in the basic model and are zero everywhere 
reflecting the fact that the farm is earning the maximum net return at 
each point along the path. When land availability is limited, the large 
land acquisitions determined by the singular path during the period of 
the land price increase may no longer be feasible and the optimal control 
will contain at least one segment of limit level land acquisition (Figure 
lb, dashed and dotted lines). One approach to determining the optimal 
control might suggest following the singular path until the constraint 
becomes binding and then following the boundary until the singular path 
can be reattained (Figure lb, dotted line). This control path is non-
optimal because it does not satisfy expression (4.2). Evaluating the 
return to the marginal unit of land along the boundary following 
control path leads to a control that is at limit level for most of the 
planning horizon because Q is positive throughout the segment of limit 
level land acquisition and hence Q is positive from time zero up to the 
point at which the singular control path is reattained during the period 
of rising land prices [tg). To satisfy expression (4.2) the control path 
indicated must be the same as the control path used to evaluate ^2t" 
Starting the limit level optimal control later than the point at which 
the constrant becomes binding in the singular path (t^) will be non-
optimal because that would mean delaying acquisition of the optimal 
acreage and increasing the period of losses from below optimal farm size. 
Hence, all optimal paths must include some limit level land acquisition 
Figure 1. Part (a) shows the assumed land price path increasing at an 
increasing rate after t^. Part (b) shows the land use path. 
Throughout the figure the solid line shows the no land avail­
ability limit optimal solution, the dotted line shows the 
boundary following solution and the dashed line shows the most 
promising candiate for the optimal solution in the limited 
land availability case. Part (c) shows the return to the 
marginal unit of land along each land use path. Part (d) 
shows the return to the marginal unit of land at each point 
along the land use path. In the no land availability limit 
case, both and follow the t axis. 
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before land prices start rising (Figure lb, dashed line). Actual deter­
mination of the optimal path requires specification of parameter values 
and functional forms, but the trade-off involved in finding the junction 
points between the singular and limit level controls is simple. The 
optimal control balances the marginal losses from acreage above the 
optimal farm size (between t^and t^) and the positive marginal returns 
from the segment in which acreage is below the optimal level (tg to • 
In Figure 1, the points t^, t^and t^ must satisfy: 
qt3 = qt3 = qt4 = qt4 = qt2 = ° 
where the land use path is known to be: 
^t = \3 + SCc-Cs). for tg < t < t^ 
If the efficiency penalty for farm size above the optimum is small, 
"buying ahead" will tend to begin earlier. As the efficiency penalty for 
above optimum farm size becomes larger, the beginning point of the limit 
level acquisitions will approach the point at which the constraint 
affects the singular path. This control path will usually involve jump 
discontinuities at the beginning and end points. The presence of 
controls with jump discontinuities is within the necessary conditions for 
junctions between the singular and bang-bang control paths outlined by 
McConnel and Powers and discussed by Lowenberg-DeBoer for the context of 
this problem. Hence, it is likely that for at least some land price 
paths and parameter values, "buying ahead" is a promising strategy. 
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Based on the analysis of these two special cases the overall impact 
of the land available constraint can be seen to depend on the land price 
path, the parameter values and the functional forms. Under some 
conditions which provide a plausible approximation to observed situa­
tions, the land availability constraint will tend to dampen the effect of 
capital gains by constraining the expansion of farm size. Under other 
conditions it is possible for the land availability limit to lead to 
larger than optimal farm acreage in some periods as decision makers "buy 
ahead" to mitigate the impact of the constraint. 
Limited availability of land, the income approach 
In the income approach to the value of unrealized gain, the optimal 
leverage ratio is not independent of land use and capital gains. Hence, 
the limited availability of land will have an impact on the financial 
structure for that model. The income approach can be modeled by redefin­
ing the argument of the debt cost function to be debt divided by the sum 
of invested equity and some portion of unrealized gain. This term is the 
leverage ratio when net worth is calculated based on market values and 
will be labeled the market value leverage ratio. The portion of 
unrealized gain recognized in the debt function argument is an approx­
imation of the impact of farmland price increases on conservative market 
value. The debt cost function can then be written as: 
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where: 
to = the proportion of unrealized gain recognized in the financial 
negotiation. 
If (18) is substituted into the Hamiltonian (3) and the optimization 
process repeated, a financial structure equation similar to (9) can be 
derived: 
which in theory can be solved for the optimal market value leverage ratio 
as a function of the discount rate and debt cost function coefficients. 
It can be shown that (9') implies debt and equity investment paths of: 
k +{og d 
(19.1) UJJ. = D|_+K+(HG^ ~ 
The negative term in farm acreage in equation (19.1) indicates equity 
investment is reduced if the level of land ownership is increased. The 
positive term in farm acreage in equation (19.2) suggests that debt is an 
increasing part of the financial structure when land use is increased. 
This is reasonable because it is less costly to meet the collateral 
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requirement in the financial negotiation with unrealized capital gain 
than with invested equity. The model suggests that the increasing debt 
use among U.S. farmers in the 1970s may have been in part a response to 
the substitutability of unrealized gain for invested equity in the 
financial negotiation. 
If the land availability constraint is binding and farm acreage is 
less than the optimal level identified in the unconstrained model, then 
equation (19.2) indicates that a smaller part of the new capital needs 
will be financed by debt- More invested equity will be needed, because 
with a smaller farm less unrealized capital gain is accumulated. 
Conversely, if land use is above the level defined along the singular 
arc in a "buy ahead" case, a larger portion of new capital needs will be 
satisfied by debt use because more unrealized capital gain will be avail­
able for collateral. Hence, the direction of the impact of the land 
availability constraint on debt use is the same as it is for land use. 
For instance, in the case of the small initial acreage and large optimal 
acreage, the land use is below that which would be expected in the 
unconstrained case for at least part of the horizon and debt use would 
also tend to be less. In the "buying ahead" situation, the land avail­
ability constraint would tend to expand debt use over a portion of the 
planning horizon. 
The impact of capital gains in the income approach to land use is 
similar to that identified in the wealth approach case; the ownership 
costs of land are offset by capital gains effects. The optimal marginal 
value product of land can be expressed as: 
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(15) Pf^(l-T) = Y2+[B^-B^(l-e"P^^"'^^^'^"''^)/p(l-T)][r+r.^^)(l-T) 
b 
S s 
in which the proportion of unrealized capital gains substitutability for 
current income term has been replaced by: 
(20) 
S 
which is the debt cost reduction from the marginal unit of land over the 
remaining horizon. The larger the proportion of unrealized gain 
recognized as a permanent addition to net worth (u), the larger debt cost 
reduction (20) will tend to be larger and land use will be expanded. The 
pattern of bang-bang and singular land purchase controls for the income 
approach will be similar to that identified in the wealth approach case, 
but the junction points may differ because the value of debt cost reduc­
tion due to the marginal unit of land (20) may differ from the value of 
substituting unrealized gain for current income. 
Adjustment Costs 
Adjustment cost may be significant in farm size expansion. 
Purchasing real estate is not costless; there may be realtor's fees, 
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search costs and other charges. Expansion demands additional management 
skill and time. The costs of changing the equipment and facilities to 
match the larger scale operation might also be considered adjustment 
cost. It is possible to consider separate adjustment costs for land, 
nonland inputs and the financial structure, but this study will focus on 
the adjustment cost of land because in the model farmland capital gains 
and losses drive changes in all state variables and changes in nonland 
inputs and financial structure can be seen in response to land change. 
Hence, the costs of changing nonland inputs and financial structure can 
be seen as part of the land adjustment cost. In addition, limiting 
adjustment costs to one input reduces the mathematical complexity. In 
some situations, land price sensitivity to producer purchases could also 
be seen as an adjustment cost. For example, in a local land market large 
purchases by a single decision maker may drive up local price temporarily 
without affecting the long run land price, which is probably determined 
in light of long run regional and national investment opportunities that 
are not affected by local conditions. Hence, the difference between the 
usual market price and the price paid by the decision maker intent on 
expansion can be seen as a premium for enlarging his or her farm acreage 
at a certain time, an adjustment cost. 
The adjustment cost can be modeled by subtracting an adjustment cost 
term under the integral in the objective function (1). The adjustment 
cost term may take a variety of function forms, but a quadratic form is 
commonly used because it recognizes that adjustment cost may increase as 
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the size of the adjustment increases and it maintains the mathematical 
tractability of the model. The adjustment cost can be written as: 
(21) "la (ug^)^ 
where: a = a constant adjustment cost coefficient, a > 0 
The one-half is added to simplify subsequent notation. When the deriva­
tive is taken, the numerical coefficients will cancel leaving only the 
term (aUg^]. The constant (a) is twice the constant in an adjustment 
cost term defined without the one-half. If the optimization process is 
repeated assuming that there is no fixed limit on land purchases 
the optimal control for equity investment and nonland inputs is unchanged 
from expressions (4.1) and (4.3). Because the Hamiltonian is no longer 
linear in the land purchase control, an interior solution holds whenever 
the nonnegativity constraint on acreage change is satisfied. The 
quadratic adjustment cost allows an explicit solution of the interior 
land acquisition control. The optimal control for land is no longer 
singular and becomes: 
(4.2') u^t = 
0. < « 
The adjoint variables are still described by equations (7.1-7.5). The 
argument for the optimality of these conditions is similar to that 
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previously advanced in the totally singular case. Goh (1966) indicates 
that the necessary conditions for a partiàlly singular model in which the 
first derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the nonsingular 
controls is not a function of the state variables, include the ordinary 
Legendre-Clebsch condition for the nonsingular variables and the general­
ized Legendre-Clebsch condition (pp. 725-726). The ordinary Legendre-
Clebsch condition for the land purchase control is: 
(22) huz = - a,! 0, 
Hence, the ordinary Legendre-Clebsch condition is satisfied. The gener­
alized Legendre-Clebsch condition is unchanged from the basic model. The 
argument for sufficiency of these condtiions is based on the plausibility 
of the solution and the lack of economic incentive for the alternative 
solutions involving chattering. 
Optimal control paths 
Optimal changes in debt, equity and nonland inputs can be character­
ized by the singular solutions (10.1), (10.2) and (13). The optimal land 
purchases can be complex for the general land price path, but the 
important implications of the adjustment cost for this study can be seen 
by examining the special cases used in the land availability limit 
analysis. Land purchases can be characterized by noting that if the 
interior solution: 
(23.1) 
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is to hold over time, then its first derivative with respect to time must 
also hold: 
(23.2) «2^ =i(\t " *t%4t) 
«2t ~ ~ ^^)/p(l-t)](r+r'^-j}(l-t) 
The optimal change in the rate of land purchase at any time is known if 
the current farm acreage is known. If land use is above the optimum and 
land is being acquired, the land purchases will be increased because the 
right hand side of equation (23.2) is the negative of the net marginal 
product of land. If land is below the optimum, the rate of change in 
land purchases will be decreasing. This may seem to be a paradoxical 
relationships, but the intuitive sense behind this plan can be seen by 
observing the connection between the current level of net marginal 
product of land and land acquisitions. If the net marginal product of 
land is high indicating that land use is below the optimum, acreage are 
also likely to be large, unless the conditions encouraging large farm 
size are only temporary. Hence, condition (23.2) indicates that when the 
net marginal value product of land is large, land acquisition is 
increasing, but at a decreasing rate. This is logical because as land is 
purchased, the land use level approaches the optimum and land 
141 
acquisitions must decrease. If the net marginal value product of land is 
negative, land acquisitions will be made only if there is some demand for 
a larger farm size in the future so that the return to the marginal unit 
of land over the remaining horizon is positive (Q>0). Hence, land acqui­
sitions are building up to some future larger optimal farm size. With 
adjustment cost it is likely to be optimal to spread the acquisitions out 
over a long period to reduce purchases and adjustment cost in each 
period. As the time the large farm size will be optimal approaches, 
acquisitions are likely to increase because the present value of the gain 
from optimal farm size becomes larger. Equation (23.2) suggests 
precisely this pattern of land purchases increasing rate. 
For the beginning farmer problem, the adjustment cost model suggests 
and land acquisition path that begins with large land purchases that 
decrease as the optimal farm size is approached in contrast to the linear 
land acquisition path imposed by the constant land availability limit. 
If the difference between the initial farm size and the optimal size is 
large, then farm size is likely to be below the optimum for some time and 
the return to the marginal unit of land over the remaining horizon is 
likely to be large at time zero. This suggests a large initial level of 
land purchases. This is reasonable because initial land purchases will 
produce income over the whole planning period and, hence, a larger 
adjustment cost can be justified in that case. As in the limited land 
availability model, the adjustment cost will tend to obscure the impact 
of capital gain on farm size. Farm acreage will be below the optimum for 
a substantial part of the planning horizon and if adjustment costs are 
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large or the difference between, the initial and optimum acreage is large 
the optimum farm size may never be reached. 
As in the land availability limit case, the second special case 
shows the "buying ahead" phenomenon. This case assumes that the land 
price is stable in the initial part of the planning horizon, but large 
capital gains occur in the later part of the horizon. The singular 
control path of the basic model showed no land acquisitions until land 
prices start rising and then large purchases are made. The large 
purchases are unlikely to be optimal with adjustment costs so there will 
be incentive to spread buying over a larger period. If it is assumed 
that the producer starts with a farm size at the stable price optimum at 
time zero, condition (23.2) suggests that the optimal acquisition 
strategy demands positive land purchases at time zero. If the plan of 
waiting until land prices start to rise to begin buying land is used the 
net marginal value product of land will be positive at the point when 
land prices begin to rise and capital gains start to offset other 
ownership costs. This implies that the rate of land purchases should 
decrease at that point. But the rate of purchase up to that point is 
zero so no purchases would ever be made. Condition (23.2) does not allow 
"buying ahead" to start anywhere in the period between time zero and the 
land price rise. In this period, if no initial purchases are made, the 
net marginal value product of land is zero because initial farm size is 
the stable price optimum, implying that the rate of change of land 
purchases is zero. If land purchases are zero and the rate of change of 
land purchases are zero then purchasing can not begin. If an initial 
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land purchase is made, the net marginal value product of land will become 
negative as the stable price optimal farm size is exceeded. Using 
; 
condition (23.2), this implies land purchases increasing at an increasing 
rate, building up farm acreage to take advantage of the later capital 
gains without incurring large adjustment costs. The crucial choice in 
this strategy is the initial purchase. The initial purchase and 
condition (23.2) imply the land purchase strategy. The initial purchases 
must be choosen so that equation (23.1) is satisfied when the return to 
the marginal unit of land over the remaining horizon is evaluated along 
that strategy. This problem can be expressed as a second order differen­
tial equation with boundary value conditions. The problem can be solved, 
but does not add analytical insights. 
An adjustment cost problem could also be constructed for the income 
approach model. The results would be similar to those in the land avail­
ability limits case. Debt usage would be restricted in part of the 
beginning farmer problem and exaggerated in part of the "buying ahead" 
problem. 
Equity Investment Limits 
Retained earnings is the major source of investment equity on U.S. 
farms. The model can be manipulated to limit investment to retained 
earnings by defining a new control variable for operator withdrawals from 
current earning. Let this control be noted u^^. The portion of unreal­
ized gain that is a substitute for current income must be treated as a 
withdrawal to avoid double counting the unrealized gain in meeting the 
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financial constraint. Unrealized gain is deducted from the capital 
requirement in the financial constraint (Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985, p. 51); 
if the fraction of unrealized that is a substitute for current income 
could be saved and become part of invested equity (k^ ) then that part of 
unrealized gain would be subtracted twice. The unrealized capital gain 
could be saved and added to equity, and included in the accumulated 
unrealized capital gain term . With the control variable for 
operation or withdrawal from current earnings equity investment can then 
be expressed as current income minus the withdrawal variables. Hence, 
constraint (2.1) becomes for the wealth approach case: 
d 
(2.1') = ujj. = [pf(x^, lj - yjxj. - yglc - r(^)dj(l-t)-u^^ 
The objective function in this model is the maximization of the 
discounted value of withdrawals: 
(!') max Z = + (^ê|.Lj.]dt+e"^^^"'^^^[K|,+(l-<{>-'l'T)Gj 
It is assumed that the entire terminal value is withdrawn from the 
business. If the control variable for withdrawals is limited to positive 
values, equity investment is limited to current income. This formulation 
is a rearrangement of equations (1) and (2.1) which allows the equity 
investment to be constrained to retained earnings by limiting the range 
of a control variable within exogenous bounds. Most of the body of 
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theory on singular control deals with controls limited in this way. The 
alternative would be to place an inequality constraint on the basic model 
limiting equity investment to less than or equal to the current income. 
Singular control problems in the presence of such constraints have not 
been widely studied. Savings from off-farm earnings could be included in 
the model, by adding an off-farm income term to the current income 
expression. In a simple model, this term could be a function of time to 
reflect earning trends over time. 
The relationship of this model to revious formulations can be seen 
by substituting constraint (2.1*) into the basic objective function (1). 
The Hamiltonian becomes: 
(3-) h= +x,^{[pf[x^, (1-T ) 
- 4t^ + St "2t ^  St"3t 
d 
* "4t' * ^5t h't 
The adjoint variables are defined by equations similar to (5.1-5.5): 
(5-1') h - ^ ^lt"ht^ (1-^) 
(5-2') - -^2t " (^lt"^4t)[(fflry2)(l-t)] + g*+^5t^t 
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(5.3') ii" = -x3^ = (aie - x^j(pfx-yi)(l-t) 
(5-4') 
3H 
(5-5') 3f"=-^5t = ° 
t 
and the transversality conditions (6.1-6.5). The optimal control is 
singular and bang-bang defined by (4.2), (4.3) and: 
0 if e-P(l-T): + X4; < 0 
(4.4) u^j. = ^singular if e"^= 0 
» if + ^4t > 0 
The sufficiency arguments are the same as for previous models. The 
Hamiltonian can be shown to be concave in the state variables. The form 
of the Hessian is the same as for the basic model with the exponential 
discounting term [ e"^ replaced by the adjoint variable terra 
which is shown below to take an exponential form in the 
optimal solution. Along the singular arc, the generalized Legendre-
Clebsch condition is the same as for the basic model. 
Alternative discounting term 
The optimal pattern of withdrawals can be characterized by solving 
equations (5.1') and (5.4') simultaneously and substituting the resulting 
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expressions into (4.4). The sum in (4.4) can be seen as an 
alternate discounting term that captures the impact of equity shortages. 
Expression (4.4) indicates that if the absolute value of the alternative 
discounting term is greater than the value of the standard discounting 
term then all current income should be saved. Solving the 
first order differential equation system (5.1') and (5.4') for the 
alternative discounting term can be accomplished by subtracting (5.4') 
from (5.1') yielding: 
(24) - = (X^^ - \J(r'(^]^+(r+r'[^)](l-T) 
and using the transformation: 
\ - st -\t 
\ - ^it " ^4t 
Hence, the system of differential equations can be expressed as a single 
first order equation in Y with the solution: 
-p ( 1-T ) T+J h dr 
(25) = e 
where: 
= (r'(^)^+r+r'(-=^)) (1-T) 
kt/ 'kt 
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where the constant has been evaluated using the transversality 
conditions. The term reflects the return to the marginal unit of 
equity over the remaining horizon. By substituting into (4.4) it can 
be seen that along the singular arc: 
(26.1) 
which implies: 
T 
(26.2) p (1-t )t -p (1-t)T+J^h^dr = 0 
If equation (26.2) is to hold over time, its first derivative with 
respect to time must also be zero. But the first derivative of equation 
(26.2) is the financial structure equation (9) developed in the case of 
unlimited access to equity. Hence, along the totally singular arc the 
previously defined optimal capital structure and controls hold and the 
alternative discounting term (Y^) reduces to the simple discounting term 
because: 
-p(1-t)T + /^h^dr = -p(1-t)T + /^p(l-t)d 
= -p(l-T)T + p (l-T)T-p(l-T)t 
= -P(1-T)t 
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The adjoint variables needed to evaluate expressions (4.2-4.4) can 
be found by substituting into equations (5.1*-5.5*) and integrating, 
using the transversality conditions to evaluate the constants: 
(7.1*) T^)T+/sh^dr + ^-P(1-T)T 
« -p ( 1-T ) T+J h dr 
(7.2') - /((e [(pf^-ïjlCl-T)] 
—p ( 1—t ) ty \ 
+ e (l-<i>-i('T) 
„ -p(l-T)T+/\ dr 
(7.3*) = /t® (pfj^-y^)(l-t)ds 
~ -p ( 1-T ) T+f h dr D 
(7.4*) = - J^e (r+r'(—)] (l-T)ds 
(7.5') Xg^ = 
From equation (7.1*) and (7.4*) it can be seen that an alternate expres­
sion for is the present value of the marginal cost of debt and the 
marginal return to equity over the remaining horizon, discounted at a 
rate that is less than or equal to the discounting in the freely variable 
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equity case. When equity is a binding constraint at some point in the 
planning horizon, the input and financial variables must be determined 
simultaneously. Equity will be constraining only as production or land 
ownership returns create a demand for expansion. The problem is 
essentially to decide whether current withdrawals or savings, with the 
promise of higher withdrawals in the future, will maximize wealth. 
Control paths in two special cases 
In general, the exact combination of singular and bang-bang controls 
depends on the functional forms and the parameter values. It is, 
however, useful to re-examine the two special cases of the beginning 
farmer and the established farmer faced with a stable land price early in 
the planning period, but sharply rising land price later. If the 
beginning farmer starts with no land or debt and a pool of equity far 
less than would be needed to finance the optimum farm size identified in 
the perfectly variable equity case, then the initial adjustment would 
entail acquiring land, nonland inputs and debt until the singular equali­
ties in expressions (4.2) and (4.3) hold when evaluated with the adjoint 
variables (7.1'-7.5'). Withdrawals would be zero and all current produc­
tion income would be reinvested if the leverage is higher than the 
optimal level for the perfectly variable equity case at any point along 
the candidate path without offsetting low leverage points. This is 
because when leverage is higher than the variable equity optimum, the 
term h^ is larger than the discount rate, the absolute value of the 
exponent in is smaller than the after-tax discount rate, is larger 
than the discounting term (e"^ and decision rule (4.4) indicates 
151 
zero withdrawals. In nonmathematical terms, this means that the returns 
to equity in the future are sufficiently large that retaining current 
earnings increases wealth. 
Offsetting low leverage points can occur in several situations. One 
is the "saving ahead" phenomena, analogous to the "buying ahead" identi­
fied in previous models. "Saving ahead" is discussed below for the 
established farmer special case. In the beginning farmer case low lever­
age ratios may occur if conditions are such that expansion is slowed or 
temporarily stopped at some point in the horizon, thereby reducing total 
capital demand and debt use at those points. This would reduce the 
present value of the marginal capital cost and signal a smaller incentive 
to current savings. For instance, this could happen if there is a period 
of farmland price declines in this general period of capital gains. 
Expansion just prior to and during the decline could be slowed, but 
savings may continue so that the firm is in a position to expand when 
capital gains resume. Thus, equity may be relatively plentiful in this 
period. 
That leverage will be higher than the variable equity optimum early 
in the horizon of the beginning farmer problems can be seen by examining 
the singular land purchase equation: 
FT -P(1-T)S 
+ J e < #6gdg + e 
-P(1-T)T, 
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In the initial instantaneous adjustment, the equity can be treated as 
fixed; the adjustment can be thought of as taking no time, so there is ao 
time to generate current production income to be saved. If the leverage 
ratio is set at the variable equity optimum given the relatively small 
and fixed amount of equity, the amount of land that can be financed will 
be small and the marginal product of land higher than the variable equity 
optimum. The marginal value product of land minus current and financial 
costs would be positive until the variable equity optimum farm size could 
be acquired and the singular equality would not hold. By taking on a 
debt load beyond that specified by the unconstrained model, more land 
could be acquired, increasing financial cost and lowering the marginal 
value product of land. In this way, the singular equality could be 
achieved. 
If the decision maker starts out with some land and debt, it is 
possible that the debt cost may be high enough so that the left hand size 
of equation (27) is negative and no land acquisitions are made until the 
debt load is reduced. Given that the beginning farm size is far below 
the variable equity optimum and the marginal productivity of land is 
relatively high, this would still indicate a leverage ratio higher than 
those indicated in the unconstrained problem over at least part of the 
horizon. 
If the land price path was such that equation (14) held throughout 
the horizon in the unconstrained equity case, reinvestment of all produc­
tion income would continue until the variable equity optimum leverage 
ratio could be achieved or the end of the planning horizon. Retaining 
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earnings is the wealth maximizing decision because the marginal dollar 
invested when the farm size is below the optimum and the leverage ratio 
above the variable equity optimum earns a return larger than the discount 
rate, thereby increasing the net present value. Because there are no 
liquidity loss in the terminal value, limit level saving can occur right 
up to the end of the planning horizon. As farm size grows the leverage 
ratio needed to maintain the equality (27) would drop, with the leverage 
ratio approaching the variable equity optimum as the farm size approached 
the optimum. Explicit singular control variables for land and nonland 
inputs can be derived by solving simultaneously the second derivatives 
with respect to time of the singular land and nonland input equations and 
the change in debt constraint (2.4). These controls contain terms 
similar to control equations (13) and (17) with adjustments for limited 
equity which reduce acquisitions, plus terms depending on equity invest­
ment. Because leverage is changing along the singular path these control 
equations are much more complicated than (13) and (17). They are not 
derived here because they do not add substantially to the analytic power 
of the model. 
Farmland capital gains have an effect on the farm size and leverage 
ratio path needed to achieve equality (27). All other things equal, the 
larger the capital gain the higher the leverage ratio and the larger the 
farm size needed to establish the equality. Hence, when equity invest­
ment is limited to retained earnings for the beginning farmer problem, 
farm size is smaller than it would be in the unconstrained case, but the 
effects of capital gains are still present. Farm size is still larger 
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than it would be if the capital gains were ignored in the decision 
process. When equity is constrained, capital gains increase the wealth 
maximizing leverage, even for the wealth approach model. Similar results 
could be derived for the income approach case, with leverage being 
increased both by the substitutability of unrealized capital gain for net 
worth and by the equity constraint. 
In the second problem, if prices are stable in the early part of the 
period and a farmer begins the planning process with farm size, nonland 
input use and leverage at the stable price, variable equity optimum, then 
both "saving ahead" and "buying ahead" will tend to occur. In the uncon­
strained problem, equity investment would not start until land prices 
started to rise in the later part of the planning horizon. If the rate 
at which equity investment is demanded in the unconstrained model exceeds 
current income, and the land price path is as shown in Figure la, there 
will be a segment of limit level retained earnings. As in the case of 
the land availability constraint, the problem is in deciding where that 
limit level segment begins. If expression (4.4) is evaluated along the 
equity investment path suggested by the unconstrained problem, a logical 
contradiction occurs. The candidate path shows no equity investment 
until late in the planning horizon, but expression (4.4) shows limit 
level investment at the initial time because equity will be a binding 
constraint at some point and the debt use indicated by the simultaneous 
solution of the singular land and nonland input equation and the finan­
cial constraint will be above the variable equity optimum, with the 
result that is greater than the discounting term (e"^^^ is 
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not reasonable to start the limit level investment later than the time at 
which it occurs in the unconstrained model, because this would increase 
» 
the losses from suboptimal farm size and high leverage. By beginning 
limit level savings before the land price started to rise, the decision 
maker could find a feasible control path that would balance the losses 
from larger than usual equity levels in the period before the land price 
rise with gains from a leverage level closer to the optimum after land 
price starts to increase. Losses from equity levels above the variable 
equity optimum would occur because as equity is increased, the marginal 
cost of debt drops and in the decision rules for land and nonland input 
use this means lower financial cost and greater input use. But the extra 
inputs beyond the variable equity optimum earn returns below the cost of 
equity and hence the objective function value will be reduced because the 
present value of returns will not exceed the present value of immediate 
withdrawal. The interval between the beginning of limit level savings 
and of the land price rise would depend primarily on how sharp the land 
price rise is and on the size of current production income. If the land 
price rise is modest or the production income is close to the equity 
demand, then the interval will be small. If the capital gains are very 
large, so that the demand for equity is large, or if the production 
income is small, the interval may be large. In some cases, limit level 
saving may start at the beginning of the planning horizon. 
The "buying ahead" of farmland in this model occurs at least 
partially because there are no other investment opportunities within the 
decision framework. Even if the return on this alternative investment 
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were lower Chan the discount rate, so that it would not be a relevant 
option in the unconstrained problem, it may increase returns to store 
equity needed in the future in the nonfarm investments, compared to 
investments in farmland and nonland inputs beyond the optimal levels. 
This example should not be taken to indicate that "buying ahead" is a 
common result of anticipated equity shortages by farmers. The dampening 
effect on land purchase by equity constraints suggested in the beginning 
farmer problem is a more likely scenario. The buying ahead in the second 
problem does indicate that constraining equity does not always dampen the 
effects of capital gains. 
Land Price Risk 
The future path of land prices is not known with certainty and this 
lack of certain knowledge may have major consequences for the decision 
maker. If farm decisions are based on the expected level and rate of 
change of land prices and the expected path is not realized, then farm 
size, financial structure and enterprise choice decision may be non-
optimal. In some cases, the nonoptimal choice may be disasterous. For 
instance, if a producer expects large land price increases and chooses a 
large farm size with a heavy debt load, but capital losses are realized, 
then he or she may be forced out of agricultural production when lenders 
observe the large debt compared to the reduced value of assets and decide 
that continued lending to this business is too risky. This part of the 
study sought to model and identify important ways in which land price 
risk affects the input levels, financial structure and enterprise choice 
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of the expected wealth maximizing producer. This study concentrates on 
the risk neutral case because it is mathematically more tractable and 
because risk neutral results are often used as a benchmark for further 
analysis. It was assumed that the state variables at the initial time 
are known and the paths of parameters other than the land price is 
deterministic. 
The use of expected wealth as the appropriate objective function is 
based on von Neumann-Morgenstem utility theory (Hey, pp. 27-37) and 
requires the assumption that the lack of certainty about land prices is 
risk in the classic sense, that is probabilities can be attached to 
future land prices. Obviously, the exact probability distributions of 
future land prices are not known, but it seems reasonable that a decision 
maker could take objective information on past land price realizations 
and current economic trends, plus subjective judgments, and form some 
probability estimates. 
Land purchases by the decision maker are unlikely to contribute to 
the reliability of the land price path estimates, hence an adaptive 
control formulation is not required. If the area were isolated from 
larger markets for durable assets and if the producer had potential 
market power in that area's farmland market, it might be possible to 
learn more about the extent of that market power by varying land 
purchase, but this seems to be an implausible scenario for U.S. 
conditions. For similar reasons, the usual control theory formulation in 
which the objective function includes a probability function as a state 
variable or as a function of state variables is inappropriate. For most 
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U.S. producers, the probability density of farmland prices is not 
controllable and does not depend on their input and financial decisions 
individually. 
For some versions of the model, however, the evolution of the state 
variables is affected by land price path realizations because the 
equations of motion (2.4 and 2.5) include stochastic land price terms. 
Hence, the stochastic control formulation which utilizes the stochastic 
calculus of Ito and dynamic programming arguments is most appropriate. A 
more detailed explanation of this methodology may be found in Dreyfus 
(1965, pp. 214-219), Kamien and Schwartz (1981, Section 21) or Arnold, 
(1973, pp. 220-224). This formulation derives the optimal feedback 
control in which new information is taken into account at every point in 
the planning horizon. Hence, the focus of the analysis must be on the 
rules for the "first best choice" of input levels and financial 
structure. The time paths of land, nonland inputs, debt and equity can 
not be meaningfully derived because the decisions will depend on land 
price realizations at every point. 
Stochastic land price path 
The stochastic control formulation depends on the assumption that 
the change in the land price path over time can be modeled as the sura of 
a deterministic term which may depend on time the current land price 
realization, and a white noise (or random walk) term: 
(28.1) = 6(t, + o St 
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where: 
8(") = any real function of time and the current land price, 
Ç = a white noise process and 
a = a constant which is related to the variance of the land price. 
The white noise process is defined to be normal and independently 
distributed with a zero mean at every point. There is no known physical 
process which can exactly be called white noise because the assumption of 
independence demands extremely irregular behavior and because the assump­
tion of constant spectral density requires an infinite variance. The 
white noise process is a useful mathematical concept because it can be 
linked to ordinary calculus methods by the stochastic calculus of Ito 
(Arnold, Chapters 4 and 5). Using the theory of generalized functions 
white noise can be shown to be the first derivative of a Weiner process 
(Arnold, 1973, p. 68): 
(29) = Çj. or Sgds 
where: W = a Weiner process. 
A Weiner process is assumed to be such that (w(t^)-w(tj) are normally and 
independently distributed with zero mean and variance (t^-t^) for all 
t^>tj. A Weiner process is continuous, but nowhere differentiable in the 
usual sense of the word. This leads to the differential representation 
of the land price path: 
(28.2) dg = e^dt + odW 
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or the integral representation: 
(28.3) 6^ = Gg + /gSsds + f^adW 
The expected value of the land price level is then: 
(29.1) E[BJ = Bq + /J 0^ds 
and the land price change expected value is: 
(29.2) E[B^] = 0J. 
Impact of land price risk, wealth approach 
The wealth approach problem for the case of stochastic land price 
can be represented by substituting the land price path (28.1) into 
equation (1) and taking the expected value: 
(!') Z - '''["c * - Ulc]dc 
where: 
The form of constraints (2.1-2.4) and (2.6) is unchanged. The debt 
acquisition constraint (2.4) contains the land price level, which is 
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stochastic, but the constraint is not a function of the change in land 
price. Hence, representation as a stochastic differential equation is 
not required. The accumulated unrealized gain constraint becomes a 
stochastic differential equation: 
(2.5') dG^ = L^e^d^ + oL^dW 
when the land price change (28.1) and the Weiner process representation 
(28.2) are substituted into (2.5) 
Because of the stochastic land price, the usual control theory 
techniques can not be used in the maximization of equation (1'). The 
optimization can, however, be carried out by converting the problem to a 
discrete time dynamic programming problem and allowing the increments of 
time to become very small. The optimal value function is: 
(30.1) J(I, t) = the maximum expected discounted value of current 
income and capital gains and losses over the 
remaining horizon from time t to T, with the 
vector of initial values I=(k^ , 
and assuming an optimal feedback policy is 
followed. 
The recurrence relation with current income and capital gains and losses 
discounted to time zero is: 
30.2) J(I, t) = max E{e~^^^~^^'^[i:|.+Lj.(ej.+ç)-Uj|.]At+J(I+AI, t+At)} 
where: At = a small increment of time. 
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The maximization in recurrence relation (30.2) is subject to constraints 
(2.1-2.4), (2.5') and (2.6). The boundary condition is: 
-p(l-T)Tr (30.3) J(I, T) = e^ ~ [x^+G^d-i)-#)] 
The final term on the right hand side of the recurrance relation can be 
evaluated by expanding it in a Taylor series and substituting in the 
control constraints: 
(30.4) J(I+AI, t+ût) s J(I, t) + J^At + Jj.Al + h.o.t. 
= J(I, t) + J^At + J^U^^At 
+ J u At + J u At 
L 2t X 3t 
^ •^D^®t"2t ^ *"3t - "it^A" 
+ J 0 L A + J L ffAW 
G t t t G t 
1 2 2 2 
+ Lj.AW + h.o.t. 
where : 
AW = a small increment in the Weiner process, 
Al = a small increment in each element of the vector I and 
h.o.t = higher order terms. 
Expression (30.4) is a stochastic differential equation and it may be 
simplified using Ito's Theorem (Arnold, 1973, pp. 101-105). In 
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2 particular, this theorem shows that 6W =At. This can be intuitively 
understood by noting that the Weiner process is defined so that: 
and 
e[aw] = e[w|.2 - = 0 
e[aw^] = e[(Wj.2 - = t^-t^ = At. 
By substituting expression (30.4) into (30.2), taking the expectation, 
subtracting J(I, t) from.both sides, dividing by t and allowing At to go 
to zero, the recurrance relation can be characterized by the determi­
nistic differential equation: 
(30.5) 0 = max u^^, Ug^, u^^ * ^t®t ~ "it^'^'^t 
+ vit + -^l^zt " •^x"3 + 
+ + *"3t - %lt) 
" ^g^t®t " 
The expected value of the land price in (30.5) is defined by (19.1). The 
expectation of the product equals the product of the expected 
land price multiplied by the land purchase and the derivative of the 
recurrence relation with respect to debt because the land purchase, like 
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the other controls, is deterministic and because the recurrence relation 
is already in expected value terms. 
The conditions for an interior maximum are: 
31.2) J + E(B ]j =0 
L t D 
31.3) J + aj = 0 
X D 
Based on the arguments present for the deterministic model with freely 
variable equity the control path for equity and nonland inputs will be 
characterized by an initial adjustment followed by a singular arc which 
maintains the interior maximum conditions (31.1) and (31.3). Hence, 
equations (31.1) and (31.3) will hold everywhere except possibly at the 
first instant while the initial adjustment occurs. If there is unlimited 
land availability the land purchase path after the first instant will be 
characterized by equation (31.2) or by 0^2=0. Hence, along the maximiz­
ing path after the first instant the terms containing control variables 
will vanish and the recurrence relation can be characterized by: 
31.1) - e -p(l-T)t 
30.6) -Jj. = e -p(l-T)t 
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If the initial adjustment occurs instantaneously and is thought of as 
taking no time, equation (30.6) will hold' over the entire remaining 
planning horizon after t, though it may not hold as t^ approaches t from 
below. Because the stochastic process is assumed to be continuous, 
planned discontinuos adjustments in the control variables will occur only 
in the initial adjustment at time zero. The "first best choice" at time 
zero will be the initial adjustment that allows conditions (31.1, 31.3 
and 31.2 or "2t~®^ to hold over the remaining horizon. After time zero, 
the first best choice will be the control that maintains those conditions 
in the next instant. As in the case of deterministic, singular control 
the argument for optimality of this solution is based on satisfaction of 
known necessary of conditions and the plausibility of the solution. 
Solving the differential equation 
Analysis of the first best choice decision rules implied by 
conditions (31.1-31.3) requires an explicit solution of the partial dif­
ferential equation (30.6). Expression (30.6) takes the form of a non-
homogeneous diffusion equation and analytic solutions to this type of 
problem are well known. The approach here will be to guess a solution to 
the problem based on solutions constructed formally for a more limited 
set of conditions. It will be verified that the solution satisfies 
equation (30.6) and the conditions under which the solution is bounded 
will be specified. Proof of the uniqueness of this solution is desir­
able, but is not attempted in this study. The focus will be on the 
applicability of the decision rules generated. 
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It can be shown (Cannon, 1984, p. 338) that the solution to the 
problem: 
32) dR = Rggdt + h(G, t)dt 
R(G, 0) = g(G) 
is of the form: 
R(G, t) = f^K(G-s, t)g(s)ds + , t-v)h(s, v)dsdv 
where: 
_ (G-s)^ 
K(G-s, t) = —-—J- e 
[4irt): 
s = a variable of integration. 
In constructing this solution the functions F and g are assumed to be 
bounded. The equation (30.6) can be put in the form of problem (32) by 
employing the following transformations (Cannon, pp. 15-16): 
33.1) 
33.2) t* = T-t 
33.3) t** = - /J ^ Vds = /J 
167 
It is also useful to express the inverse of the relationship defined in 
equation (33.3): 
f 
* ** ** 
t = A(t ) or t = T-A(t ) 
The transformation (33.1) eliminates the terra in (30.6) which involves 
the first derivative of the recurrence relation with respect to the 
accumulated capital gain (jg)• The transformation (33.2) reverses the 
time index so that the terminal value (30.3) becomes the initial value. 
Transformation (33.3) incorporates the time varying coefficient of the 
second derivative term into the time index variable. 
The recurrence relation is expressed as a function of the original 
levels of the state variables. In order for solution (32) to be of that 
form, the deterministic state variables must be expressed as a function 
of their original level and of time. The stochastic accumulated capital 
gain variable will be expressed in this way because of transformation 
(33.1). Assuming that the appropriate singular controls can be defined 
as functions of time, land, nonland inputs, debt and equity can be 
expressed as the sum of their original level and the integral over the 
dynamic constraints (2.1-2.4). For example, the equity variable 
becomes: 
^t = kq + /q 
"ic 
where: = the optimal equity investment control 
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If Che transformed function is denoted J then its first derivative with 
respect to time is: 
* * * 
where: U , U = optimal land and nonland input controls which can be 
2t 3t 
simplified to 
• -"t ' - jgl/, 
using the interior maximum conditions (31.1-31.3). Thus, the problem 
(30.6) can be written: 
** 
(30.6') j = j , * + )1[, 
t G G T-A[t J 
where: J = J [G , t J 
with initial value: 
— * —o(l—T)Tr * T (30.3') J(G , 0) = e [K? + G (1-4-4?)] 
Even with the transformation, however, the partial differential 
equation problem defined by equations (30.6') and (30.3') does not 
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exactly fit the form of problem (32), which requires the functions f and 
g to be bounded. As the accumulated capital gain goes to infinity, the 
initial value (30.3*) becomes unbounded so that this condition can not be 
met. But it is often true in solving partial differential equations that 
the solutions apply to a broader range of case than the formal conditions 
necessary for constructing those solutions. Hence, the guess is made 
that the solution to the problem defined by (30.6') and (30.3') is of the 
same form as the solution to problem (32). In terms of the original 
variables, the candidate solution is: 
(33) J(I, t) = J_ 
, rT . 2/,T 2 2 
1 
f ft 2 2 /z [ml lgds) 
e 
' + S(l-*-*T)]dS 
r fV . 2/ v2 2 
fTf- 1 -(G+/tVs'^=-^V^/t= ^s ds 
+ JtJ- r = 
_ ^-p(l T)Vj-^^ + L^e^ô-U^^ldSdv 
where: s, S = variables of integration. 
The solution is the expected value of current income and capital 
gain over the remaining horizon, given a normal distribution of 
accumulated unrealized capital gains with a mean at any time of: 
(34.1) Wy = G[ + I^LgGgds, v 2 + 
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and variance: 
The form of the distribution function is a result of the assumption o^ 
normal white noise in the land price change. The mean of the distribu­
tion is simply the expected value of capital gains given a specified land 
ownership path. Because of the time varying coefficient of the second 
derivative term in equation (30.6), the variance takes an integral form 
and is the sum over time of the total variance in capital gain for all 
land owned. In the simple case in which land ownership is constant and 
the decision maker stands at point zero, the variance takes the form: 
In solving the partial differential equation problem, the state variables 
other than G can be treated as parameters of the J function, because they 
are controllable and their derivatives do not appear in (30.6). The form 
of the solution for the wealth approach can be simplified by noting that 
the state variables other than G are not affected by the integration over 
S, Hence, the terms in those state variables can be brought through the 
integral. It is also true that: 
(35) r 
t s ' 
1 -( G+J L 9 ds—S r CJ L ds ^ t s s t s dS = 1 
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because Che integrant of (35) is a normal density function. Hence, the 
solution can be written: 
(33.1) J(I, t) = + (W-#) Ï 
(2Tr/^a\^ds)"^ 
* » t s •-< ]dv 
•" t "• V V V Iv" 
= + E(G^)(l-<j)-'l'T)] 
jT^-P(1-T)V[^ + L 0 ^_u* ]dv 
J t "• V V V Iv" 
Along Che optimal path, the recurrence relation is simply the expected 
neC present value of current return and capital gain. The land 
purchases, acquisition of nonland inputs, equity investment and changes 
in debt used are deCermined by decision rules (31.1-31.3). 
The soluCion can be verified by differenciacing Che candidate 
solution and forming the equation (30.6). In taking the derivatives, it 
should be remembered that the state variables are initial levels of 
assets and can be represented in the form: 
Kt = Ko + fo*lsds 
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The initial level of the asset does not vary with time and hence taking 
the derivative of the recurrence relation with respect to the state 
variables can be treated as taking the derivative under the integral with 
respect to a parameter. By substituting the derivatives of the candidate 
solution into equation (30.6) and using the interior maximum conditions 
(31.1-31.3) to simplify the following identity is formed: 
- /I L_ g-[(v-S^a*^+p(l-T)Tl[^ + S(W-*T)] 
^2 + 2(P-S)L^0^ - (u-s)\J dS 
20 
-P(l-T)t 
+ e 
T 8 r 1 -[u-s] 720*^1- 2(u-s) 
c t 1 / *2 
(2*a*2]2 
+ S(l_*^T))]dS 
•] 
T2f® 1 _-[w-s] /2o r(w-S) 1 1 
f" -co 1 / I. *4 ~ *2^ 
(2110*^)^ 
» S(H,-n))]dS 
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The solution (33) will be bounded even though the terminal value term is 
unbounded as the accumulated unrealized capital gain approaches infinity 
because the exponential term in S will dominate the linear term in S and 
drive the integrand to zero as S goes to +" or 
Decision rules examined 
The decision rules can be better understood by taking the derivative 
of the recurrence relation with respect to the state variables and 
substituting those derivatives into equations (31.1-31.3). The decision 
rules for the financial structure and the nonland inputs take the same 
form as in the deterministic case. The derivatives of the recurrence 
relation with respect to equity, debt and nonland inputs are identical to 
the adjoint variables previously defined (7.1) (7.3) and (7.4). At first 
glance, the derivative with respect to land differs from its determin­
istic counterpart because of the way land affects the expected value of 
unrealized gain. Land occurs in both the mean and variance terms of the 
accumulated unrealized gain density function. The change in the expected 
value of accumulated unrealized gain with respect to land is: 
t s 
s[;5,:L;ds]-:{[[G+r2l,8,ds-s): - f5,=L;ds][;5,:L,ds] 
- (g+/^L 6 ds-s)(/^a^L^ds)/^0 ds}dS tss t s '^t s 
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By expanding the mean minus the random variable term, the derivative can 
be written as a sum of the moments and products of moments of G^: 
(36.2) -j—= -l. + (u^+3pa*^]-pa*^] 
^0 o* 
- [u^-(a*^+w^)] f^Ggds} 
where: 
rT, 
= G + 8 ds 
t S S 
2 T 2 
a* = fj.0 Lgds . 
In deriving equation (36.2) it is useful to note that the third moment of 
2 3 
a nominal distribution can be expressed as 3yff +ii . Equation (36.2) can 
be simplified to: 
9E(G 1 
(36.3) aiq = - e[b^) 
Hence, the decision rule for land purchases is of the same form as the 
control developed in the deterministic case, with the land price path 
terms replaced by their expected values. This certainty equivalence 
result occurs because the land price and capital gain terras enter the 
model linearly. Land price risk has a more complex effect in the income 
approach model because the accumulated unrealized capital gain term 
occurs in the nonlinear debt cost function. 
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Impact of land price risk, income approach 
Up Co Che simplification of Che recurrence relaCion in equaCion 
(33.1) the development of Che income approach model is identical to the 
wealth approach model except ChaC Che currenC income term is replaced 
with: 
- ''iV 
Because G occurs in the current income term of the income approach model, 
the simplification includes an expected debt cost term: 
(33.1') J(I, t) = g-P (!-?)?[+ (1-*-#) fZo Ï e ^ ^ Sds] 
(2na*^)^ 
.00 1 -(u-s)^ /2a*^  D * 
- /-» T® +u)S^ ](l-T)dS+Ly8y*-Uiy }dv 
( 2%o*^) ^ 
= + (W-#)E(G^]] 
D ^ 
V V 
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That this is indeed a solution can be verified by differentiating and 
substituting into equation (30.6). The solution will be bounded if the 
debt cost function is bounded everywhere except perhaps as the leverage 
ratio goes to negative infinity and if the exponential term in the normal 
density function dominates the debt cost function as capital losses 
become infinite. The boundedness of the solution revolves around the 
behavior of debt cost as net worth becomes small or negative. Usually, 
the credit available to a decision maker will be limited and it is likely 
that for some value of the leverage ratio no more credit will be avail­
able at any interest rate. Certainly, for negative leverage ratios, 
commercial credit sources will dry up and even family members or friends 
will be reluctant to lend. Taken literally, this means that the cost of 
debt is infinite beyond the credit cut-off point. But this literal 
interpretation ignores the financial and legal responses open to the 
borrower and to the lender. The first response to leverage position 
beyond the cut-off point is likely to be debt and asset restructuring. 
Assets would be sold to retire debt and reestablish a viable financial 
structure. This liquidation may be voluntary or forced through 
foreclosure. The cost of the restructuring to the borrower is the 
liquidity loss incurred due to rapid sale of assets. The liquidity loss 
may be large, but it will be finite. If the liquidity losses are very 
large or if the asset prices have dropped substantially, the decision 
maker may not be able to reestablish a viable financial structure and is 
forced out of business. In that case another cost is incurred, the loss 
of future income from the firm. Again, this may be large, but it will be 
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finite in most cases. If some debt remains after the liquidation of 
assets, the decision maker has the legal option of bankruptcy which 
limits the liability for debt cost as the net worth becomes very small or 
negative. Without bankruptcy, the remaining debt would continue to 
generate interest costs which could never be repaid because there is no 
income after firm liquidation. The present value of this cost of remain­
ing debt would tend toward infinity because the debt cost would be high 
in a negative net worth situation and because the interest charges would 
accumulate over an infinite horizon. Without bankruptcy or similar legal 
procedure, the decision maker always remains liable for the debt. With 
the availability of the bankruptcy option the cost of the remaining debt 
after liquidation is also finite. Hence, the cost of having a debt load 
such that the leverage ratio is greater than the cut-off point is likely 
to be large, but finite under the existing financial and legal system, 
because all the costs incurred in such a situation are likely to be 
finite. 
If the bankruptcy option did not exist, the optimal financial 
structure would be all equity when land price are risky and the leverage 
is measured on a market value basis. When the debt cost function becomes 
infinite at some finite leverage ratio, the expected cost of debt and the 
objective function (1') go to negative infinity for any positive level of 
debt. This occurs because if a leverage ratio beyond the cut-off point 
occurs with some positive probability, no matter how small, the expected 
debt cost become infinitely negative and cancels out all past and future 
income. The marginal cost of debt would then be the discount rate and 
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the certainty equivalence results for land and nonland inputs derived 
above would hold. 
If the debt cost function is bounded everywhere except perhaps as 
capital losses approach infinity, and in the case that it is not bounded 
for infinite capital losses, it is dominated by the exponential term of 
the normal density function, then the decision rules (31.1-31.3) become 
relevant. Taking the derivative of (33.1') with respect to the debt and 
equity and substituting into rule (31.1) the financial rule becomes: 
(31.1' - * ,-p(l-T)T 
V V 
V V 
Expresson (31.1') indicates that along the optimal path the discounted 
marginal cost of investment at time t is equal to the expected present 
value of the discounted marginal cost of debt over the remaining horizon. 
It should be noted that the expected values in expression (31.1') would 
be defined even if the first derivative of the debt cost function become 
unbounded at a finite number of points. For proof of the integrability 
of a function with a finite number of discontinuities, see Ferrar, p. 70. 
An example of a point at which the debt cost function may become 
unbounded is the credit cut-off value; the debt cost function may become 
vertical at this point before leveling off at some high finite value over 
the remaining domain. 
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The optimal leverage ratio at the initial point can be found by 
noting the equality: 
and substituting expression (37) into (31.1), yielding: 
31.1") ^ E[r.r.^l-pKl-.)av = 0 
V V V V 
Equation (31.1") is satisfied if the integrand is always equal to zero 
along the optimal arc: 
At time t, the amount of unrealized capital gain at that moment is known 
with certainty, so equation (9'*') is identical to equation (9) at time 
t. The first best choice of financial structure is the same as under the 
deterministic decision rule, but the financial plan on which this first 
best choice is based differs substantially from the deterministic paths 
of equity and debt. The financial plan referred to here is not a set of 
optimal control paths. Such paths can not be meaningfully derived in an 
optimal feedback problem. Rather the financial plan is the set of 
expected control paths based on expected land price paths. These 
expected paths are important in calculating the first best choice, but 
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random events may force the actual control path to deviate from the 
expected path. 
Because of the nonlinear debt cost function, the expected marginal 
cost of debt and the expected marginal cost of equity for a constant 
leverage ratio will rise rapidly as time passes. To maintain the 
equality (9**'), the financial plan must specify constantly decreasing 
leverage. In the basic deterministic case, the leverage ratio was 
constant. In most cases in which the planning horizon is relatively 
long, the decision maker must effectively plan to achieve an all equity 
financial structure in the future because the variability of the expected 
land price path in the distant future is likely to become so large that 
equation (9*'*) will hold only for minute amounts of debt or there will 
be no positive leverage ratio that satisfies it. 
In equation (9'*'), the leverage ratio is a random variable. The 
distribution of this random variable at any point will depend on the 
expected value of capital gain (®^)> Che land price variance parameter 
(o), the fraction of the unrealized capital gain that is recognized as a 
substitute for invested equity (u) and on the farm size, because the land 
area appears in the variance term (34.2). All other things equal the 
larger the expected capital gain, the smaller the expected marginal cost 
of debt, because with large values of unrealized capital gains for the 
same variance the leverage ratio is less likely to stray into the high 
leverage ratio, high debt cost area. With larger values of the land 
price variance parameter or farm size, the marginal cost of debt will 
tend to be higher because the leverage ratio will have a higher 
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probability of taking the value in the high debt cost area. The 
relationship of the expected debt cost and the leverage ratio distribu­
tion is illustrated in Figure 2. With a larger fraction of the 
unrealized capital gain recognized as a substitute for invested equity, 
more of the land price variability is transferred to the debt cost and 
the expected marginal cost of debt will be higher. Because the expected 
values in equation (9*'') depend on the farm size, the leverage ratio for 
planning purposes beyond the initial choice must be determined simultan­
eously with planned land and nonland inputs. 
If equity is perfectly variable, the financial plan on which first 
best choice of financial structure is based is not important. In the 
variable equity case, any financial structure adjustment required by 
future realizations can be met. The financial plan is important only if 
there is some reason to believe the plan infeasible. For instance, if 
equity investment is limited to retained earnings there may be many cases 
in which not enough equity is available to satisfy equation (9**') and 
the land and nonland input decisions everywhere even if they can be 
satisfied initially. If equity investment is at a positive limit level 
somewhere during the planning horizon, the conditions under which the 
differential equation (30.3') was developed no longer hold. The 
differential.equation was solved assuming that interior maximum decision 
rules (31.1-31.3) held everywhere except perhaps as t^ approaches t^ from 
below. The new problem would have to be solved in segments defined by 
where the controls were at limit levels and where the interior solution 
holds. An added transformation would be needed in the limit level 
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Figure 2. The figure shows the market value leverage ratio on the 
horizontal axis, and the debt cost and the probability of 
leverage ratio values on the vertical axis. The solid line is 
the debt cost as a function of the leverage ratio. It is the 
convex debt cost function used throughout this research. The 
dotted and dashed lines show leverage ratio distributions. 
The tight distribution illustrated by the dashed line would 
have a relatively low expected cost of debt because the 
chances of a high leverage ratio realization are small. With 
the fat tailed distribution illustrated by the dotted line, 
the expected debt cost would be higher because there is a 
substantial probability of high debt cost realizations beyond 
Kt+WG; 
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segments because the first order terms in the limit level control would 
not disappear. Solutions are possible, but complicated because the com­
bination of limit level and interior solution control depend on function 
forms and parameter values. General, analytical solutions can not be 
easily derived and other numerical techniques, such as dynamic 
programming, appear to offer better empirical tests. Hence, analytical 
solutions to the constrained control case will not be derived here. From 
the analytical framework developed thus far it can, however, be seen that 
reduction in the initial choice of farm size may be an important 
consequence of equity constraint in this model. If land can be sold only 
at the end of the planning horizon, equity available is less than the 
interior solution level at some points, and the expected marginal cost of 
debt becomes very high at the debt level needed to finance the interior 
solution level of land and nonland inputs at those points, then the 
optimal initial choice of farm size may be less than that specified by 
the interior solution. With less land, less debt will be needed in the 
future, expected debt cost will be reduced and greater expected returns 
may be earned. 
The decision rules for land and nonland inputs take the form of 
expression (4.2) and (4.3) with adjoint variables replaced by the deriva­
tives of the recurrence relation along the optimal path. The reucrrance 
relation derivatives differ from the deterministic adjoint variables only 
in that the marginal cost of capital is in expected value form. The 
singular path is defined by expressions like (11) and (14) with the 
expected marginal debt cost substituting for its deterministic counter 
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part. As in the deterministic case the planned path of the inputs will 
be characterized by an initial adjustment followed by a singular path for 
nonland inputs and a singular or zero purchase path for land. The 
planned path of input use and financial structure is important for the 
first best choice because of the constraint on land sales. If land were 
perfectly variable during the planning horizon, the initial adjustment 
would always be such that the decision rule equalities (31.2-31.3) would 
hold over the remaining horizon and the first choice in the stochastic 
case would be the same as in the deterministic problem. This occurs 
because at the initial point in the financial structure equation (9'*') 
is identical to the deterministic financial structure equation (9) and 
the initial point of the singular path is identical to that defined by 
land and nonland input equations (11) and (14). But if land sales are 
disallowed, the initial land purchase may not be such that the singular 
land purchase path (14) holds. It may be optimal in some cases to make 
no initial land purchases to avoid a farm size larger than optimal in the 
future. In that case, the expected cost of debt and planned land and 
nonland input use matter, but these variables must be determined simul­
taneously and hence require more information about functional forms and 
parameter values. If the land price path and other informaton is such 
that the initial adjustment allows the singular land purchase path to 
hold, then the first best choice in the risky land price case is 
identical to the deterministic path. 
Arguments for the sufficiency of the optimality conditions for the 
risky land price case are similar to those advanced for the deterministic 
185 
model (Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985, pp. 71-74). Because the recurrence 
relation (33) is concave in the initial levels of the state variables, 
decision rules (31.1-31.3) describe a maximum. The control variables 
which maintain the the state variables at the maximizing level are 
obvious candidates for the optimal control. Chattering controls which 
alternate between the control limits are unappealing for practical and 
empirical reasons; such behavior does not appear to serve any economic 
purpose and is not observed. As in the deterministic case, such 
arguments do not prove the optimality of the conditions, but they do 
suggest that they are good candidates for a maximizing solution. 
Limitations of the model 
The models presented in this study overcome several of the limita­
tions of the simple model developed by Lowenberg-DeBoer. The limited 
availability of land, adjustment cost, equity investment constraints and 
risky land prices are incorporated here, through the interaction of the 
constraints and of the constraints and risk effect was not examined. The 
model, however, still has many of the limitations previously identified 
(Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985, p. 93). A fixed discount rate is used through 
it can be argued that the discount rate might vary with firm size and 
risk. The focus of the model is on the microeconomic impact of land 
price changes on buyers. Macroeconomic impacts and the supply side of 
the land market are not taken into account. 
Though land price risk has been incorporated, the model is still 
only a very rough approximation of decision making in a risky environ­
ment. Only land price risk has been considered, but the producer faces 
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many other risks some of which are correlated with land price risk. For 
instance, commonly used land price models' suggest that input and output 
price risk is related to land price risk because the land price is seen 
as a function of returns to land and if input price is higher or output 
price lower, the returns to land will be reduced and hence land price 
will decline. This problem can be dealt with in the framework developed 
here. If more than one equation of moton was stochastic, the differen­
tial equation (30.6) would be a higher dimension diffusion equation. 
Analytic solutions to these higher dimension problems are possible 
(Widder, 1975, Chapter 12) and may offer some useful insights. Another 
limitation of the model is the assumption of normal distributed land 
prices which is used to make the problem mathematically tractable. This 
limitation can not be overcome with currently available mathematical 
techniques in the framework used here. Nonnormal distribution can be 
used in numerical dynamic programming solutions. In addition, the model 
does not include the cash flow problem or the difference between long and 
short term debt, that may be especially important in making decisions in 
a risky environment. 
Summary and conclusions 
This research considered the impact of limited land availability, 
adjustment costs, equity investment constraint and land price risk on the 
farm decision making in an environment of farmland capital gains. A 
dynamic model farm firm is used which allows acreage expansion and change 
over time in nonland inputs, debt and equity. Optimal control theory 
techniques are used to maximize the present value of returns from farm 
187 
investments. The limited land availability condition was imposed on the 
model by placing an upper limit on the land acquisition control variable. 
Adjustment costs were considered by subtracting a quadratic function of 
the land purchase control from the income stream; as more land is 
purchased the quadratic adjustment cost term is larger, dampening the 
incentive for rapid changes. Equity investment was limited to retained 
earnings by rewriting the problem so that the objective function is 
maximization of withdrawals and then limiting the withdrawal control 
variable to nonnegative values. Land price risk was considered by 
assuming the land price change is the sum of a deterministic trend term 
and a normal white noise process. In this situation, the equation of 
motion for the accumulation of capital gains and losses is a stochastic 
differential equation. The problem of maximizing expected wealth given 
the stochastic accumulation of capital gains and losses is solved using 
the stochastic calculus of Ito and dynamic programming arguments. 
These extensions of the basic model developed by Lowenberg-DeBoer 
suggest that the impact of land price changes identified in the earlier 
work can persist under a wide variety of conditions, though the 
additional constraints may dampen or exaggerate the effects. The earlier 
work indicated that capital gains create incentives to enlarge farm size, 
increase debt use, reduce use of nonland inputs, and choose land exten­
sive enterprises. Capital losses have the opposite effect. 
Because the combination of singular and bang-bang controls in the 
constraint problems depends on the function forms and parameter values, 
that part of the study focused on an analysis of two special cases: the 
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beginning or small farmer problem and the case of an established farmer 
faced with a land price path that is stable for the early part of the 
planning horizon and rises sharply later. In the limited land avail­
ability, adjustment cost and equity constraint problems, the impact of 
capital gains on farm size, and debt use is dampened for the beginning 
farmer case. If the initial farm size is below the optimal acreage, the 
land purchase limitation can create an initial period of limit level 
expansion. The simple model used in previous research assumed the farm 
size could be instantaneously adjusted upward to the optimal level. 
During the period of limit level expansion, the full effect of capital 
gains may not be apparent, because enough land can not be acquired to 
achieve the optimal level of the sample model. Some capital gain effects 
may still be seen though. For instance, if the initial farm size were 
such that it was optimal for a problem without recognition of capital 
gains and large capital gains occurred in the planning period, then a 
model which did not recognize capital gains would show no acreage expan­
sion, but the model developed here would show a period of limit level 
expansion. The expansion in the model with the land purchase constraint 
may not be as great as in the simple model, but it will be greater than 
in a model which does not recognize the capital gains impact. 
In the beginning farmer case, adjustment costs may reduce the 
initial land purchases. It becomes too expensive to expand rapidly, so 
acquisition are spread over a longer period. During the acquisition 
period, farm acreage is less than it would be in the simple model. 
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Capital gains will affect the speed of adjustment. With larger capital 
gains it will be profitable to expand more rapidly, because the 
additional capital gains offset the higher adjustment cost. 
As in the simple model, nonland input use, debt levels and equity 
investment in the limited land availability and adjustment cost models 
follow the land purchase pattern. With limited land availability nonland 
input use will tend to be larger. Debt increase and equity investment 
will be lower if borrowing against unrealized capital gains is not 
permitted. When accumulated unrealized capital gain can not be 
substituted for equity, retained earnings will be increased and debt use 
decreased compared to the simple model because less unrealized capital 
gain will be available to replace equity investment. 
When the initial acreage is small relative to the optimum size, 
limiting equity investment to retained earnings reduces the expansion 
that can be financed and provides incentive to incur a higher debt load. 
The higher debt use can be justified because with the smaller than 
optimal farm size the marginal product of inputs is larger than it would 
be in the simple model, so a higher marginal debt cost can be tolerated 
before marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The incentive to use 
larger amounts of land relative to nonland inputs persists in the limited 
equity investment case because capital gain still offsets the cost of 
using land in production. 
In the established farm case, the land availability constraint 
adjustment cost and equity limits exaggerate the capital gains impact by 
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incentives for producers to "buy ahead", thereby enlarging farm size 
during the stable price period. In the limited land availability case, 
the prospect of future capital gains makes it profitable to buy land 
beyond the optimal farm size when it is available early in the planning 
horizon, rather than to lose potential capital gains because land can not 
be acquired fast enough later on. Adjustment costs create incentives to 
start acquiring land earlier and spread out the purchases over a longer 
period. In both the limited land availability and adjustment cost cases, 
the problem is to find the optimal trade-off between lower current income 
from too large a farm size in the early part of the planning horizon and 
gains from being closer to the optimum size after the capital gains 
period starts. 
Both saving ahead and buying ahead can occur in the limited equity 
case. If the lack of equity is a binding constraint in the higher 
capital gain period at the end of the planning horizon, then it may be 
profitable to increase retained earnings early in the planning horizon to 
reduce later equity shortages. The added equity in the initial stable 
land price period can be used to reduce debt and increase land and 
nonland input use. 
The beginning or small farmer problem probably describes situations 
of many farmers in the U.S. and elsewhere. Hence, the impact of capital 
gains is probably less than would be expected from the unconstrained 
version. The importance of the second special case is not as a descrip­
tion of farm conditions. The ability to forecast sharp land price rises 
in the distant future is unreliable enough that relatively few decision 
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makers ever face such a problem. The value of the second problem is as a 
counter example that shows that the constraints do not always dampen the 
t 
capital gain effects. 
Analysis of the optimality conditions for the stochastic land price 
model shows that in the wealth approach case for the expected wealth 
maximizing producer the deterministic decision rules hold. Because the 
land price and unrealized capital gain enter the wealth approach model 
linearally, the deterministic rules evaluated at the expected land price 
and unrealized gain amounts given the first best choice. Hence, for the 
wealth approach the impacts of land price changes identified in the 
deterministic model persist. In the income approach model, risky land 
price have a more complex effect. If equity is freely variable the first 
best choice of financial structure is identical to the deterministic 
case, but if equity investment is a binding constraint at some point in 
the planning horizon land and debt use may be reduced. This occurs 
because the first best choice of financial structure is based on a finan­
cial plan that requires decreasing leverage as time passes. If available 
equity is inadequate to decrease leverage fast enough, land and debt use 
are likely to be reduced. The decreasing leverage financial plan is a 
response to the fact that land price risk tends to increase when planning 
for periods in the distant future. 
Forecasting land prices 5 or 10 years from the initial date is 
simply less reliable than forecasting land prices a month or a year from 
the initial date. With a higher land price variance the probability 
increases that land prices will fall enough below the expected value to 
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drive the market value leverage ratio to dangerously high levels. In 
practical terms, extremely high leverage ratios can mean that further 
credit is cut-off and foreclosure may result when financial obligations 
can not be met. Effectively, the cost of debt becomes very high; it may 
mean the loss of the farm and future farm earnings. 
The income approach model suggests that the traditional desire of 
farmers to be debt free may have been part of a wealth maximizing 
strategy to cope with land price risk. The model indicates that the plan 
to reduce or eliminate debt use is an important part of the financial 
structure decision regardless of ^Aether or not a review of debt use over 
a farmer's career shows progress toward that goal. The actual series of 
first best choices of debt use may differ from the financial plan on 
which those choices are made. For instance, if the model were solved at 
annual intervals over a 40-year horizon with freely variable equity, the 
series of first best choices would show debt use at the level identified 
in the deterministic model, though that choice is based on a financial 
plan which requires decreasing debt use. In a practical decision making 
sense, the impact of the decreasing debt use plan is likely to be an 
increased emphasis on financial flexibility; the producer plans in the 
ability to reduce debt use instead of planning for continuing current 
debt use. 
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PART III 
EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL WORK 
The recent financial problems of U.S. farmers have accentuated the 
need to understand the impact of capital gains and losses on farm 
production and finance decisions. Were the farmers who expanded their 
operations and incurred large debt loads in the farmland capital gains 
period of the 1970s speculators or were they rational entrepreneurs 
reorganizing their businesses to take advantage of profit opportunities? 
Are the farmers experiencing financial stress merely individuals who 
gambled on further land price increases and lost? Or did they respond to 
incentives created by lending practices and government policy which 
increased expected returns, but also made them more vulnerable to cash 
flow crises, collateral risk and other financial problems? Can the asset 
restructuring of the 1970s toward greater investments in land and less in 
liquid forms (Boehlje and Eidman, 1983, p. 937) be explained by the large 
capital gains of the period? 
Many economists have suggested a link between farmland price changes 
and production and finance decisions. Farmland capital gains have been 
connected to incentives to increase farm size (Lins and Duncan, 1980), 
slowing growth of land productivity (Castle and Hoch, 1983) and 
increasing debt use (Lins and Duncan, 1980). Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985a, b) 
has developed a theoretical model of the farm firm which incorporates the 
impact of capital gains and losses on production and finance decisions. 
The analytical results from this model suggest that if enough equity is 
196 
available to achieve the optimal capital structure and if the firm may 
acquire as much land as desired then: 
1) land ownership tends to be greater when capital gains are 
larger, 
2) the use of nonland inputs tends to be reduced when capital gains 
rise, and 
3) debt use tends to be greater when capital gains are larger. 
Capital losses have the opposite effect. Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985b) shows 
that under plausible circumstances the capital gains effects may be 
dampened or disappear entirely if the solution is constrained by the 
availability of equity or land. 
Casual observation suggests that land and equity may be binding 
constraints for many farmers. Because most U.S. farms are relatively 
small, closely held businesses it is difficult for them to attract 
outside equity investment. Hence, their equity supply is often limited 
to family savings and retained earnings. Only about three percent of 
U.S. farmland changes hands each year and in most areas the amount of 
land for sale that will fit into a given farmer's business is only a 
fraction of the land put on the market. A cash grain farmer may not be 
interested in buying rough pasture land that comes up for sale nearby. 
Similarly, a farmer specializing in a beef cow calf operation may not be 
in the market for tillable land. Travel time and costs usually 
circumscribe the area in which farmland purchases are considered. 
Therefore, the impact of capital gains and losses on farm production 
and finance decisions is an empirical issue. Were the parameter values 
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in the U.S. in the 1970s and early 1980s such that the capital gains of 
that period could have led to the expansion of farm acreage and debt use, 
and the reduction in the use of nonland inputs? If the capital gain 
effects are observed in the model under the parameter values of the 1970s 
and 1980s, then the view of the expanding, debt incurring farmer making 
rational, economic decisions given available information is supported. 
If, however, the capital gains effects disappear under the equity and 
land availability constraints of the period, then speculative motives 
become a more plausible alternative explanation. 
The primary objective of this research is to provide a preliminary 
test of whether the capital gains effects on acreage, nonland inputs and 
debt use are plausible under recent economic conditions. The methodology 
involves a deterministic dynamic programming (DP) model of a farm firm 
based on central Iowa conditions. Solutions to the model under various 
land price paths are compared. Sensitivity testing is used to examine 
the impact of the unobservable parameters, the proportion of unrealized 
capital gain or loss substitutable for income and the proportion of 
unrealized capital gain or loss substitutable for equity in the financial 
negotiation (4) and w respectively in Lowenberg-DeBoer*s (1985) notation). 
Because the tax treatment of capital gains and losses plays an intimate 
role in the impact of land price changes, solutions under several tax 
parameter levels are also compared. 
A secondary objective of the research is to verify the sufficiency 
arguments for the theoretical model. Because sufficiency conditions are 
not well-developed for singular control models of the type used by 
198 
Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985a, b), the optimality arguments are based on 
satisfying known necessary conditions and the plausibility of the 
solutions when compared to other candidate solutions. Another form of 
evidence for the optimality of the candidate solution is to solve the 
problem numerically via dynamic programming (Bryson and Ho, 1975, 
p. 268). If the DP solution is consistent with the proposed singular 
control solution, the optimality of the candidate is supported. 
This analysis is an exploratory first step. It does not consider 
enterprise choice, adjustment cost and other problems examined in the 
theoretical model. In particular, it does not include the impact of land 
price risk, which Lowenberg—DeBoer (1985b) suggests may substantially 
alter the optimal decisions in some cases. Though simple and prelimin­
ary, it is hoped that this research provides an empirical test of the 
explanatory power of the model and indicates fruitful areas for further 
work. 
The general organization of this paper is to briefly review previous 
research, explain the empirical model, discuss the numerical results, and 
consider the implications of the work. The next section reviews previous 
empirical research on the impact of land price change on production and 
finance decisions. The theoretical background of the research is covered 
in the third section. A basic model of farm firm decisions in an 
environment of capital gains and losses is outlined and the primary 
analytic results are reviewed in the third section. The implementation 
of the model in a deterministic DP model is explained in the fourth 
section. Scenarios to be analyzed with the DP algorithm are developed in 
the fifth section. The DP solutions are analyzed and compared in the 
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sixth section. The final section discusses the conclusions and 
implications of the empirical research and earlier theoretical work. 
Previous Empirical Research 
Though economists have hypothesized many impacts of capital gains 
and losses on farm production and finance decisions, empirical tests of 
these hypotheses are rare. The body of research on livestock capital 
gains does not generalize to the case of farmland price changes, because 
livestock capital gains are almost purely a result of tax rules, but 
farmland capital gains are primarily price appreciation. 
Researchers have often" included changing land prices in programming 
models of the farm firm, but the full range of capital gain and loss 
impacts have not been treated. For example. Van Arsdall and Elder (1969) 
found that increasing the land value in a single period linear program­
ming model (LP) of an Illinois farm firm reduced farm size and led to 
more land intensive activities in the optimal solution. Their model, 
however, did not include realization of the capital gain or the substitu­
tion of unrealized capital gains for income or equity. Vandeputte and 
Baker (1970) assumed that capital gains affect farm production decisions 
through the substitutability of capital gains for current income in the 
consumption decisions and through realization of the gain at the end of 
the period. They develop a multiperiod linear programming example in 
which intensive hog production is in the optimal solution when capital 
gains are fully taxed, but production switches to crops when the capital 
gains tax deduction is incorporated in the model. They did not include 
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financial activities in their model, but they note that, "were credit 
specifications also to be included, the differences might be still 
greater because of the credit consequences of assets accumulated under 
the capital gains provisions of the tax laws" (p. 526). 
Farm firm simulation models have often included changing land 
prices. For instance, in their model of a Nebraska wheat farm Held and 
Helmers assume a constant annual appreciation rate and that all land 
value increase was an addition to equity. They found that a higher rate 
of land price appreciation tended to increase the chance of firm survival 
and enhance growth by helping to maintain the minimum equity level needed 
for farm existence and by increasing the borrowing power of the firm. 
Skees and Reid assume that the land price is a function of returns to 
land and that these returns are stochastic. Hence, the land price is 
stochastic in their model. They show that the correlation of land 
returns and land prices tends to substantially increase farm risk levels 
and that the impact of land price risk tends to be greater for larger 
farms. Because production and finance relationships are assumed in 
simulation models, capital gain and loss impacts on these relationships 
could not easily be tested in these studies. 
The research on land price formation approaches the impact of land 
prices on production and finance decisions from an aggregate perspective. 
What is the equilibrium price level given that farmers have certain 
avenues of production and financial response available when the land 
price changes? Econometric models have shown that expected capital 
gains, government land diversion programs, technological change. 
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conservation payments, farm enlargement and the rate of return on 
alternative investments can all be used to explain farmland price changes 
(Reynolds and Timmons, 1969; Tweeten and Martin, 1968; Herdt and 
Cochrane, 1966; Klinefelter, 1973; and Brown and Brown, 1984). Shalit 
and Schmitz (1982) demonstrate that the debt carrying capacity of 
farmland can be important in determining farmland prices; if more money 
can be borrowed against land, the demand for land increases and prices 
are forced up. They suggest that lenders are crucial in land purchasing 
behavior because they determine the supply of credit. The capital asset 
pricing model was used by Barry in comparing the risk of farmland 
investments with that of nonfarm financial instruments. He found that 
the systematic risk associated with farmland was relatively low; thus, 
farmland was "a promising candidate for risk reduction in a well 
diversified portfolio." 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this research is based on a modified 
Vickers' model of firm level decision making. The model assumes that the 
firm's owners seek to maximize the net present value of returns to the 
business subject to the constraint that equity plus debt must equal the 
capital absorbed in acquiring inputs. The maximization of net present 
value allows considerations of the timing of cash flows. Through the 
discount rate information on the owner's risk preferences and returns on 
alternative assets enter the problem. The net present value maximization 
also approximates utility maximization for cases in which utility is 
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primarily a function of money income and the owners may borrow against or 
save cash returns to achieve the desired consumption pattern. 
In continuous time, the objective function can be written: 
T -P (l-T)t 
(1) max Z = / e ^ ir dt + S - K 
0 tu
where: T = total number of periods, 
= the income in period t, 
= the discount rate, 
T = the average tax rate, 
S = the salvage value of the firm's assets, 
= equity capital invested in the firm, and 
t = variable of integration, time. 
The financial constraint is: 
(2) K+D-aX-BL+G=0 
t t t t t t t 
where: = debt, 
= nonland inputs, 
= land area, 
Gj_ = unrealized capital gains, and 
a^, = capital absorbed by nonland and land inputs. 
The capital absorbtion parameters (a, g) may differ from the price of the 
input. For instance, special financing agreements may reduce the capital 
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required. For simplicity, the following analysis assumes that the 
capital absorbed by l^nd is equal to its "price. The income term can be 
more fully specified as the sum of after tax current income from 
production and the proportion of the capital gain in period t that is 
substitutable for current income: 
(3) 1.^ = o - ycix; - - '(k-tv- ""tl 
where: = the output price, 
Yj^, y2 - the current costs of using nonland and land inputs, 
f(*) = production function, 
r(*) = a convex credit supply function with r'>0 and r*'>0, 
w = the proportion of unrealized capital gain that can be 
substituted for equity in the financial negotiation, 
<t) = the proportion of unrealized capital gain that can be 
substituted for current income, and 
= the change in the land price at time t. 
As in a conventional Vickers' model, the current cost terms (y^, are 
the costs of inputs actually consumed in the production process. For 
nondurable inputs, like fertilizer, the current cost is the full purchase 
price. For durable nonland inputs, the current cost includes maintenance 
and depreciation. Property taxes are a primary component of the current 
cost of real estate ownership. The cost of debt is assumed to rise with 
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increasing leverage. The argument is that when debt is larger relative 
to equity, the lender incurs more risk and this risk cost is passed 
through in the form of higher interest rates (Vickers, 1968, pp. 67-68). 
With time subscripts on the discount rate, the nonland capital absorption 
parameter the current cost coefficients and the output price, and a time 
variable in the production and debt cost functions, this specification is 
slightly more general than that used by Lowenberg-DeBoer. The time 
varying coefficients and the changes in the functions over time do not 
present any conceptual problem for the theoretical model, but they do 
make derivation of the explicit control expressions more complicated and 
hence they were omitted in the original discussion. The time variable in 
the production function is assumed to capture technological change. In 
the debt cost function, time is assumed to reflect changing financial 
conditions which may shift interest rates for all borrowers and may 
affect the premium charged for risk. 
Unlike the usual Vickers' model, the income term includes a propor­
tion of unrealized capital gains or losses and some unrealized capital 
gain or loss can be substituted for equity in the debt cost function. 
The argument for the substitutability of unrealized capital gains for 
current income is based on the idea that with perfect capital markets 
unrealized capital gains or losses would be a perfect substitute for 
current income because one could at any time cash in the unrealized gains 
or losses without penalty (Bhatia, 1972). In an imperfect capital market 
with differing expectations among agents and transactions cost, 
unrealized capital gains are no longer a perfect substitute for cash, but 
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it is reasonable to assume that for at least some agents the unrealized 
capital gains are an imperfect substitute for cash. The proportion $ 
reflects the degree to which the farm decision maker is willing to 
substitute accrued capital gains or losses for cash gains or losses. 
The substitutability of unrealized capital gains or losses for 
equity is based on the common practice in agricultural lending of valuing 
collateral assets at a "conservative market value." This is a market 
value adjusted for selling costs, taxes and the uncertainty about whether 
the gain or loss will ever be realized. The views of lenders and their 
expectations about the future influence the equity substitution parameter 
(tu). If lenders are willing to recognize a larger proportion of 
unrealized price appreciation as an addition to equity, the effective 
leverage will be reduced and debt costs lowered, leading in many cases to 
expanded debt use. If lenders believe that the price appreciation is 
ephemeral then they will be unlikely to recognize it in the financial 
negotiation as an addition to equity and debt costs will be unchanged by 
the land price change, regardless of the farmer's view on the permanence 
of the land price change. 
Because the tax treatment of capital gains and losses is not 
symmetric in the U.S., the salvage value term will differ depending on 
the land price path and the land acquisition strategy. If capital gains 
are earned, the salvage value term can be written: 
(4) s = + (l-*-#^)g^] 
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where: t = the proportion of capital gains that is taxable and 
= equals the average tax rate after the business is terminated. 
This specification assumes that all the assets are sold for their full 
market value at the end of the horizon and all debt is paid off. Hence, 
the terminal cash flow is the value of invested equity plus the after tax 
capital gain income ( ( 1-#^)G^ . To prevent double counting of capital 
gain, the proportion of the unrealized capital gain that has already been 
recognized (<j>G^) is subtracted. For simplicity, the salvage value term 
(4) assumes that there are no liquidity losses. Such losses could be 
incorporated by recognizing only a portion of the terminal value of 
assets. Under current U.S. law only, 40 percent of capital gains are 
taxable. 
In the capital loss case, the salvage value must account for the 
partial deductibility of capital losses from taxable income. The value 
of capital loss deductions is limited because only a proportion of the 
loss can be deducted (currently 50 percent of long-term capital losses) 
and because the annual capital loss deduction is constrained (to the 
lower of the taxable income over the zero bracket amount or $3,000 under 
current law). The salvage value term is then the sum of the invested 
equity, the capital loss which has not yet been recognized, and the value 
of the capital loss deduction. If the decision maker lives long enough 
to use the entire deduction, if income is at least high enough to allow 
the maximum deduction each period, and the discount rate and average tax 
rate are constant, then the salvage value term may be written 
(Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985a, p. 28): 
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(5) S = ^ 
where: 5 = the proportion of the capital loss that is tax deductible and 
e = the annual limit on capital loss deductions. 
The last term in the capital loss salvage value term (5) is the present 
value of the stream of tax benefits from the capital loss deduction. The 
period during which these deductions occur is calculated as the total 
deductible loss, (6G^) divided by the annual deduction (e). 
A crucial simplifying assumption used in solving the theoretical 
model is that land is sold only at the end of the planning horizon. This 
models the situation of the farmer who may wish to sell the land upon 
retirement, but does not plan to sell before then. Or it may model the 
case of an investor who plans to hold the land for some specified period. 
Without this assumption it would be necessary to record the capital gain 
for each tract separately so that if it were necessary to sell it during 
the planning horizon, the exact capital gain or loss could be calculated. 
If land is sold at the terminal date, only the aggregate capital gain or 
loss is needed and this can be recorded as a running total of all capital 
gains and losses. The assumption also simplifies the maximization 
problem. If land could be sold at any time, the order of tract sales 
might be important. For instance, even if land is homogeneous, it may be 
advantageous for tax reasons to sell the most recently acquired tract 
first. The selling price of the recently acquired tract would be the 
same as for other tracts, but in a rising land price market the taxable 
capital gain would be smaller. In a deterministic model of an average 
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farm firm, the assumption of sales only at the end of the period is 
reasonable. Farmers do not usually buy land with the intention of 
selling it while they are still in business, though they may be forced to 
sell by unforeseen circumstances. 
The decision variables in this model are the farm acreage (L^), 
nonland inputs (X^), debt (D^), and equity (K^). If the land price path 
is linear in time and the levels of the decision variables are set 
initially and remain unchanged over the horizon, this is a static 
constrained maximum problem in ordinary calculus. For other land price 
paths or if the decisions variables change over time, optimization 
requires control theory techniques. The key analytic insight of both the 
static or dynamic problems can be understood by examining the marginal 
rate of substitution between land and nonland inputs. For Che dynamic 
case of rising land price in the absence of land or equity constraints, 
the MRS equation takes the form (Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985a, p. 65): 
D 
(6 )  
f 
X 
[Yj + a(r+r 
f 1 
S ojr' D 
pTT-TT { 
where f^ = the first derivative of the production function with respect 
to nonland inputs and 
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= the first derivative of the production function with respect 
to land. 
Like the usual Vickers model, the factor cost ratio in the MRS equation 
contains both the current cost sof using the input (Yj^ , Y^) and the 
financial cost. Unlike the conventional Vickers model, the cost of using 
land (assuming capital gains) is reduced by the savings from buying now 
rather than later at a higher price: 
(6 1) 
the value of interest savings due to recognition of unrealized capital 
gains as a substitute for equity: 
B wr 
the value of unrealized gains that are recognized as current income (<j)8^) 
and the realization of the gains at the end of the period 
Because the cost of land use is reduced by capital gains, the 
optimal input mix tends to include more land and fewer nonland inputs. 
Taxes affect the magnitude of the impact because the unrealized capital 
gain that is substituted for current income is not taxed and the 
realization of capital gains is only partially taxed at the end of the 
horizon, while the benefits of buying now rather than later and the debt 
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cost reduction due to added equity in the form of unrealized gain are 
fully taxed as they occur. The greater the substitutability of capital 
gains for income («t» ) and for equity (<o) and the smaller taxable propor­
tion of capital gain ('I'), the greater the incentive to expand land use 
and decrease use of other inputs. It should be noted that it is not 
inconsistent for accrued capital gain to be both recognized as current 
income and used as an equity substitute in the financial negotiation, 
though for analytic purposes dealing with a pure model of one effect or 
the other simplifies analysis by reducing the number of channels for 
capital gain and loss effects. In a capital loss case, the MRS equation 
has a similar form with the value of capital loss deduction tax benefits 
replacing the taxation of capital gain term '^)CT t)^^j ^ When land 
prices are declining (3^<0), the land price change terms in the cost 
ratio, except for the value of capital loss tax deductions, increase the 
cost of owning land. This creates incentives to economize on land use 
and farm more intensively. 
If there is adequate equity to achieve the optimal financial 
structure in which the marginal cost of equity equals the marginal cost 
of debt, then the leverage ratio (D^/(K^+wG^) is a constant 
(Lowenberg-DeBoer 1985a, p. 86) and the factor cost ratio is completely 
determined at any point in the horizon independent of the input choice. 
If the optimal financial structure cannot be achieved, the debt and 
equity levels must be solved for simultaneously with the input levels. 
With adequate equity, the absolute level of debt use may rise with 
farmland capital gains because land tends to be a capital intensive 
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input, but the level of debt use relative to effective equity (K^-hoG^) is 
constant. With the substitutability of unrealized capital gain for 
equity (w>0), the level of debt relative to invested equity (K^) rises 
with capital gains, because it is less expensive to meet the equity 
requirement in the financial negotiation with unrealized capital gains 
than with investment of retained earnings or outside capital 
(Lowenberg-DeBoer, 1985a, p. 87). 
With constraints on the availability of land and capital, the 
optimal capital structure or the optimal MRS may not be achievable during 
at least some part of the horizon. If equity capital is a binding 
constraint, the leverage ratio is no longer constant and the factor cost 
ratio depends on the debt level. Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985b) shows that for 
some plausible circumstances this results in a dampening of the land 
price change effects, but exaggerated effects are also possible. A more 
complete analysis of the model is available in Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985a) 
and Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985b). 
The Numerical Model 
Dynamic programming was chosen for the numerical solution to the 
problem because it requires a minimum of additional assumptions and 
because it facilitates extending the model to a stochastic environment. 
The primary alternative to DP would have been a multiperiod LP or 
quadratic programming (QP) algorithm, which would have required strict 
assumptions about the functional forms involved. With DP, no functional 
form assumptions are required. This exploratory research utilizes only 
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one production function form, a power function, and one debt cost 
function form, a step function in which the interest is at the average 
market rate up to some specified maximum leverage and very high above 
this leverage. Testing the sensitivity of the solutions to the 
functional forms is a relatively simple matter of estimating new forms 
and substituting them into the algorithm. 
With discrete control techniques, a wide choice of functional forms 
would also have been available, but extension of the model to an environ­
ment of sequential decisions in a stochastic environment would have been 
difficult. DP allows the solution of sequential stochastic problems with 
simple extensions of the basic algorithm (Dreyfus and Law, 1977, 
Chapter 9). Sequential, stochastic problems can also be solved by 
discrete stochastic programming (DSP) (Cocks, 1969; and Rae, 1971) in an 
LP or QP framework. It is not clear, however, that DSP has an advantage 
over DP because DSP requires a separate block in the LP or OP matrix for 
each possible outcome. Hence, the matrix becomes very large and the 
advantage of lower problem solving cost with LP or QP software and the 
ability to use a larger number of decision variables is diminished. 
In a stochastic environment, the sequential nature of land and debt 
use decisions may have important consequences for the optimal choices. 
For example, if an open loop solution, which specifies levels of the 
control variables over the entire horizon, is used in a risky environment 
in which large land price declines are possible, then low levels of land 
and debt use may be chosen to avoid the large losses that could be 
associated with large farm size and a highly leveraged position in a 
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period of declining prices. An optimal feedback solution, which assumes 
that the decision maker observes the environment at each decision point 
before making a decision, may indicate a higher initial land and debt use 
level because there is more flexibility in adjusting to the conditions 
that may occur. Because stochastic DP is a simple extension of 
deterministic methods, the deterministic DP algorithm constructed for 
this exploratory research can serve as the foundation for software to 
solve the stochastic problem. 
The primary problems with DP are the "curse of dimensionality" and 
the lack of commercially available software. Because DP is essentially 
an efficient enumeration technique, the number of possible solutions over 
which it is necessary to enumerate and problem solving costs rise rapidly 
as the number of variables increase. Most DP problems have three or 
fewer decision variables. Larger problems can be solved, but the cost 
becomes prohibitive given the current state of computer technology. In 
this case, working with a small number of variables is not a severe 
distortion of the decision situation. In a long-term planning context, 
it is unlikely that the farmer will plan to raise a specific number of 
livestock or to plant a specific number of acres to a given crop at some 
point in the distant future. It is more likely that the decision maker 
would seek to plan major variables, like farm size and financial 
structure, and then construct more detailed short-run plans within the 
context of the major long-run decisions. 
The lack of readily available DP software is not a major barrier for 
anyone with rudimentary programming skills. DP programs are relatively 
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simple, consisting primarily of a set of nested do loops, with a 
mechanism for accepting input and producing output. Kennedy reviews a 
wide range of successful DP applications in agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries. He suggests that the interest in long-term planning and 
control, the increased efficiency of computer equipment, and the 
diffusion of programming skills will make DP a more common research tool 
in the future (Kennedy, 1981, pp. 141-142). 
DP algorithm 
The central idea of DP is stated in the principle of optimality: 
"The best path from A to B has the property that, whatever the initial 
decision at A, the remaining path to B, starting from the next point 
after A, must be the best path from that point to B" (Dreyfus and Law, 
1977). This principle is put into practice by enumerating backwards from 
the end of the planning horizon. In the last period, the problem is a 
simple one-period optimization. This optimization is carried out for all 
relevant values of the state variables at the beginning of the last 
period. In the second to the last period, one must choose the control 
variables which optimize the sum of that period's return and the optimal 
objective function value for the subsequent period given initial state 
variable levels generated by the control choice in the second to the last 
period. This process is repeated in each period with an optimization 
over the stage at hand and the rest of the process. By enumerating only 
over the optimal choice in each period given the state variables at the 
beginning of the period, DP substantially reduces the size of the 
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enumeration problem compared to enumerating over all possible paths. 
Dreyfus and Law provide a good introduction to the techniques of DP. 
DP problems are commonly formulated in three statements: an optimal 
value function, which is a statement of the problem in words; a 
recurrence relation, which is mathematical expression of the relationship 
which is optimized in each period; and the boundary condition, which is 
the value at the end of the planning horizon. The boundary condition 
serves as a starting point for the backward enumeration. The optimal 
value function for the above problem is: 
optimal value function = the maximum present value of returns for 
the periods t through T given an initial 
farm acreage L, equity level K, and 
unrealized capital gain G. 
Debt is eliminated from the problem by substituting in the financial 
constraint (2). This substitution eliminates one state variable and 
substantially reduces problem solving cost. Typically, DP constraints 
simplify the problem by reducing the number of independent state 
variables or by reducing the range over which enumeration must occur. 
The recurrence relation is a function of the initial land, equity, 
and unrealized capital gain levels. It can be expressed as the sum of 
the optimal choice for the period at hand and the recurrence relation 
over the remaining horizon: 
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n (m +._.-u_) 
(7) S (L, K, G) = jnax{ I ^ 
i=l(ltP(l-t))i 
where: = land purchases, 
u^ = equity investments, and 
n = number of years for decision period. 
The maximization in equation (7) is carried out over land purchases, 
equity investment, and the level of nonland inputs. New investment (ug) 
is subtracted from the current income stream because it represents a cash 
outflow to the decision maker. If the income term (n-Ug) is constrained 
to be nonnegative, new equity investment is limited to retained 
earnings. 
Years are grouped into decision periods to simplify the problem, 
with the number of years per decision period being denoted by n. 
Grouping years reduces the number of possible sets over which the 
enumeration must occur and reduces problem solving cost. Because land 
purchase is not usually an every year decision, this is not a totally 
unrealistic assumption, though it is possible the choice of decision 
years may affect the outcome. It should be noted that if n is one and 
the time units are allowed to become very small, the DP problem becomes 
identical to the continuous time optimal control problem solved by 
Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985). In fact, DP could be used as an alternative 
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solution technique for the optimal control problem (Kamien and Schwarz, 
1981, section 20) or it could be used to provide analytic solutions to 
the analogous discrete time problem (Dreyfus and Law, 1977, Chapter 7). 
With appropriate defined variables, discrete and continuous time formula­
tion suggest identical optimal solution approaches. Discrete time is 
used for the empirical work because the data are in discrete time form. 
The income term is a discrete version of equation (3): 
(3.1) = [Pj.f(L+U2, X, t) - Yi^X - y 
,L + aX - K - G 
- K + WG ' - K -
+ 
The subscripting in equation (3.1) reflects the assumed timing of 
decisions, sales, and purchases. The input and financing decision is 
assumed to be made at the beginning of the year. Land may be purchased 
only at the beginning of the n year period. Debt and nonland inputs are 
assumed to be adjusted at the beginning of each year. It is assumed that 
input costs are paid and output sold at the end of each year. Because 
land must be purchased before the production period, it is acquired at 
the price established at the end of the previous year (B^ ^). Though 
nonland input levels are set at the beginning of the year, it is assumed 
that the nonland inputs are actually acquired during the production 
season as needed. Hence, the current cost of nonland inputs (Yj^) is 
based on the price during the year. The current costs of land ownership 
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(y2^) and the capital absorbed by nonland inputs (a^) is also assumed to 
be based on values during the year. The capital gain is the 
difference between the price that land could be purchased for at the 
beginning of the year and the price which is established at the end of 
the year. For this exploratory research, a power function: 
^1/2/3 (8) f(Xj., Lj., t) = At Xj. Lj. 
was used for the production relationship and a step function: 
(9) r = ^ ^ 
M otherwise 
where i = the average market rate of interest, 
L = the maximum allowable leverage, and 
M = a very large number, 
for the debt real estate and nonreal estate cost. The power function has 
been widely used for production function approximation. It requires the 
factors of production to be limiting; an advantage in this case since it 
is unlikely that any significant production could occur with no land or 
with no nonland inputs. It is relatively easy to estimate in logarithmic 
form. Heady and Dillon (1961) suggest that the unit elasticity of sub­
stitution which is inherent in the functional form may be a satisfactory 
approximation for a firm level relationship, though it is unrealistic for 
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per acre or per animal situations (p. 84). Attempts were made to 
estimate coefficients for a translog function, which would avoid the unit 
elasticity of substitution assumption. In the Central Iowa data for 
1957-1969, this resulted in many statistically insignificant coefficients 
and some implausible signs. The simple power function model estimation 
resulted in statistically significant and plausible coefficient estimates 
for all variables. Predicted output levels appear reasonable. The power 
function seems to be an adequate approximation for exploratory research, 
however, further work in the area should not be tied to continued use of 
this assumption. 
A separate debt cost function of the form (9) was specified for real 
estate and nonreal estate debt. It was assumed that real estate debt, 
which is usually lower cost, is incurred first, up to a maximum 
percentage of the market value of real estate. If the debt level 
permitted under the maximum leverage (A) is greater than the maximum 
amount that can be borrowed on real estate, nonreal estate debt may be 
contracted up to the maximum leverage. This ordering of debt acquisition 
assumes that the decision maker chooses the debt source with the lowest 
nominal cost. In the context of a model which abstracts away from the 
maturity structure of debt and interest rate risk, this is a reasonable 
approximation of the debt acquisition decision, though in a more detailed 
model that order may sometimes be violated. 
A step function was used for the debt cost because it appears to be 
a reasonable approximation in the financial situation of U.S. agriculture 
where lenders tend to respond to risk by nonprice methods such as capital 
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rationing instead of adjusting the interest rate (Barry et al., 1981, 
pp. 220 and 224; Baker, 1968, p. 519), and because available data are 
inadequate to estimate the hypothesized smooth credit supply curve. 
Barry, Hopkin, and Baker (1983) suggest a debt cost function which is 
flat for initial borrowing and then slopes upward as the farmer is forced 
to ~eek credit from higher cost lenders (p. 141). They state, "Available 
evidence suggests that a given lender is not likely to respond to a 
higher interest rate with more loan funds for a given borrower" (p. 141). 
When this observation is combined with the fact that split lines of 
credit are discouraged in agricultural lending, a credit profile is 
derived that consists of a series of steps. As more credit is demanded 
by the decision maker, all of the debt is shifted up to a higher cost 
lender. In the long-term planning context, it is not clear that there 
are very many steps. The Farm Credit System lenders have usually had the 
lowest stated interest rates among commercial agricultural lenders, yet 
there is little evidence that they are willing to provide less credit to 
a given borrower than other lenders. In fact, they have a reputation in 
many areas of being willing to provide more credit than their chief 
rivals, commercial banks. The relative advantage of the PCS lenders in 
effective debt cost may not be as great as the differential in stated 
rates, because of the PCS stock requirements and because FCS lenders 
often require greater documentation, thereby increasing transaction cost. 
FCS lenders frequently require additional income and cash flow informa­
tion, while the traditional once a year balance sheet update may be 
adequate for small commercial banks. 
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The relevance of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) finance 
companies and merchant and dealer credit to the long-term credit profile 
in a deterministic decision framework is questionable. Would the 
representative farmer modeled here consider these lenders as long-term 
sources for all business credit needs? It is true that some farmers 
remain FmHA borrowers throughout their careers, but it is unlikely that 
this is a relevant alternative in planning. Certainly, it is the FmHA 
policy to graduate borrowers to commercial sources as soon as possible. 
Would the representative farmer plan to forego cash discounts and pay the 
service charges on merchant and dealer credit as a long-term credit 
source? In a stochastic environment, merchant and dealer credit, the 
FmHA, and finance companies may be very important in adding flexibility 
to the system, but for this deterministic model a first approximation of 
the debt cost function without them will probably not be a major source 
of distortion. This leaves a debt cost function with one step, which can 
be specified as the average interest rate on FCS borrowing or on 
borrowing from one of its commercial competitors, depending on data 
availability, up to some critical leverage level and no credit available 
beyond that leverage. The lack of data on lender imposed borrowing 
limits, beyond statutory maximums, reinforces the decision to use a step 
function. The available data are inadequate to specify a more 
sophisticated function and many arbitrary decisions would be required to 
implement such a choice. 
In the context of the model, the critical leverage level may be the 
result of either internal or external capital rationing. With internal 
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rationing, the decisionmaker stops credit use before the lender's cutoff 
leverage. Internal capital rationing is commonly observed among U.S. 
farmers and Barry and Baker have demonstrated that it can be seen as a 
rational response to the value of liquidity. Unused credit is a source 
of liquidity and one could argue that the value of unused credit rises as 
more debt is incurred and the liquidity of the firm falls (Barry and 
Baker, 1983, p. 223). This would result in a smooth upward sloping debt 
cost function instead of the step function assumed here. Unfortunately, 
there is little empirical evidence on the magnitudes of liquidity 
premiums, so specifying the rising debt cost due to liquidity costs is 
impractical. Hence, for both internal and external capital rationing, a 
step function is used to approximate the firm's debt cost, leverage 
relationship. 
The cost of debt beyond the credit cutoff is specified as some very 
large but finite number because the existence of bankruptcy laws imposes 
a limit on the decisionmaker's liability. Lowenberg-DeBoer (1985b) 
argues that the debt cost does not become infinite because the decision­
maker cannot lose more than the equity in the firm and the present value 
of future earnings (p. 170). The magnitude of M is such that credit use 
beyond the credit cutoff will never be an optimal choice. 
The boundary conditions are discrete versions of the salvage value 
terms of the theoretical model (4, 5). The boundary condition for 
capital gains is: 
(4.1) S^(L, K, G) = K + (l-*-4'T^)G 
for G > 0 
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and for capital losses it is: 
(5.1) S^(L, K, G) = K + (W)G + il 
for G < 0. 
It is assumed that the firm is liquidated at the beginning of the 
terminal year (T), so no production takes place during that period. 
Implementation of algorithm 
The algorithm is implemented in a computer program written in PL/1. 
The program consists of five subroutines: Main, which accepts the input 
data and sets up the decision problem; Recurr, which calculates the 
recurrence relation values for each initial land, equity, and unrealized 
capital gain combination; Bounds, which checks if the state variable 
values generated by the recurrence relation are consistent with the user 
specified range for the subsequent period; Trans, which saves recurrence 
relation values from one period's calculation for use in the next 
period; and Output, which prints out the optimal control path and 
recurrence relation values for each possible initial state variable 
combination in each decision period. Flow charts of the algorithm are X 
found in Figures 1 and 2. 
The recurrence relation subroutine consists of five nested do loops. 
The first three loops are indexed over the land, equity, and unrealized 
capital gain ranges that are specified in the input. For each combina­
tion of state variables, an optimum land purchase, savings choice, and 
nonland input level is calculated and recorded. The control variable 
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Main: Accept Input 
Calculate Frequently Used Values 
Calculate Boundary Values 
Do for Each Year Starting with the Last Year: 
-Call Recurr,<-
"Call Output,<-
—Call Trans,<-
End. 
•>Trans: Save optimal recurrence relation value 
to be used in the next iteration as 
value over the remaining horizon. 
•>Output: Print optimal recurrence relation 
values and control choices. 
->Recurr: Find the control choices which maximized 
the present value of returns over the 
remaining horizon for each combination 
of user specified initial land, equity 
and unrealized capital gain levels.<-
(See Figure 2 for more detail). 
->Bounds: Check if control choices result in land, 
equity or unrealized capital gain choices 
exceeding the user specified range in the 
subsequent period. 
Figure 1. Flow chart of the dynamic programming algorithm 
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Do for each user specified level of initial land, equity and 
unrealized capital gain: 
Calculate bounds for land purchase; 
—Do for all land purchase levels: 
Calculate bounds for retained earnings ; 
p—Do for all retained earnings levels: 
p—Do for each year within the period: 
Check calculus interior and corner solutions for 
nonland inputs; 
Calculate present value of production before 
interest given land purchase and nonland input 
choice; 
Calculate present value of interest payments, 
property taxes, retained eanings and unrealized 
capital gain substitutable for income. 
End; 
End; 
—End; 
Check if the present value current income minus interest, taxes 
and retained earnings over the period is nonnegative; 
Call bounds; 
Check if the present value of current income in the period, 
minus interest on debt, property taxes and retained earnings, 
and plus unrealized capital gain substitutable for income and 
the present value of returns over the remaining horizon is 
greater than the previous maximum; 
If the returns exceed the previous maximum, record the present 
value of returns as a potential optimal recurrence relation 
value and record the control path. 
If returns exactly match those under some previous control 
choice, the record the nonunique control path 
—End; 
Figure 2. Flow chart of the recurrence relation subroutine 
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values which maximize wealth are chosen by iterating over feasible land 
purchase and savings choices, with the nonland input level chosen by 
calculus arguments for each land purchase and savings combination. The 
bounds of the land purchase and savings iteration are partially 
internally calculated. The land purchase is varied from zero to the 
maximum amount that can be financed with the existing level of equity and 
unrealized capital gain or the maximum land available for purchase. The 
model allows both equity investment and disinvestment. The savings 
choices range from the maximum amount that can be dissaved and still 
allow the existing farm acreage to be financed the next period to the 
savings that would produce the largest equity amount specified by the 
user for the beginning of the next period. Dissaving implies that equity 
is withdrawn from the farm firm for consumption or investment elsewhere. 
The land purchase and savings choice is made by period. The land 
purchase is assumed to be made at the beginning of the period and the 
savings decision is made for the period as a whole, with a constant 
amount saved each year. The nonland input choice is made separately each 
year to allow equity accumulation and unrealized capital gain to have an 
impact within the period. The alternative would be to assume savings 
were put in a bank account until the beginning of the next period, 
clearly an unrealistic assumption in a situation dominated by a lack of 
capital. Retained earnings are most likely to be reinvested in the farm 
business as soon as possible. 
The calculus arguments for the nonland input optimality are designed 
to check interior and corner solutions for maximizing one year net farm 
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income given the farm acreage, equity level, and savings plan. The 
nonland input is assumed to be perfectly variable; the level in one year 
does not constrain the choice in the next year. This overstates the 
flexibility of nonland input use because acquiring or selling specialized 
equipment and facilities may be difficult, but it is a simplifying 
assumption that is consistent with the theoretical model and reduces the 
number of state variables in the model. The program checks five possible 
nonland input levels: 
1) the calculus interior solution given farm acreage assuming no 
nonreal estate debt is used; 
2) if choice (1) results in a capital requirement exceeding 
available equity and real estate debt, then the calculus interior 
solution assuming that the marginal nonland input is financed 
with borrowed capital is tried; 
3) if choice (2) can be financed without nonreal estate debt, then 
the optimal nonland input level lies in between the levels of (1) 
and (2) at the maximum nonland input that can be purchased 
without using nonreal estate debt; 
4) if choice (2) results in a capital requirement exceeding 
available equity and debt, then the nonland input level is set at 
the maximum amount that can be financed; 
5) if choice (4) results in a negative nonland capital amount, then 
the farm acreage is unfeasible because it cannot be financed with 
available debt and equity. 
The debt level is determined simultaneously with the nonland input 
228 
because the financial constraint (2) has been solved for debt and 
substituted into the nonland input choice, arguments. 
» 
In developing the algorithm, an alternative method of optimizing the 
nonland input was initially attempted, which iterated over discrete 
levels of nonland input. The range of the nonland input index was user 
specified and assumed to be based on observed input use. Even if only 
one nonland input level is chosen per period, this results in high 
problem solving cost because of the many iterations that must be 
performed or in inaccurate solutions because the nonland increment must 
be made large. 
After the nonland input path is determined, the constraint limiting 
equity investment to retained earnings is checked. The present value of 
the period's current income from production minus expenses, including 
interest, and minus retained earnings must be nonnegative. This formula­
tion of the constraint assumes Chat interyear transfers within the period 
are possible so long as they are made up with interest within the period. 
For example, if the current income before savings in a two-year period is 
$6,000 the first year and $10,200 the second year with a discount rate of 
ten percent, then savings of up to $8,000 annually is permitted because 
the present value of the deficit in the first year ($1,818) is offset by 
the present value of the surplus in the second year ($1,818). The 
interyear transfers might be accomplished by delaying consumption or 
drawing on personal nonfarm wealth to augment farm earnings temporarily. 
Imposing the constraint in this way reduces the lumpiness problem in 
savings. The alternative would be to require that current income after 
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retained earnings be nonnegative in each year, which is a more stringent 
requirement. Under the alternative specification, there is no allowance 
* 
for income increasing with savings and technological change; the savings 
sum must be available in the lowest income year. 
The maximization of wealth for a given land, equity, and unrealized 
capital gain level involves comparing wealth under the current plan with 
the highest wealth amount calculated up to that point for the state 
variable combination. The wealth is defined as the present value over 
the period of current income, minus retained earnings, plus any 
unrealized capital gain that is substitutable for income, plus the 
present value of wealth over the remaining horizon given the current land 
purchase and savings choices. It is possible for nonunique optima to 
occur if differing land purchase and savings plans result in the same 
wealth. The program will record one nonunique plan. This tells the user 
that the solution is not unique, but does not indicate all possible 
nonunique plans. Because the possible number of nonunique plans is very 
large, recording them all was not considered feasible. Because the 
discrete increments are used for land and saving, the chance of nonunique 
solutions is small and none have been encountered in multiperiod models 
using this algorithm. 
The input consists of annual time series over the relevant period 
for interest rates, input and output prices, land prices, and property 
taxes, plus the parameters which are assumed to be constant over the 
planning horizon such as production function coefficients, the average 
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tax rate, the capital gains exemption, and the maximum leverage. 
Debugging was handled by running the algorithm for representative input 
data and manually verifying the results. The source code for the 
computer program is reproduced in Appendix A. 
Input Data and Parameter Estimation 
The input data for the problem are assumed to be in some sense 
expected values. The focus of this research was not expectations forma­
tion, so sophisticated models of this process were not constructed. 
Rather, plausible scenarios were constructed employing two simple 
expectation assumptions: 
1) the expectations are the "best" statistical forecast using data 
up to the first year of the planning horizon and 
2) perfect foresight, in which the expectations are the observed 
values for the period. 
Which forecasting methodology is "best" depends on the characteristics of 
the data, but in most cases univariate time series models were used. 
Parameters which could not directly be observed are estimated when data 
is available, as in the case of the production function, or their impact 
on model solutions is examined by means of sensitivity testing, as in the 
case of the substitutability parameters {<|), u). The simple step function 
used in the algorithm did not allow the full range of financial choices 
assumed in the theoretical model, thus sensitivity testing is done on the 
leverage ratio and the maximum percentage of real estate debt to 
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determine their impact on solutions. Several solutions are also 
calculated with alternative tax parameter values. 
Parameter values other than land prices differ substantially under 
the two expectation assumptions. This can make it difficult to identify 
pure land price path effects. To more closely analyze land price path 
effects, two additional scenarios were defined based on the forecasts, 
but with the land price altered. A higher capital gain scenario was 
created by multiplying the dollar value of forecast capital gains by ten. 
The resulting land price path more closely approximates the nominal 
changes in land prices observed in the 1970s than the forecasts. The 
factor of ten is, however, arbitrary. It could be eight or 12. A factor 
of ten is used because it is large enough so that if land prices can 
significantly affect production and finance decisions, that effect should 
be visible. Yet it is small enough so that the expectation is within the 
realm of possibility. The other scenario uses the forecast land price 
increases multiplied by ten up to 1981 and then drops to the forecast 
path. This creates a land price bubble similar to that found in the 
observed values. Hence, the basic scenarios are: 
1) forecast values, 
2) perfect foresight, 
3) higher capital gains, and 
4) land price bubble. 
The treatment of parameter values in each basic scenario is summarized in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. The treatment of parameter values in expectation scenarios 
Statistically Sensitivity 
Observed values estimated values testing Parameters 
Land price Perfect foresight Forecast Higher capital 
gain 
Land price bubble 
Input and output Perfect foresight Forecast None 
prices, interest 
rates, discount 
rate, and nonland 
input capital 
requirement (y ^ , 
y2» ^t» P » G^t) 
Higher capital 
gain 
Land price bubble 
Tax parameters All basic^ 
(t, t^ , 5, e) scenarios 
None Higher capital 
gain 
Substitutability None 
parameters (<f), w) 
None All scenarios 
Production 
function (a^, 
®2» ^3) 
All basic 
scenarios 
All scenarios None 
Debt supply None 
function parame­
ters, minimum 
leverage ratio 
(L), and percentage 
real estate debt 
None Higher capital 
gain 
Forecast 
^The basic scenarios are: forecast, perfect foresight, higher 
capital gain and land price bubble, with a maximum leverage of 0.2 and a 
maximum real estate debt of 50 percent of market value. 
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Wherever possible, univariate Box-Jenkins models were used to 
construct the statistical forecasts. Univariate Box-Jenkins models offer 
numerous advantages over multivariable econometric methods in terms of 
the logical approach to forecasting and theoretical consistency (Jenkins, 
1979, pp. 88-94). For the purposes of this research, the univariate 
models offered a feasible method of generating predicted values for a 
relatively large number of variables. In many forecasting circumstances, 
univariate models perform at least as well as more complicated 
multiequation econometric models (Naylor et al., 1972). For this 
project, the land price forecast is crucial and previous research 
indicates that a univariate model predicts short-term land price changes 
at least as well as econometric methods (Pope et al., 1979). 
The problem in using univariate models in this context is that the 
forecast period is relatively long, while the greatest strength of Box-
Jenkins model forecasting is in the short term. Because the models 
usually rely on stochastic trend, forecasts for the distant future are 
usually flat. Stochastic disturbances in the most recent observations 
work themselves out in the short term and no new disturbances are 
introduced. Given the uncertainty about the distant future, however, a 
forecast of "more of the same" is not necessarily an unrealistic expecta­
tion. 
The time period to be considered is the 15-year span, 1970-1984. 
The period was chosen because it encompasses a time of large capital 
gains and losses, when land price changes were a potentially major force 
in agricultural decisions. It comes at the end of a 40-year period of 
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almost continuously rising land prices, so that expectations of capital 
gains were reasonable almost irrespective-of how that expectation is 
formed, and the capital losses of the 1980s were not widely anticipated. 
In general, U.S. farmers responded to the conditions of this period by 
increasing their holdings of intermediate and long-term assets and 
incurring additional debt (Boehlje and Eidtnan, 1983, p. 935; USDA, 
Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector, 1978, pp. 98-99). This reduced 
their liquidity and increasing debt service requirements, leaving them 
vulnerable to cash flow difficulties and other financial problems. 
Insight into why farmers restructured their balance sheets during this 
period would be useful to policymakers in developing programs to mitigate 
the effects of financial stress and avoid its resurgence, and to 
decisionmakers and those who advise them in identifying the consequences 
of certain approaches to valuing capital gains and losses. Other periods 
in U.S. history would offer an equally interesting test of the 
explanatory power of this model — the land price boom and crash of the 
World War I period for instance — but no other period offers such 
inmiediate and compelling need for study and readily available data. 
Central Iowa was used as the focus of this exploratory research 
because it is in a state that showed among of the largest farmland 
capital gains, from 1970-1981 and among the largest capital losses after 
1981, because adequate data are available for estimating production 
relationships from the Iowa Farm Business Association (IFBA) annual 
summaries, and because the central region of the state contains a mix of 
crop and livestock production that may reduce the impact of enterprise 
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choice decisions on the research results. The choice of a state with 
land price boom and bust extremes is logical in research that hopes to 
test the potential for capital gain and loss impacts. If they will show 
up anywhere, then they are most likely to show up when price changes are 
greater. 
The IFBA is an independent farm management and recordkeeping 
organization. IFBÂ members are not a random sample of Iowa farmers. 
They participate voluntarily and it can be argued that their interest in 
detailed recordkeeping indicates management skills that are above those 
of the average farmer. The advantage of IFBA data is that it offers a 
relatively detailed look at a substantial group of commercial farmers. 
Membership in the central region has varied over the years, but recently 
it has ranged around 400. Unfortunately, individual records are not 
available, but the Iowa State University Extension Service does publish 
an annual summary of average assets, costs, and income for various farm 
acreage classes to give other farmers some standard for comparison. The 
format of these publications has been relatively consistent since 1957, 
so 13 years of data are available before 1970. The role of these 
summaries as a public standard for comparison strengthens the argument 
for using this data as a proxy for the information used by farmers and 
their advisors in formulating expectations. It is not known how 
influential the summaries are in the formation of expectations, but they 
are intended to be part of that process. 
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Production function estimation 
The production function (8) was estimated from the cross-sectional 
time series data of central Iowa IFBA farmers using the error components 
method (Judge et al., 1982, p. 499). This technique assumes that in 
addition to the general error term (e^^) there is some year specific 
error (u^) that is the same across farm size classes. It is assumed that 
the trend term (t) captures systematic productivity changes, such as 
those generated by technological innovation. The year error terra 
captures random effects from such sources as weather, disease, and pest 
problems common to all the IFBA farmers in a given year. The general 
error term is assumed to capture all other sources of error: omitted 
variables, the collection of individuals who happen to belong to the IFBA 
in a certain size class, and events on individual farms. In logarithmic 
form, the model can be written: 
(10) In = A + a^lnt + a^lnX^^^ + a^lnL^^ + u^ + e^^ 
where: i = the farm size class. 
The general and year specific errors are assumed to be independent, with 
2 2 
zero mean and constant variance of and , respectively. The 
general and year specific errors are assumed to be uncorrelated. The 
covariance matrix has the sum of the two variances on the diagonal 
2 2 (a^ + Og ) and the year specific variance everywhere else (Judge et al., 
1982, p. 489). Because this variance structure deviates from the 
constant variance multiplied by an identity matrix assumed for ordinary 
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least squares estimation, generalized least squares (GLS) is required. 
The GLS transformation involves expressing the original observations as a 
deviation from a fraction of their means. The fraction is: 
11)  b = 1 -
2 2 Na + a 
u e 
where: N = the number of farm size classes. 
The other primary method for dealing with cross-sectional time 
series data employs dumny variables for the year effect. Instead of 
assuming.that there is a random term for each year, it is assumed that 
there is a separate intercept term for each year. The dumny variable is 
adaptable to a wider range of situations because the assumptions about 
the distribution of the year specific error (u) are not required (Judge 
et al., p. 497). It is, however, unsuitable for capturing expectations 
about the future because the model provides no information about future 
intercept values. 
The problem of correlation between the year specific error and the 
independent variable raised by Mundlak is a possibility here. For 
instance, if pesticides are a large part of nonland input, then a year in 
which insect infestations are particularly heavy might be characterized 
by a large nonland expenditure for insecticide and a large negative year 
specific residual for all four sizes. Similarly, when the infestation is 
unusually light, the nonland input level may be small and the year 
specific residual a large positive. If there is correlation between the 
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year error and the independent variables, the error component model is 
misspecified and coefficient estimates will be biased. The formal test 
for correlation of the year error and the independent variable suggested 
by Hausmann (1978, pp. 1261-1264) does not appear to apply here because 
the dunmy variable and the error component model contain a differing 
number of slope coefficients. This occurs because the trend term must be 
dropped from the dummy variable estimation in order for the model to be 
full rank. The argument used by Hausmann, however, does apply. If the 
model is properly specified, the slope coefficient estimates for the 
dumny variable and error component models will be similar because the 
specification error would not bias the dummy variable estimate, and if 
the error component model is correct it will similarly be unbiased 
(Hausmann, 1978, p. 1263). The two models differ only in how the year 
effects are treated. The slope parameters being estimated should be the 
same, though the estimates may differ in efficiency. For the central 
Iowa data, the dummy variable and error component model estimates for the 
land and nonland input coefficients were almost identical. 
The need for year effect terms can be examined with an F-test 
comparing the residual sum of squares for the dummy variable model and 
for a restricted model in which it is assumed that a common intercept 
exists for all years (Judge et al., 1982, p. 495). 
p _ (SSE restricted model - SSE unrestricted model)/(T-l) 
(12, 43) MSE unrestricted model 
^ (0.5521 - 0.0386)/12 
0.00089831 
= 47.6. 
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where: SSE = sum of squares error, 
MSB = mean square error, and 
T = number of years. 
The F-test is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating 
that the hypothesis of a common intercept is not accepted. 
2 2 Because the variance terms (a^ , ) are not known, they must be 
estimated before the GLS transformation can be made. The variance of the 
general error can be estimated from the residuals of the dummy variable 
model, and the year error variance can be estimated from a regression of 
the mean output in each year on the mean land and nonland input levels. 
The estimation and transformation procedure suggested by Judge et al. 
requires the same number of farm size classes in each year, but the 
published IFBA data had four farm size classes before 1964 and five after 
that date. A modified procedure for handling the differing number of 
classes is outlined in Appendix B. 
The variables used in the estimations were: Y, the real gross 
income measured in 1969 dollars; X, all expenses except for interest and 
property taxes measured in 1969 dollars; and L, farm area measured in 
acres. The units for output and nonland input where chosen to allow 
aggregation. A central Iowa farm may produce corn, soybeans, hogs, and 
many other products; no one physical unit is suitable for this diverse 
collection of outputs. The gross income did not include income from off-
farm employment, nonfarm investment, or sales of equipment and real 
estate. The convention of measuring farm income after deducting 
purchased feed and livestock was followed. It is argued that this yields 
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a better estimate of actual farm production because the purchased feed 
and livestock were not produced on the farm in question (Lee et al., 
t 
1980, p. 154). 
In addition to the operating expenses, such as fuel, fertilizer, and 
hired labor, the nonland input category includes the imputed value of 
family and operator labor, all depreciation, building repairs, and 
insurance. The family and operator labor is taken from estimates in the 
published summaries that are based on the wages for hired farm labor. 
With this specification, the objective function is the returns to capital 
and management. The problem of insuring some income for family consump­
tion is thereby reduced because some family income is always included in 
the nonland input. The model does not require that operator and family 
labor be fully employed. It is assumed that off-farm employment is 
available for operator and family labor not used on the farm, at least to 
the extent that minimum consumption requirements are met. 
For the purposes of the study, building and other real estate 
improvements were taken to be nonland inputs. With land measured in 
acres, the impact of building and other improvements would not be 
reflected in the estimation if real estate depreciation and repairs were 
excluded from the nonland input category. Property taxes are the only 
cost strictly attributable to the land and they do not contribute 
directly to production, so it is reasonable to exclude them from the 
measure of productive inputs. This definition of inputs also provides 
additional flexibility in the decision environment. There may be cases 
in which large capital gains occur and it is optimal to neglect building 
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repair and replacement to invest in more land. It should be noted that 
improvements affect the price of a particular piece of property, but 
t 
general capital gains on U.S. farmland cannot be attributed to improve­
ments. Major farmland price formation hypotheses suggest that capital 
gains and losses depend on technological change which makes more farm 
income attributable to land and less to labor (Melichar, 1979), or the 
interaction of inflation and tax rules (Feldstein, 1980). Consistent 
with this observation, it is assumed that farmland capital gains are 
independent of the real estate improvement repair and maintenance 
decision. 
The estimated equation for the 1957-1969 data was: 
(10.1) Y. = -3.1995 + 1.0312-Int + 0.7734 InX. + 0.2924 InL. 
It It It 
(1.5986) (0.4088) (0.0595) (0.0408) 
where: Y.^ = gross income in 1969 dollars, 
t = 57, 58 ... 69, 
i = 1 ... 4 for 1957-1963 and 1 ... 5 for 1964-1969 
X.^ = nonland inputs in 1969 dollars, and 
L. = land in acres. 
It 
Standard errors are listed under the coefficient estimates in equation 
(10.1). All the coefficient estimates are significantly different from 
zero at the 0.05 level. The overall F-test is significant at the 0.01 
level with F = 53,871. The coefficient estimates are plausible. The 
trend coefficient is positive, consistent with observed changes in 
productivity. If the intercept and the trend term are considered to be 
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parts of a year specific intercept, the model can be seen as a two input 
power function in which the sum of the input coefficients indicates the 
returns to scale. The estimated coefficients sum to 1.07, indicating a 
slight degree of increasing returns to scale. This is reasonable for the 
range of farm sizes considered. Economies of size research suggests the 
cost curve continues to decline over a wide range of farm sizes (Miller, 
Rodewald, and McElroy, 1981; Madden, 1967). Decreasing returns to scale 
may set in for very large farms, but no observations are available in the 
very large size range and it is unlikely that conditions on the very 
large farms are relevant to the representative farm modeled here. The 
increasing returns to scale do not create a problem for the solution 
algorithm because capital constraints will force a finite firm size, even 
if production relationships do not. 
In the context of the theoretical model, sufficient conditions for 
optimality under increasing returns to scale can be found in the models 
with equity restrictions (Lowenberg-DeBoer 1985a, p. 13). When the 
negative debt cost terms in the bordered Hessian or matrix of second 
derivatives of the Hamiltonian outweigh the production function terms, 
which may be positive with increasing returns to scale, the matrix can be 
negative definite for the parameter combination considered. Explosive 
solutions can occur in the theoretical model with increasing returns to 
scale, but they do not necessarily occur. 
The dummy variable and error component model estimates for the land 
and nonland input coefficients are almost identical, supporting the 
argument that the model is correctly specified. Using data for 1957-
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1969, the dummy variable coefficient estimates were 0.2902 for land and 
0.7761 for the nonland inputs for the dummy variable. Simple t-tests 
fail to reject the hypothesis that the estimates from the two models are 
equal. It is reasonable that at this level of aggregation the year and 
input correlation are negligible. The year effect may be correlated with 
use of some pesticide or other individual input, but when one aggregates 
nonland inputs across enterprises and subgroups of inputs (fertilizer, 
pesticides, equipment, etc.), then it is likely that under Iowa 
conditions the correlation of the year residual with the specific input 
is swamped by other variation. 
Time series forecasts 
Interest rates, input and output prices, indexes, and land prices 
were forecast with the Box-Jenkins methodology of identification, estima­
tion, and diagnostic checking (Pankratz, 1983, p. 17). Sample autocor­
relation functions were calculated for the time series to be forecast and 
compared to the theoretical autocorrelation functions for autoregressive 
and moving average models. Models that fit the patterns in the sample 
autocorrelation were estimated. Criteria for the "best" model were the 
minimum mean square error, plausibility of the forecast, and the random­
ness of the residuals. The residuals were checked visually by plotting 
them against time and against the original series, and with the Box-
Pierce chi-square approximation (Malbert, 1975, p. 21). 
Because most of the time series were nonstationary, differencing was 
used to induce stationarity. This is standard procedure in Box-Jenkins 
models (Pankratz, 1983, p. 157; Malbert, 1975, p. 12; Jenkins, 1979, 
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p. 98). Explicit tests of the appropriateness of differencing, such as 
those suggested by Fuller (1976, pp. 366-382), were not employed because 
of their complexity and because the problems associated with inappropri­
ate differencing were not encountered. For instance, inappropriate dif­
ferencing may cause forecasts to wander off to plus or minus infinity. 
The land price forecast was based on the USDA land price index for 
Iowa as reported in Agricultural Statistics. The rule used in construct­
ing all the data series is that the most recently reported estimate is 
used. This assumes that the most recent revision contains the most up to 
date and accurate information. The USDA index was used in preference to 
the one estimated by Iowa State University economists, because the ISU 
series is too short for effective use of the Box-Jenkins methodology. 
The estimated model for the 1912-1969 period is a first-order autoregres-
sive in the first differences of the land price index: 
LP. - LP» . = 0.8099 + 0.4505(LP, , - LP» .). L C—i L—1 L—Z 
This model utilized a constant term, implying deterministic trend in land 
prices. As a general rule, Box-Jenkins models do not use deterministic 
trend unless there is some compelling reason to believe that there is 
some systematic change in the process (Pankratz, 1983, p. 189). A 
stochastic trend which follows recent disturbances in the data is 
preferred because it is more flexible and does not require the time 
series to follow exactly the same pattern that it has in the past. 
Pankratz suggests fitting models with and without a constant term in the 
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preliminary stages of estimation to check the possibility of determinis­
tic trend. The constant term is used here because it substantially 
reduces the mean square error of the model compared to estimates with no 
constant, and because it generates a more plausible long-term forecast. 
The Iowa land price forecast rises steadily with increases of $6 to $8 
annually during the early 1970s, dropping off to a regular $5 annual 
increase through the remainder of the period (Table 2). Given the con­
tinuous, modest rise in land price through the 1950s and 1960s, this is a 
more plausible forecast than the small initial increase and then no 
change prediction generated by models without deterministic trend. An 
argument for deterministic trend in land prices is that technological 
change is altering the factor shares in agriculture so that more income 
is attributable to land. 
The forecasted prices are substantially below the observed land 
price increases of the 1970s (Table 3), but are consistent with the 
experience up to 1970. It should be noted that this forecast is based on 
all available data, including the land price declines of the 1920s and 
1930s. If one thought that the structure of the land market had changed 
with the advent of government farm programs and that the only relevant 
data were after 1933 or after World War II, then the estimate would 
probably show much larger increases. A model based on the shorter data 
period may also overestimate the land prices for the 1980s because of the 
optimistic trend estimate based on the continuously rising prices of the 
data period. In real terms, the forecasted values appear close to the 
observed values for the 1980s. It is not clear which price index is most 
appropriate for deflating land prices, but if the observed land price for 
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Table 2. Price, interest rate, and tax expectations for 1969-1984 based 
on statistical forecasts 
Real Nonreal Output Input Property 
Discount estate estate price price Land tax per 
Year rate interest interest index index price acre 
—nominal dollars— 
1969 0.070 0.058 0.078 1.000 1.000 382 6.3 
1970 0.070 0.058 0.078 1.013 1.016 394 6.5 
1971 0.070 0.059 0.078 1.013 1.016 402 6.8 
1972 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 409 7.1 
1973 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 415 7.3 
1974 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 420 7.5 
1975 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 425 7.8 
1976 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 430 8.0 
1977 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 435 8.3 
1978 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 440 8.5 
1979 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 445 8.7 
1980 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 450 9.0 
1981 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 456 9.2 
1982 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 461 9.5 
1983 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 466 9.7 
1984 0.070 0.060 0.078 1.013 1.016 481 9.9 
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Table 3. Observed price. interest rate :, and tax : values for 1969-1980 
Year 
Discount® 
rate 
Real 
estate 
interest 
Nonreal 
estate 
interest 
Output 
price 
index^ 
Input 
price 
index*" 
Land 
price 
Property 
tax per 
acre 
1969 0.020 0.057 0.078 1.000 
—nominal 
1.000 382 
dollars— 
6.12 
1970 -0.107 0.058 0.090 1.017 1.038 392 8.67 
1971 0.198 0.060 0.073 1.051 1.096 392 8.91 
1972 0.129 0.061 0.070 1.169 1.173 414 8.48 
1973 0.011 0.063 0.081 1.661 1.404 466 8.60 
1974 -0.176 0.066 0.094 1.780 1.596 597 8.59 
1975 0.076 0.069 0.089 1.712 1.750 719 9.39 
1976 0.206 0.072 0.082 1.729 1.865 920 9.78 
1977 0.006 0.073 0.079 1.695 1.923 1259 11.05 
1978 0.026 0.073 0.088 1.949 2.077 1331 11.00 
1979 0.117 0.077 0.107 2.237 2.404 1550 11.19 
1980 0.192 0.081 0.129 2.271 2.654 1811 12.35 
1981 0.120 0.086 0.149 2.356 2.846 1941 12.31 
1982 -0.011 0.096 0.143 2.254 2.865 1802 14.32 
1983 0.362 0.099 0.119 2.271 2.942 1568 12.85 
1984 0.041 0.099 0.119 2.407 2.981 1396 12.85 
^After tax return on common stock, calculated from dividend yields 
and annual percentage price changes on the Standard and Poor's composite 
of 500 stocks. Standard and Poor's Statistical Service, Security Price 
Index Record, 1984. 
^From USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 1983, pp. 441-442. 
^From USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 1982, pp. 420, 427 and USDA, 
Agricultural Outlook, May, 1985, p. 27. Adjusted for 1969=1/ 
^From USDA Agricultural Statistics, 1980, 1981, and 1984. 
^Calculated from "Farm Business Summary for Central Iowa," 
ISU Coop. Extension Service, Ames, Iowa, 1957-1983. 
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1984 is deflated by the observed index of prices paid by farmers for 
production items, the real value is $468 (constant 1969 dollars), and if 
the 1984 forecast land price is deflated by the forecast prices paid 
index, then the real value is $465. The fact that the forecast misses 
the land price boom of the 1970s is not surprising because it was not 
generally anticipated by the experts of the time and it is unlikely that 
it would be anticipated by a simple, univariate model. 
The forecast of prices paid by farmers was based on the USDA index 
of prices paid by farmers for all production commodities, including 
fertilizer, seed, and building and fencing material as reported in 
Agricultural Statistics. It excluded interest, taxes, and wages. For 
the aggregate nonland input defined for this study, an index including 
wages would have been better, but the available index including wages 
also had interest and taxes, which are explicitly handled elsewhere in 
the model. Iowa data were not used for the prices and interest rates 
because these variables are based on national markets, not local markets 
like land. Also, data series for Iowa prices and interest were either 
nonexistent or too short for effective use of the Box-Jenkins method­
ology. The estimated model is a first-order moving average on the first 
differences. 
PAID - PAID , = -0.4588e , 
t t-1 t-1 
where: PAID^ = index of prices paid in year t (1969=100) and 
e^_^ = prediction error in period t-1. 
The forecast shows a price increase to 1.0163 in 1970 and constant 
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thereafter (Table 2). Again, this forecast is substantially lower than 
the observed values (Table 3), but consistent with the relatively low 
inflation experience in the 1950s and 1960s. The index was either 
dropping or constant through most of the 1950s and rising slowly in the 
1960s. Model estimates with a constant term will generate continuously 
rising prices, but that constant term is not statistically significant in 
the models estimated and, more important, there is no reason to believe 
that prices should be systematically rising. 
With the nonland inputs defined in real terms, the prices paid index 
plays the role of the current input cost (Y^^ in the theoretical model 
(3). If prices are unchanged, the price of nonland inputs is one. 
The forecast of prices received by farmers is based on the USDA 
index of prices received for all farm products as reported in 
Agricultural Statistics. Because central Iowa farmers produce grain, oil 
seeds, livestock, and other products, no one commodity group index was 
appropriate for measuring changes in prices received. The estimated 
model was a first-order moving average on the first differences: 
RECEIVED - RECEIVED , = -0.4297e , 
t t-1 t-1 
where: RECEIVED^ = index of prices received in period t and 
e^ = prediction error in period t-1. 
The forecasts show a modest rise in 1970 to 1.0130 and constant 
thereafter (Table 2). The observed index shows a much larger rise 
(Table 3), but the forecast is plausible given the roughly constant index 
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of the 1950s and 1960s. The 1969 index value is only slightly above the 
1950 value, and it is below the Korean War commodity boom values in 1951 
and 1952. 
The average interest rate on outstanding real estate debt was used 
to forecast real estate debt cost. The 1910-1969 data was found in the 
Ag Finance Databook. Rates on outstanding debt were used in preference 
to rates on new debt because of the longer data series available and 
because they capture some of the effect of the relatively long maturities 
of real estate credit. The model does not explicitly include debt 
maturity, but it is unrealistic to base decisions on the expected cost of 
new debt when the debt cost of the average farmer during the period was 
based on the interest rates from 5, 10, or 15 years ago because of long-
term fixed interest loans. Currently, the difference between the average 
interest rate on outstanding debt and on new debt is decreasing because 
of the widespread use of variable interest loans, but there is no reason 
to think that the average farmer in 1970 could anticipate that change. 
The estimated model is a second order autoregressive on the first 
differences: 
RIt - ^:[_l = 0.5286 + 0.1702 3) 
where: RI^ = real estate interest 
The forecasts show the real estate interest rate rising to 5.8 percent in 
1970, 5.9 in 1971 and 6.0 for 1972 and later (Table 2). Observed 
interest rates rose substantially more in the 1970s and 1980s, reaching 
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almost 10 percent on outstanding real estate debt in 1983 (Table 3). 
During the 1950s and 1960s interest rates rose modestly from 4.5 percent 
in 1950 to 5.7 percent in 1969. Models with constant terms can generate 
forecasts of continuously rising rates that more closely mimic the 
observed values from the 1970s and 1980s, but the constant term is 
statistically nonsignificant and the mean square error rises compared to 
models without the constant. Though interest rates had risen steadily in 
the decades immediately preceding 1969, there was no compelling reason to 
believe that they would continue to rise systematically in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
Average interest rates on outstanding Production Credit Association 
debt were used in forecasting the nonreal estate debt cost. The PCA 
series was used because that lender was an increasingly important source 
of nonreal estate credit through the period being considered and because 
the data series is slightly longer than the commerical bank series 
(Melichar, 1979, p. 28). With only 29 observations the PCA series is 
almost too short for the application of the Box and Jenkins methdodology. 
Longer series exist (OSDA, 1957, p. 30), but they are plagued by 
unreliable data and changing definitions. The random walk model: 
' NRIj. - NRI^  = e^  
where: NRI^ = the nonreal estate interest rate in period t. 
was used because the sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions showed no statistically significant estimates. Also, in simple 
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moving average and autoregressive models estimated on the data, the 
coefficient estimates were invariably not significant. Plotting the ^ 
first difference of the series and the Box-Pierce statistic suggest that 
the hypothesis that the first differences are random can not be rejected. 
PCA loans are generally short terra, often a year or less, so it is not 
surprising that in annual data lagged effects are weak. With a random 
walk model the best estimate of the next period price is this period's 
price. Hence, the forecast is constant at the 1969 value, 7,8 (Table 2). 
The forecast is lower and more regular than the observed values 
(Table 3), but there is no information in the 1940-1969 PCA series or 
other statistical sources which would cause one to anticipate the high 
rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a market which is character­
ized by efficient information flow and rapid adjustment, the forecast of 
"more of the same" is reasonable in the absence of knowledge concerning 
factors which will shock the market. 
The discount rate was based on return to common stocks as measured 
by the dividend yield and annual percentage price change for Standard and 
Poor's composite of 500 stocks. For farm firms organized as sole propri­
etorships, the most straight forward discount rate is the after-tax 
return to nonfarm investments of comparable risk (Alpin, Casier and 
Francis, 1977, p. 50; Lee et al., 1980, p. 77). For comparability of 
risk equity investments are more suitable than the fixed and relatively 
sure return of debt securities. Common stock is the most widely held 
equity investment in the U.S. and its returns are well-documented. The 
argument for using the common stock return does not require that the farm 
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motivated people in the financial industry. In the absence of an 
appropriate model, the mean value 4.4 percent was used as the best 
available forecast. Though the stock price level has risen substantially 
over the data period, the annual percentage change shows no apparent 
trends. This forecast misses the cyclical variation in returns that 
continue in the 1970s and 1980s, but it provides information about the 
expected long term gains that could be expected in the stock market. 
The discount rate should be measured net of taxes. Little empirical 
information exists on average farm tax rates. The Internal Revenue 
Service Data (1RS) studied by Sisson is of little use to this study 
because it is difficult to identify farmers from tax data alone. The 
taxpayer with farm income may be a commerical farmer, a non farm investor 
in agricultural production; or an urban worker with a rural residence 
that produces some farm products. The best available data appears to be 
a survey of Indiana farmers conducted in 1980. The data relate to tax 
returns filed in 1978 and 1979. The survey found a mean tax rate of 
about 12 percent (Baker and Lapp, 1981, p. 16) and showed an average tax 
rate that is roughly constant over all farm sales classes. This supports 
the argument for using a constant average tax rate though the farm 
business size may vary substantially over the planning horizon. The 12 
percent mean tax rate includes income and social security self-employment 
taxes. The rate is after deductions and exemptions. Because Iowa and 
Indiana farmers engage in the same enterprises and operate under similar 
conditions, the average tax rate among central Iowa farmers is likely to 
be similar to that used in Indiana. State income taxes were not 
included. 
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Under the law in effect in 1969, the capital gains deduction was 50 
percent. This was changed in October, 1978 to 60 percent (Harl, 1983, 
Section 27.06), but here is no reason to believe that the average farmer 
could anticipate that change. Hence, the capital gain deduction for the 
farmland sold at the end of the planning horizon is specified at 50 
percent throughout the planning hoizon for the forecast solutions. 
With a 12 percent average tax rate, the after-tax dividend returns 
is 2.82 percent. Assuming a 50 percent capital gain deduction and annual 
realization of capital gain, the after-tax capital gain rate on common 
stock was 4.14 percent. The after-tax discount rate for the forecast 
model was 7.0 percent. 
The remaining parameters for the forecast solutions are the capital 
absorbed by nonland inputs , the maximum leverage (A) and the maximum 
percentage of real estate capital that may be borrowed. In the central 
Iowa IFBA data, there are about $2.14 invested in inventories of feed, 
stored grain, livestock equipment and miscellaneous supplies for every 
dollar of the nonland input. For example, if expenditures on crop and 
livstock inputs, labor, insurance and other nonland costs is about 
$20,000 then the incentives carried by that farm in utilizing those 
inputs will be around $42,800. The proportion is roughly constant over 
the data period. For example, the proportion is 2.14 for the 1957-1969 
period and 2.10 for the entire data set, 1957-1983. The IFBA data are 
based on year-end inventories so it does not include items that are 
purchased and used up during the year, such as seed, fertilizer, and 
fuel. This working capital requirement was estimated at 50 percent of 
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the nominal value of nonland inputs, based on a six month production 
cycle. Hence, the capital absorbed by nonland inputs in the forecast 
solutions is estimated as 2.64 multiplied by the prices paid index, 
because the investment was calculated on a nominal basis. 
Solutions were calculated with several leverage levels to test the 
sensitivity of the model to the availability of debt. Results with 
leverage ratios of 0.2 and 0.5 are reported in detail. These modest 
leverage levels are consistent with the general conservative financial 
behavior of U.S. farmers. The 0.2 leverage level is close to the 
observed average level of the 1960s and 1970s. The 0.5 leverage is 
representative of the greater debt us of some farmers observed in the 
1970s. Modest leverage reduced problem solving costs because it 
constrains firm growth and shrinks the number of potential paths over 
which the algorithm must enumerate. 
Property taxes were forecast based on a linear trend model estimated 
from the IFBA data: 
PT^ = -10.25 + 0.2404t 
where: PT^ = property tax per acre. 
The Box-Jenkins methodology was not appropriate for the short time series 
and cross sectional nature of the IFBA data. Because property taxes tend 
to be a localized phenomena, longer state and national series were not 
used. The forecast shows property taxes rising at about $0.20 to 0.30 
per acre annually. 
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The maximum percetiCage of real estate capital that can be borrowed 
was set at 50 percent of market value in the base solutions. This level 
is consistent with the 65 percent of normal value that the Federal Land 
Bank could lend in 1969. Normal value was based on a standard set of 
input and output prices. It was often below market values because of 
lags in adjusting the reference set of normal prices for inflation. In 
the early 1970s the Federal Land Bank statutory maximum was changed to 85 
percent of market value, but the average farmer in 1969 would probably 
not have anticipated that change. 
For the perfect foresight solutions, the observed values of the time 
series variables and other parameters were used when available. The most 
recent values of the debt cost variables were not available when the 
research was being conducted. The 1983 value for PCA interest was taken 
to be the average rate on new loans (Amols and Kaiser, 1984, p. 53) and 
the 1984 rates for both debt types were assumed to be constant from 1983. 
The simple algorithm used in their exploratory research did not allow a 
changing tax rate or maximum real estate debt. Hence, the 12 percent 
average tax rate was used for both expectation assumptions and the 50 
percent maximum real estate debt was maintained. 
The production function for the perfect foresight solution was 
reestimated following the same procedure as was used for the forecast 
solution, except that all available data, 1957-1983 was used. 
Presumably, in the perfect foresight case there is knowledge of how 
productivity will change during the planning horizon. The estimated 
equation with standard errors listed under the coefficient estimates is: 
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InY^t; = -2.4582 + 0.68751nt + 0.22571nX + O.SSlGlnL 
(0.7453) (0.1919) (0.0375) (0.0548) 
All the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. The overall F test is significant at the 0.01 level with 
F=76,109. Consistent with the observation of slower technological change 
during the 1970s, the trend coefficient is smaller than in the earlier 
estimate. The land and nonland input coefficients are similar to the 
earlier estimates, though the land coefficient is slightly smaller and 
the nonland input coefficient is larger. 
Numerical Results 
The model was solved for the forecast and perfect foresight 
scenarios assuming an initial equity of $120,000, approximately the 
average equity of an Iowa farmer in 1970 if all unrealized capital gain 
is considered an addition to equity (USDA, 1978, p. 27). This initial 
equity level assumes that the decision maker can cash in all assets at 
market value and make a fresh allocation decision. In the first period 
of the basic models, no initial land holding is assumed. Solutions 
calculated for variations on the basic scenarios, such as higher leverage 
or alternative increment values, are started at the lowest initial land 
purchase identified for the basic model of that expectation scenario. 
For instance, if the smallest first year farm size for the scenario is 
240 acres, then variations of the scenario use an initial farm size of 
240 acres. This reduces problem solving cost for sensitivity testing and 
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is unlikely to affect the solutions, given the continuous functions 
employed and the importance of the capital constraint. For instance, 
with increasing returns to scale it is likely that if any production is 
profitable all available capital will be used. Increasing capital avail­
ability by allowing higher leverage ratios is unlikely to reduce the 
initial acreage chosen. The choice in the higher leverage model is 
between the optimal path identified for the lower leverage case and those 
additional paths that are made possible by greater debt use. The impact 
of assuming an initial landholding in the sensitivity testing was spot 
checked by solving a few cases for the whole range of land values; in no 
case did this solution differ from that calculated for the more 
restricted land purchase assumption. 
The 15-year planning horizon was divided into three 5-year periods 
(n=5). The increment values were set at: land, 80 acres; annual saving, 
$8,000; and capital gains, $10,000 for the forecast scenario and $100,000 
for higher capital gain, land price bubble and the perfect foresight 
scenarios. The choice of increment size was made to balance the need for 
small increments to aid in finding accurate solutions and larger 
increments to reduce problem solving cost. It must be emphasized that 
the numerical magnitudes in the solutions are conditional on the 
increment values. For instance, allowing 40 acre land increments may 
speed growth and increase the present value of returns if acquiring 
capital for the larger land unit is a major impediment to expansion. 
Smaller increments would be preferred for savings and capital gains 
variables, because they are essentially continuous in actual farm 
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operations. Lumpiness in land sales is realistic, though the size of the 
tracts may differ from area to area. Eighty acre tracts are not 
unreasonable for central Iowa conditions. In the limited sensitivity 
testing done increment sizes did not change the general impact of land 
prices on the solutions. 
The range of state variable values over which the solutions were 
sought was set to allow all feasible paths. Because the capital 
constraint dominated the solutions, this meant in practice input combina­
tions that could be financed and savings levels that could be achieved 
with inputs at the maximum level that can be financed. The capital gains 
range was determined by the minimum and maximum landholding. If a solu­
tion specified the extreme value of a state variable range as optimal, 
the model was rerun with a broader range. The adequancy of the ranges 
was spotchecked by rerunning a few models with broadened ranges; in no 
case did this result in a different solution when the previous solution 
was not at an extreme value of a range. 
Land purchases were limited to a maximum of 400 acres per 5-year 
period. This is a relatively low level of land availability. In the 
traditional 36 section township, this implies that the decision maker 
places successful bids on only 2 percent of the land every 5-year period, 
usually about 3 to 4 percent of U.S. farmland changes hands in any given 
year. Many farmers would be willing to search for land over a wider area 
than a single township. At maximum leverage ratios of 0.5 and less, 
however, the land availability is not a binding constraint; more land 
could not be financed even if it was available. 
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Solutions were calculated with the proportions of unrealized capital 
gian or loss that could be substituted for current income or equity set 
at zero and one (<fr=l, 0; oi-l, 0). These values were chosen to test the 
sensitivity of the solutions to extreme values of the substitutability 
parameters. To facilitate the discussion the substituability parameter 
combinations will be refered to as: 
1. the no flow value case when both substitutability parameters are 
set to zero (*=0, w=0) and capital gain or loss is recognized 
only at the end of the horizon; 
2. The income substitution case when capital gains and loss are 
substitutable for income alone (<j)=l, w=0) ; 
3. the equity substitution case when capital gains and losses are 
substituable for equity alone (*=0, w=l); and 
4. the maximum flow value case when both substitutability 
parameters are set to one (#=1, w=l). 
Forecast scenario 
When expectations are based on statistical forecasts the optimal 
solution for 1970 is to purchase 240 acres of land and use $19,500 on 
nonland inputs (Table 4). The nonland input per acre is $81. This 
initial period choice is the same for all values of the unrealized 
capital gain or loss substituability parameters. Debt use is set at 
$24,000, the maximum allowable with a 0.2 leverage limit. All the 
solutions discussed here use the maximum available debt given the 
effective leverage. This is reasonable given the increasing returns to 
scale and the generally low, after-tax cost of debt when compared to the 
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Table 4. Land purchases, saving, nonland inputs, and debt use in the 
forecast and higher capital gain scenarios, solutions using, a 
maximum leverage of 0.2 
Land Annual Total^ Nonland^ 
Period 4,c (ijd purchases saving debt inputs 
Forecast scenario: —acres— 
1970-1974 0 0 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1 0 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
0 1 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1 1 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1975-1979 0 0 80 16,000 32,000 25,200 
1 0 80 16,000 32,000 25,200 
0 1 80 16,000 34,000 25,900 
1 1 80 16,000 34,000 25,900 
1980-1984 0 0 160 40,000 48,000 35,200 
1 0 160 40,000 48,000 35,200 
0 1 160 40,000 52,000 36,700 
1 1 160 40,000 52,000 36,700 
Higher capital 
gain scenario 
: 
1970-1974 0 0 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1 0 320 8,000 24,000 8,100 
0 1 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1 1 320 8,000 24,000 8,100 
1975-1979 0 0 0 16,000 32,000 40,700 
1 0 0 16,000 32,000 18,000 
0 1 80 16,000 52,000 25,400 
1 1 0 16,000 52,000 25,400 
1980-1984 0 0 80 32,000 48,000 61,200 
1 0 80 32,000 48,000 31,000 
0 1 80 40,000 88,000 45,900 
1 1 80 40,000 88,000 45,900 
^During the first year of the period. 
^Nonland inputs are measured in real 1969 dollars. Savings and debt 
are in nominal dollars. 
^The proportion of unrealized capital gain or loss that is 
substitutable for current income. 
•^The proportion of unrealized capital gain or loss that is 
substitutable for equity in the financial negotiation. 
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discount rate. Annual savings are set at $8000 for the first period, the 
maximum earnings that can be retained given the constraint that the 
present value of current income in the period must be nonnegative. 
The 1970 solution is close to the observed average values for Iowa. 
In 1970 the average Iowa farm was 237 acres (Iowa Crop and Livestock 
Reporting Service, 1982, p. 4). This average includes tenant and part 
owner farms. Full owner operations probably had smaller acreages. The 
1969 Census of Agriculture indicates an average farm size of 196 acres 
for full owners with gross sales over $2,500. In the 1970 IFBA data, the 
average nonland input use for farms in the 180-259 acre category was 
$18,800 when deflated by the index of prices paid for all production 
inputs. An estimate of farm retained earnings for Iowa is not available, 
but a rough idea of the savings can be reached by subtracting the average 
capital gain per farm from the average change in equity (USDA, 1978, 
p. 27). The residual change in equity varies widely between years, but 
the average value for the five year period 1970-1974 is $10,174. In this 
context, the $8,000 annual savings appears reasonable. The use of 
$24,000 of debt in the optimal solutions is largely a result of the 
maximum leverage assumption and is not useful for model validation. It 
should be noted, however, that the model correctly identifies moderate 
debt use as a wealth increasing strategy. 
In general, the 1970 values in the solution for the expectations 
based on forecast values appear to fit the observed mean values. The 
optimal control paths for the second and third periods are interesting 
from a planning perspective, but they do not offer much information for 
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validating the model. For example, the observed values for 1975 should 
not be compared to the second year solution of this scenario, but to 
I 
another solution with its initial year in 1975 and based on forecasts 
utilizing information through 1974. 
The optimal solution shows the farm firm planning to expand its land 
base through the second and third periods. Eighty acres are to be 
purchased in 1975 and 160 acres in 1980 for all substituability parameter 
values. As farm size is enlarged the use of nonland inputs increases and 
the savings capacity is greater. Debt use follows the maximum amount 
allowed given the equity level and the substitutability of unrealized 
capital gain for equity. Debt use for models in which some unrealized 
gain is substitutable for equity exceeds debt use for other models 
slightly. This additional credit is used to purchase a higher level of 
nonland inputs. Because of the lumpiness of land, the modest amount of 
additional credit derived from borrowing against unrealized capital gain 
is not enough to finance more land. The expected wealth differs only 
slightly depending on the unrealized gain and loss substitutability 
parameters. In the no flow value case, the expected wealth is $216,600. 
In the equity substitution case the wealth is only slightly higher: 
$218,200. In the income substitution and maximum flow value case, the 
expected wealth is somewhat greater: 226,900 and 228,500, respectively. 
Solutions which assume the land price is constant at the 1969 level 
are close to those calculated with forecast land prices. With a maximum 
leverage of 0.2, the land purchases in the constant land price scenario 
are: 1970, 240 acres; 1975, 80 acres and 1980, 240 acres. With constant 
265 
prices, a larger acreage can be financed with a given amount of equity, 
so a larger purchase is planned for 1980,. than in solutions with the land 
I 
price increasing at forecasted rates. Nonland input levels exceed those 
in the forecast value solutions for period two and three slightly. In 
1975, the nonland input amounts is: $26,000; compared to $25,200 in the 
no flow value and income substitution cases and $25,900 in the solutions 
that permit borrowing against unrealized capital gains. Forecast and 
constant land price solutions both have 320 acres in the second period. 
In the third period the constant land price solution shows $45,000 of 
nonland inputs on 560 acres, or $80 per acre. The forecast solution 
indicates a nonland input level on 480 acres of $35,200 for the no flow 
value and income substitution cases and $36,700 for the equity substitu­
tion and maximum flow value cases. On a per acre basis the forecast 
solution nonland inputs are $73 and $76 respectively. Slightly higher 
nonland input levels are possible because less capital is tied up in 
land. The higher nonland input level in turn generates a larger current 
income than in the forecast value solutions and thus greater savings 
capacity. The annual average savings is set at: 1970-1974, $8,000; 
1975-1979, $24,000; and 1980-1984, $56,000, compared to the forecast 
solution savings of: 1970, $8,000; 1975, $16,000 and 1979, $40,000. 
Debt use in the final period of the constant land price plan exceeds 
that of the forecast value solutions because greater savings has 
increased equity and expanded borrowing capacity. The constant land 
price solution shows $56,000 of debt in 1980 compared to forecast 
scenario solution values of $48,000 for the no flow value and income 
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substitution cases and $52,000 for the maximum flow value and equity 
substitution cases. The expected wealth is $226,200, which is higher 
than wealth in the forecast solution when no unrealized capital gain is 
substitutable for income. This suggests that even when borrowing against 
capital gain is permitted, modest land price increases do not necessarily 
increase wealth. Problems in financing land at higher prices may more 
than offset the capital gains. 
Higher capital gains scenario 
When solutions are calculated with expectations based on statistical 
forecasts, except that the land price increase is multiplied by 10, the 
larger capital gains provide incentive to purchase land earlier and 
reduce initial nonland input levels. In the basic scenario, the optimal 
first period choice when capital gain is substitutable for current income 
is 320 acres of land and $8,100 of nonland inputs (Table 4). The nonland 
input use per acre is $250. This is a larger farm acreage and lower 
nonland input level than is found in solutions with the land price 
increasing as forecast. The smaller farm size and greater nonland input 
in solutions which do not allow substitution of unrealized capital gain 
for income is largely the result of the capital gain increment 
($100,000). If the no flow value and equity substitution cases are 
solved with a $30,000 capital gain increment, the solutions are closer to 
those identified for the income substitution and maximum flow value case. 
The first period solutions are identical with 320 acres purchased, $8,100 
of nonland input and $8,000 annual saving. 
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In the no flow value and equity substitution cases, the size of the 
capital gain increment can have impact on the solution. Solutions with a 
large capital gains increment may differ from solution for exactly the 
same input data except that the capital gain increment is smaller. In 
these cases, the value of the capital gain that is recognized depends on 
rounding errors in the sytem. In the first period, the amount of 
unrealized capital gains if $91,200 on a 240 acre farm and $121,600 on a 
320 acre unit. With a $100,000 capital gain increment, the amount of 
capital gain that is recognized in the next period is the same for both 
farm sizes. Thus, there is little incentive to buy the additional 80 
acres and reduce current income by cutting nonland inputs. When it is 
possible to borrow against unrealized capital gains, the land price 
increase enlarges the credit available with the period, but this is not a 
large enough incentive to justify purchasing an extra unit of land. In 
contrast, the capital gain increment has little effect on the solution 
when unrealized capital gains are 100 percent substitutable for current 
income. The initial land purchase is 320 acres for both $100,000 and 
$30,000 capital gain increment sizes in the income substitution and 
maximum flow value cases. All the unrealized capital gains are 
recognized within the period in the income substitution and maximum flow 
value cases. The only capital gain effect outside the period is the tax 
in the terminal value. 
At first glance, the realism of an $8,100 nonland input level on 320 
acres can be questioned. It is far below the $24,900 average level 
observed for the IFBA 260-359 acre category in 1970. It must however, be 
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noted that in the short term nonland input use can vary widely from farm 
to farm. Regular repair and maintenance of equipment and facilities can 
be delayed. Fertilizer applications may be reduced, especially main­
tenance applications that may have only a small impact on current yield, 
but are intended to maintain soil fertility. Maximum participation in 
government acreage set aside programs may substantially cut input use. 
In an environment of lumpy land purchases a decision maker may be content 
in the short run with less timely field operations, lower yields and less 
current income if acquisition of another tract is possible. It would be 
possible to place a lower limit on the amount of nonland input that must 
be used, but there is little information in the IFBA data or elsewhere 
that would indicate this minimum level. 
A comparison of initial period choices in the forecast scenario and 
higher capital gain solutions suggests that the modest capital gains that 
might have been expected in the 1970s based on previous experience may 
not have had a major impact on production and finance choices. But when 
the land price boom of the mid-1970s occurred and capital gain expecta­
tions were revised upward, the parameter values indicate that incentives 
existed for change in acreage and nonland input use. 
In the second and third periods of the higher capital gain scenario 
solutions land purchases tend to be smaller than when forecast land price 
values are used. For the no flow values, income substitution and maximum 
flow value cases no land is purchased in the second period and only 80 
acres are acquired in the third period. This can be compared to the 80 
acre purchased in the second period and 160 acres acquired in the third 
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period in the forecast scenario solutions. For the equity substitution 
case, the second period purchase is the same for both forecast and higher 
captial gain scenarios, but the third period purchased in the higher 
capital gain scenario is 80 acres less than the 160 acres acquired in the 
forecast scenario solution. The larger first period purchases strain 
available equity, and with higher land prices more capital is required to 
purchase a given amount of land. The 80 acre second period purchase in 
the equity substitution case occurs because the first period purchase is 
not increased to 320 acres (Table 4). In solutions with a $30,000 
capital gain increment, this second period purchase does not occur for 
the equity substitution case. 
The increased use of nonland inputs for some parameter combinations 
in the second and third periods of the higher capital gains scenario 
solutions suggests that at low leverage levels the capital gains effects 
are quickly disipated. For instance, in the forecast scenario solutions 
the nonland input for the no flow value case is $25,200 in the second 
period and $35,200 in the third period or $79 and $73 per acre respec­
tively. In the higher capital gain scenario, the nonland input levels 
are $40,700 and $61,200 for the second and third period respectively. In 
per acre terms, this is $170 in the second period and $191 in the third 
period. When borrowing against unrealized capital gains is allowed, the 
second period nonland input level is about the same in both the forecast 
and higher capital gain scenarios, but the third period nonland input 
level is $11,200 higher in the higher capital gain scenario than in the 
forecast land price situation. This is $39 per acre higher in the higher 
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capital gain case than in the forecast value scenarios. Given the 
capital constraint and the high cost of owning land, nonland inputs 
become a better investment. The relatively low nonland input use in the 
income substitution case, $56 per acre in the second period and $78 per 
acre in the third period, can be traced to the financial strain created 
by a larger first period land purchase and the inability to borrow 
against accrued capital gains to finance nonland inputs. The total 
capital available in this case is the same as for the no flow value case, 
$192,000 in 1975 and $288,000 in 1979 but the farm acreage is 80 acres 
larger throughout the horizon. The ability to recognize unrealized 
capital gain as income creates the incentive to own more land, without 
generating the financial means to maintain nonland input levels. 
Savings in the higher capital gain scenario solutions are almost 
equal to those in the forecast value scenario. Annual retained earnings 
are $8,000 in the first period and $16,000 in the second period for all 
substitutability parameter values in both the forecast and higher capital 
gain scenario solutions. In the third period, annual saving is $40,000 
for all substitutability parameter values in the forecast value scenario 
and for the equity substitution and maximum flow value cases in the 
higher capital gain scenario. The lower, $32,000 savings in the third 
period in the no flow value and income substitution cases of the higher 
capital gain scenario can be linked to the land purchase choice. In the 
no flow value case, the 320 acre land holding is substantially below the 
levels identified for the forecast scenario and the nonland input amount 
in 1980 is close to the optimum identified by calculus agreements. In 
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most solutions, the optimal nonland input level is set at the amount that 
can be financed, choice (4) in the algorithm, and this nonland input 
level is far below the optimum amount identified by calculus arguments. 
With less land, more nonland inputs can be financed with existing equity 
and there is less incentive to save to increase nonland inputs. In the 
income substitution case, Che lower savings level occurs because the 400 
acre farm size strains available financing and nonland input level is 
relatively lower. This reduces current income and savings capacity. 
When unrealized capital gains are substitutable for equity, the use 
of debt is substantially increased in the second and third period of the 
higher capital gain scenario even with a maximum leverage ratio of 0.2. 
For the equity substitution and maximum flow value cases, debt in the 
second period is $34,000 in the forecast scenario solutions, but $52,000 
in the higher capital gain scenario solutions. Similarly, the third 
period debt for those cases is $52,000 for the forecast scenario and 
$88,000 for the higher capital gain scenario. This increase is a result 
of being able to borrow against large accumulated capital gains. In the 
third period, debt use is almost twice as large in the equity substitu­
tion and maximum flow value cases as it is in the no flow value and 
income substitution cases. 
The expected wealth is substantially increased by the higher land 
price increase, even if expansion in firm size is dampened. The expected 
wealth values are: no flow value case, $293,500; income substitution, 
$398,800; equity substitution, $300,400; and maximum flow value, 
$418,600. Even though the substitutability of unrealized capital gain 
272 
for equity can induce changes in the production and finance plans, the 
benefit in both forecast and higher capital gain scenarios is small when 
leverage is limited to 0.2. This can be seen in the higher capital gain 
scenario by noting that the difference between the expected wealth for 
the no flow value case and the equity substitution case is only $6,900. 
In contrast, the expected wealth for the income substitution and maximum 
flow value cases are $105,300 and $125,100 greater than the no flow value 
wealth, respectively. In the forecast scenario, the difference between 
the no flow value and equity substitution cases is only $1,600. The 
income substitution and maximum flow wealth figures are $10,300 and 
$11,900 higher than the no flow value wealth, respectively. 
Higher Leverage Solutions 
When a maximum leverage ratio of 0.5 is used in the forecast 
scenario, farm size, nonland input use and debt rise proportionately 
(Table 5). The initial land purchase is 320 acres. Nonland inputs are 
set at $21,500, which is close to the 1970 level in the IFBA data for 
260-359 acre farms of $24,900. The first period annual saving is $16,000 
and initial debt is $60,000. The 0.5 leverage ratio is twice the Iowa 
average leverage ratio in 1970 of 0.25. Thus, larger than average farm 
size and greater than average retained earnings are consistent with the 
larger amount of capital used in the firm. Choices in 1970 are the same 
for all values of the substitutability parameters. 
The second and third period choices differ only slightly with the 
substitutability parameter values and these differences are primarily due 
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Table 5. Land purchases, saving, nonland inputs, and debt use in 
the forecast and higher capital gain scenario solutions using a 
maximum leverage of 0.5 
Land Annual Total^ Nonland^ 
Period 4,c ojd purchases saving debt inputs 
Forecast scenario: 
—acres— 
1970-1974 0 0 320 16,000 60,000 21,500 
1 0 320 16,000 60,000 21,500 
0 1 320 16,000 60,000 21,500 
1 1 320 16,000 60,000 21,500 
1975-1979 0 0 320 32,000 100,000 15,400 
1 0 240 32,000 100,000 27,900 
0 1 320 32,000 105,000 17,200 
1 1 240 32,000 105,000 29,700 
1980-1984 0 0 320 96,000 180,000 53,200 
1 0 400 88,000 180,000 49,500 
0 1 400 96,000 195,000 45,500 
1 1 400 96,000 195,000 53,200 
Higher capital 
gain scenario 
: 
1970-1974 0 0 400 8,000 60,000 10,100 
1 0 400 8,000 60,000 10,100 
0 1 400 16,000 60,000 10,100 
1 1 400 16,000 60,000 10,100 
1975-1979 0 0 0 32,000 80,000 50,400 
1 0 80 32,000 80,000 27,700 
0 1 240 40,000 200,000 41,900 
1 1 240 40,000 200,000 41,900 
1980-1984 0 0 240 64,000 160,000 49,300 
1 0 160 64,000 160,000 49,300 
0 1 400 96,000 400,000 55,000 
1 1 320 104,000 400,000 85,200 
®Debt and nonland inputs during the first year of the period. 
^Nonland inputs are measured in real 1969 dollars. Savings and debt 
are in nominal dollars. 
^The proportion of unrealized capital gain or loss that is 
substitutable for current income. 
*^The proportion of unrealized capital gain or loss that is 
substitutable for equity in the financial negotiation. 
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to the lumpiness of the capital gain increment. The differences in the 
later periods tend to disappear if a smaller increment is used. For 
example, the solutions with a $100,000 capital gain increment show a 320 
acre land purchase in the second period in the no flow value and equity 
substitution cases, but a 240 acre acquisition for the income substitu­
tion and maximum flow value situations. If a $30,000 capital gain incre­
ment is used, 240 acres are purchased in the second period for solutions 
for all substitutability parameter values. Because of the higher lever­
age ratio the ability to borrow against unrealized capital gain increases 
debt use more than it did in the 0.2 leverage case, but the effect is 
still small. In the second period, the ability to borrow against 
unrealized capital gains results in a debt level for the equity substitu­
tion and maximum flow value cases that is $5,000 higher than debt use for 
the other two substitutability parameter combinations. In the third 
period, the substitution of unrealized capital gain for equity results in 
a debt level that is $15,000 higher. 
The forecast scenario solutions with a leverage ratio of 0.5 are 
similar to a solution which assumes the land price is constant at the 
1969 level, but uses forecast values for other variables. The land, 
savings, and debt use are identical to those identified for the model 
with both substitutability parameters set to one. Nonland input use is 
greater in the second and third periods because less capital is needed to 
finance land. Nonland input use in the constant land price solutions is 
$32,100 in the second period and $76,000 in the third period or $57 and 
$79 per acre respectively. This can be compared to the highest nonland 
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input use in the forecast value solution: $29,700 in the second period 
and $53,200 in the third period for the maximum flow value case. On a 
per acre basis this is $53 in the second period and $55 in the third 
period of the higher leverage forecast scenario solution. 
In the higher capital gain scenario, the initial land purchase jumps 
to 400 acres in solutions for all substitutability parameter values when 
the maximum leverage ratio is 0.5. This is the maximum purchase under 
the 400 acre per period constraint and also the maximum acreage that can 
be financed. Even if the decisionmaker were willing to eliminate all 
nonland inputs and concentrate all efforts on earning capital gains, 
another unit of land could not be financed. As it is, the solution 
trades current income for capital gain potential to the maximum extent 
possible given the tract size. The strain of financing the larger land 
purchase shows up in the savings capacity. Because nonland inputs and 
current income are reduced when borrowing against unrealized capital gain 
is not allowed, the annual savings is cut to $8,000 annually for the no 
flow value and income substitution cases. When unrealized gains can be 
substituted for equity, the additional borrowing power allows current 
income to expand more rapidly within the period and thus permits the 
$16,000 annual saving of the 0.5 leverage forecast scenario to be 
retained. 
In the second period, land purchases are reduced when borrowing 
against unrealized capital gain is not permitted in the higher capital 
gain scenario. In the maximum flow value and equity substitution cases 
240 acres are acquired, but in the income substitution case only 80 acres 
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is purchased, and in the no flow case farm size is constant. This occurs 
because equity is smaller than at the same point in the 0.5 leverage 
forecast scenario solutions due to reduced saving, and at the same time 
capital requirements are greater because of higher land prices. 
Recognizing the large accumulated capital gains as equity permits land 
purchases comparable to those in the forecast scenario, but with greater 
nonland input levels. For both the equity substitution and maximum flow 
value cases, the nonland input level in the second period of the higher 
capital gains scenario solutions is $41,900 or $65 per acre. In the 
forecast scenario, the second period nonland input level is $17,200, or 
$27 per acre, for the equity substitution case and $29,700, or $53 per 
acre for the maximum flow value situation. This generates greater 
current income and savings capacity in the 0.5 leverage higher capital 
gain scenario cases which permit borrowing against unrealized capital 
gain than in the no flow value and income substitution cases. The higher 
nonland input level can be attributed to the lumpiness of real estate 
purchases. Capital gains generate more than enough borrowing capacity to 
maintain firm expansion plans, but not enough to finance another unit of 
land and accompanying nonland inputs. 
In the third period, land purchases, and retained earnings are lower 
than in the forecast solutions when unrealized capital gain is not 
substitutable for equity. For example, in the no flow value case the 
third period control variables in the higher capital gain case are: 
land, 240 acres; annual savings, $64,000; and nonland inputs, $49,300 or 
$77 per acre. In the forecast value scenario, the third period control 
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variable values are: land, 320 acres; annual savings, $96,000; and 
nonland inputs, $53,000 or $55 per acre. .Again, the higher land price 
and reduced savings dampen expansion when unrealized capital gain is not 
substitutable for equity. The higher nonland input on a per acre basis 
suggests that without the ability to borrow against unrealized capital 
gains the incentive to hold larger amounts of land is quickly exhausted. 
When borrowing against equity is permitted, the third period land 
purchases and retained earnings are similar to those in the forecast 
solutions. Nonland input levels are somewhat higher. In the equity 
substitution case, 400 acres of land are purchased and annual saving is 
$96,000 for both the forecast and higher capital gain scenarios in the 
third period. In that case, nonland inputs are $55,000, or $53 per acre, 
in the third period of the higher capital gain scenario, but $9,500, or 
$9 per acre less in the same period of the forecast scenario solution. 
In the maximum flow value case, the land purchase in the third period is 
400 acres in the forecast scenario and 320 acres in the higher capital 
gain scenario. Third period savings for the maximum flow value case are 
$96,000 in the forecast scenario and $104,000 in the higher capital gain 
situation. The nonland input level in the third period for the maximum 
flow value case is $53,200, or $55 per acre for the forecast scenario and 
$85,000, or $89 per acre for the higher capital gain situation. The 
ability to substitute unrealized capital gains permits farm firm expan­
sion to continue unabated in the higher leverage case. 
In the second and third periods, the level of debt use is 2.5 times 
greater when borrowing against unrealized capital gains is permitted than 
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in the income substitution and no flow value cases. In the second period 
of the higher capital gain scenario, debt.is $80,000 when borrowing 
against unrealized capital gain is not allowed and $200,000 in the equity 
substitution and maximum flow value cases. In the third period, debt is 
$160,000 for the no flow value and income substitution case and $400,000 
for the cases which allow unrealized capital gain to be substituted for 
equity. The larger debt load leaves the firm in a vulnerable position if 
unexpected land price declines occur. The decision which is optimal, 
given expectations of continued land price increases, may not even be 
feasible if the land price declines and erodes away that accumulated 
unrealized capital gain. 
Expected wealth increases substantially in the higher capital gain 
solutions. In Che no flow value case, the present value of income is 
$325,900 in the 0.5 leverage forecast solution, but $426,200 in the 0.5 
leverage higher capital gain solution. In the income substitution case 
with 0.5 leverage, the present value is $344,900 in the forecast 
scenario, but $539,000 in the higher capital gain case. With higher 
leverage the increase in expected wealth due to borrowing against 
unrealized capital gains is greater than the increase from recognizing 
unrealized gain as current income. In the equity substitution case with 
0.5 leverage, the present value is $334,900 forecast scenario but 
$577,200 in the higher capital gain case. In the maximum flow value 
0.5 leverage case, the presenC value is $353,300 for Che forecast 
scenario, but $732,500 in the higher capital gain scenario. 
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At the relatively low leverage levels of 0.2 and 0.5, some degree of 
internal capital rationing is probably involved. In deciding on the 
degree of internal rationing, it is plausible that the decisionmaker 
tries to assess the trade off between the higher return and the risk in 
using more debt. The same decisionmaker may use a low leverage level in 
one environment and a higher leverage if the returns to taking the added 
financial risk are sufficient. The numerical solutions suggest that the 
return to using higher leverage is substantially larger when capital 
gains are larger. This difference occurs for all parameter values, but 
especially when unrealized gain can be substituted for equity. When 
borrowing against unrealized capital gain is not permitted, the high land 
price dampens expansion plans, thus reducing the increase in expected 
wealth. In the forecast scenario and the equity substitution case, the 
difference in present values between the 0.2 and 0.5 leverage solutions 
is $108,000, but in the higher capital gain scenario it is $276,800. 
Similarly, in the maximum flow value case the difference is $124,800 for 
the forecast scenario, but $313,900 xirtien the higher capital gain scenario 
is used. When capital gains are small, the higher return from additional 
debt use may not be adequate to compensate for the risk, but in a high 
capital gains environment the higher leverage may be seen as worthwhile. 
The ability to substitute unrealized capital gain for income or equity 
enhances returns in the high capital gains environment and increases the 
returns to higher leverage. 
Several cases were solved for higher leverage specifications. The 
solutions suggest with higher leverage the land availability limit 
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becomes more important. For instance, even with a constant land price, 
the solution with other variables at forecast values show land purchases 
at the 400 acre limit in all three periods. With the land at maximum 
levels, the impact of greater capital gains on the control path is 
limited to the greater use of nonland inputs when borrowing against 
unrealized capital gains is allowed. These solutions indicate that 
limited land availability can eliminate the impact of capital gains on 
farm acreage. With greater land availability, the incentive to hold land 
could be expected to increase with higher leverage. As previously noted, 
the 400 acre per five-year period land availability constraint is 
probably a more stringent limit than is experienced by most Iowa farmers, 
though it may be realistic for areas in which land is closely held, such 
as some ethnic communities. 
Solutions were also calculated for the maximum borrowing on real 
estate set at 65 and 85 percent of market value. The basic solutions 
assume that 50 percent of the market value of land may be borrowed. With 
the specified leverage levels and land constraints, the 65 and 85 percent 
solutions are identical to the 50 percent solutions. This occurs because 
the maximum leverage on the land availability becomes a binding 
constraint before the maximum real estate debt percentage. 
Perfect foresight scenario 
The initial input decision in the perfect foresight scenario 
solutions with a maximum leverage of 0.2 are virtually identical to those 
in solutions using forecast values (Table 6). Savings are higher in the 
perfect foresight solutions in the first period because current income is 
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Table 6. Land purchases, saving, nonland inputs, and debt use in 
the perfect foresight and land price bubble scenario solutions 
using a maximum leverage of 0.02 
Land Annual Total* Nonland^'* 
Period ,j,c ujd purchases saving debt inputs 
Perfect foresight scenario: —acres— 
1970-1974 0 0 240 16,000 24,000 19,400 
1 0 240 16,000 24,000 19,400 
0 1 240 16,000 24,000 19,400 
1 1 240 16,000 24,000 19,400 
1975-1979 0 0 160 40,000 40,000 22,200 
1 0 240 24,000 40,000 11,700 
0 1 240 40,000 60,000 16,100 
1 1 240 40,000 60,000 16,100 
1980-1984 0 0 0 0 80,000 52,200 
1 0 0 56,000 64,000 34,800 
0 1 0 8,000 200,000 66,100 
1 1 0 8,000 200,000 66,100 
Land price bubble scenario: 
1970-1974 0 0 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1 0 320 8,000 24,000 8,100 
0 1 240 8,000 24,000 19,500 
1 1 320 8,000 24,000 8,100 
1975-1979 0 0 0 8,000 32,000 40,700 
1 0 0 16,000 32,000 18,000 
0 1 0 0 52,000 48,100 
1 1 0 16,000 52,000 25,400 
1980-1984 0 0 0 -8,000 40,000 73,500 
1 0 0 24,000 48,000 61,200 
0 1 0 8,000 72,000 70,500 
1 1 0 24,000 88,000 76,100 
®Debt and nonland inputs during the first year of the period. 
^Nonland inputs are measured in real 1969 dollars. Savings and debt 
are in nominal dollars. 
^The proportion of unrealized capital gain or loss that is 
substitutable for current income. 
^The proportion of unrealized capital gain or loss that is 
substitutable for equity in the financial negotiation. 
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higher than in the forecast solutions. First period annual saving is 
$16,000 in the perfect foresight solution compared to $8,000 in the 
forecast scenario. The forecast values do not anticipate the commodity 
price boom of the mid-1970s and hence do not include this period of 
relatively favorable prices. 
In the second period of the perfect foresight solutions, the land 
purchases are much larger than those in the forecast scenario solutions. 
The second period land acquisition in the perfect foresight scenario is 
240 acres for the income substitution, equity substitution, and maximum 
flow value cases, and 160 acres for the no flow value cases. This can be 
compared to the 80 acre purchase for all substitutability parameter 
values in the second period of the forecast scenario with a maximum 
leverage of 0.2. It can also be compared to the no purchase decision in 
the second period of the higher capital gain scenario with a maximum 
leverage of 0.2 in the no flow value, income substitution, and maximum 
flow value cases. Or to the 80 acre purchase for the equity substitution 
case that higher capital gain situation. In the perfect foresight 
scenario, the second period contains most of the capital gains and it 
pays to own as much land as possible during that period. Land prices 
increase $215 in the first period, $953 in the second period, and drop 
$154 in the third period. 
The third period capital losses are not large enough to wipe out the 
previous capital gains, nor are they large enough to discourage second 
period purchases. The third period capital loss, however, provides an 
incentive to eliminate third period purchases. The total farm acreage in 
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the third period is about the same as in the forecast solution, but the 
purchases are made earlier to take advantage of the large capital gain in 
the second period. The 1979 total farm acreage is 480 acres for all 
substitutability parameter values in the forecast scenario with a maximum 
leverage of 0.2. In the perfect foresight scenario, the 1979 total farm 
acreage is 480 acres for the income substitution, equity substitution, 
and maximum flow value cases, and 400 acres for the no flow value cases. 
Total farm acreage in 1979 in the perfect foresight scenario is larger 
than in the solution with ten times the forecast capital gain. In the 
higher capital gain scenario, the 1979 total farm acreage is 400 acres 
for the income substitution, equity substitution, and maximum flow value 
cases. It is 320 acres for the no flow value case. This is 80 acres 
smaller than the 1979 perfect foresight solution acreage for all substi­
tutability parameter combinations. This occurs because the relatively 
more favorable output prices in the first and second period allow greater 
savings, and because the observed land value in 1974 is lower than the 
land price at ten times Che forecast capital gain. This allows a larger 
acreage to be purchased for a given amount of capital. 
With the capital gain concentrated in the second period, the optimal 
solution is to focus on generating current income in the first period. 
In the second period, the focus shifts to earning capital gains. The 
level of nonland inputs and hence current income is low during the second 
period because almost all available capital is invested in land. Second 
period nonland input use ranges from $24 to $56 per acre in the perfect 
foresight scenario, compared to nonland input use of about $80 per acre 
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in the forecast scenario. The third period can be characterized as a 
holding pattern. No land is purchased. Little current income is saved, 
except for the income solution case. Third period saving is $56,000 in 
the income substitution case, $8,000 for the cases which allow borrowing 
against unrealized capital gains, and no saving in the no flow value 
case. In the income substitution case, the third period solution 
includes a relatively higher level of saving to compensate for the low 
saving in the second period because of an extremely low nonland input 
use. Annual saving in the second period is $24,000 for the income sub­
stitution case, but $40,000 for the other substitutability parameter 
combinations. Third period saving is also possible for the other three 
parameter combinations, but not profitable. The capital losses discour­
age further investment in land. With existing debt and equity, a 
relatively high level of nonland inputs can be maintained without 
additional saving. Further increases in the nonland input use do not 
offer large enough returns to justify retaining earnings. The relatively 
high level of nonland inputs used in models where unrealized gains are 
substitutable for equity provides the financial flexibility to deal with 
the anticipated capital losses. When the land price declines and 
effective equity decreases, nonland input use can be reduced to maintain 
the feasibility of the solution. Under model assumptions, investments in 
land are locked in for the duration of the planning horizon and could not 
be liquidated to cope with the decreased borrowing power. 
The differences in input and output prices, interest rates, the 
discount rate, and other parameters makes detailed comparison between the 
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perfect foresight and forecast scenario solutions difficult. A better 
comparison might be achieved by using a land price bubble scenario with 
forecast values except for the land price path, which is at ten times the 
forecast capital gain through 1981, the observed high point in land 
prices, and then drops to the forecast value. In this scenario, the 
capital loss is much larger ($541 per acre) than in the observed values 
($154 per acre). 
The solutions show the same initial period decisions as the higher 
capital gains scenario. The second and third period choices differ 
substantially, however. In the equity substitution case, the second 
period plan shows no land purchase and nonland input levels similar to 
the higher capital gain scenario. The second period nonland input level 
is exactly the same as the higher capital gain scenario choice for the no 
flow value, income substitution, and maximum flow value cases. In the 
equity substitution case, the nonland input level is raised to $48,100, 
or $200 per acre compared to the $25,400 level or $79 per acre in the 
higher capital gain scenario because the 80 acre second period land 
purchase is eliminated in the perfect foresight solution and more capital 
is available for nonland inputs. 
Saving is reduced for the equity substitution and no flow value 
cases because the nonland input is already relatively high and the 
returns on savings in the third period are not favorable. In the no flow 
case, second period annual saving is $8,000. No saving occurs in the 
equity substitution solution in the second period. The models with 
unrealized gain substitutable for income continue relatively high levels 
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of saving in the second and third periods because their larger land 
purchase in the initial period provides greater investment opportunities. 
The third period annual saving is $24,000 for the income substitution and 
maximum flow value cases, compared to a $8,000 saving in the equity sub­
stitution case on $8,000 annual withdrawal in the no flow value case. 
For no flow value and equity substitution cases, the nonland input level 
is $73,500 and $70,500 respectively in the third period. Nonland inputs 
approach $300 per acre in those cases. In the income substitution case, 
the third period nonland input is $61,200 or $191 per acre and in the 
maximum flow value case it is $76,100 or $239 per acre. All the 
solutions show third period nonland inputs at higher levels per acre than 
all previous solutions. Debt use is at maximum levels in the land price 
bubble solutions, with higher debt levels in the models that allow 
borrowing against unrealized capital gain. Debt is still a relatively 
low cost source of capital. 
The solutions for scenarios with high capital gains in at least some 
periods suggest that the observed tendency of U.S. farmers to increase 
land investments and reduce holdings of liquid assets in the 1970s and 
early 1980s can be explained as a rational response to capital gains 
given certain price expectations. If capital gains are expected to 
continue, it is reasonable to hold more of the asset which earns both 
through production and appreciation. This tendency occurs in models with 
all substitutability parameter combinations, though substitutability of 
unrealized capital gain for income or equity increases the incentives for 
this kind of decision. The increase in land holding for a given time and 
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the decrease in nonland inputs, the liquid assets, can even be observed 
when anticipated capital losses occur in the last period of the model. 
In the perfect foresight solutions, the second period farm acreage is 
larger than that of the forecast scenario solutions and nonland inputs 
are lower. In the land price bubble scenario, the initial land purchase 
for models in which unrealized capital gains are substitutable for income 
is larger than those in the forecast solutions. Anticipated losses 
change the solutions in these cases by altering the land purchase pattern 
in the second and third periods and increasing the use of nonland inputs 
during the period of declining prices. In the perfect foresight case, 
land purchases are made earlier than they would be otherwise and third 
period purchases are eliminated. In the land price bubble solution, no 
land is purchased in the second and third periods. The behavior of the 
average U.S. farmer appears to correspond to the model of continued 
capital gains. In general, there was no move in the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s toward more liquid investments among U.S. farmers, though 
individual farmers may have made this adjustment. 
Tax parameter impacts 
Solutions for an average tax rate of 0.5 and for capital gains taxed 
as ordinary income at the end of the horizon (ip=l) were calculated for 
the higher capital gain scenario in the equity substitution case. The 
higher capital gains scenario was used in this exploratory research 
because the theoretical model suggests that tax impacts are most likely 
to exist when the land price increase is large. The equity substitution 
case is used because it best approximates known practices. The values of 
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both substitutability parameters are largely «inobservable, but it is 
known that market valuation is commonly used in agricultural lending in 
the U.S. There is less evidence that unrealized gain is substituted for 
income. A maximum leverage of 0.2 was used in the tax parameter 
solutions. The capital increment was reduced to $20,000; with the 
$40,000 capital increment, saving was difficult in the high tax rate 
solutions where savable income was sharply reduced. The discount rate 
was adjusted to reflect the varying tax parameters. With the 0.12 
average tax rate and full taxation of capital gain income, the after tax 
discount rate is 6.7 percent. With the 0.5 average tax rate, the after 
tax discount rate is 4.9 percent with the 60 percent deduction for 
capital gain income, and 3.8 percent if capital gain income is fully 
taxed. The adjustment of the discount rate reflects the assumption that 
the tax parameters affect income from alternative assets in the same way 
as they affect agricultural income. 
For comparison purposes, a new solution to the 0.12 average tax 
rate, 60 percent capital gain deduction scenario was calculated with the 
smaller capital increment. The land purchase path in the new solution 
was identical to the previously identified one. The smaller capital 
increment allowed greater saving in the first two periods, and this 
additional equity was used to purchase extra nonland inputs. Hence, 
income was greater and the expected wealth was increased to $308,400, 
compared to $300,400 with the larger capital increment. Savings was 
$12,000 annually in the first period and $24,000 annually in the second. 
The nonland inputs are: 1970, $19,500; 1975, $34,300; and 1980, $72,800, 
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compared to $19,500, $25,400 and $45,900 in the higher capital gain 
solution for the equity substitution case. When a solution is calculated 
for the identical parameter values, except that the capital gains is 
fully taxed at the end of the horizon, the control paths are virtually 
the same. The present value of expected income declines only slightly, 
to $306,100, with full taxation of capital gains. 
The major impact of the higher tax rate solutions is to reduce firm 
growth by cutting retained earnings. Whether or not the capital gain is 
fully taxed does not affect the solutions. With the higher tax rate, 
land purchases are 240 acres in 1970 and 80 acres in 1980. Annual 
savings are: 1970-1974, $4,000; 1975-1979, $8,000; and 1980-1984, 
$16,000. Nonland input use in the second and third periods is reduced by 
the lack of capital to: 1975, $39,200, and 1980, $49,300. First year 
nonland input use is identical to the low tax rate solution, $19,500. 
The solutions with varying tax parameters indicate that the tax 
treatment of capital gains does not have a major impact under the average 
farm conditions modeled in this research. Several solutions with varying 
tax parameters were calculated for other values of the substitutability 
parameters in testing the model. Though not exactly comparable to the 
solutions reported here, they suggest that the tax treatment of capital 
gains do not have a greater impact for other substitutability parameter 
combinations. This finding of no tax effect is conditional on the length 
of the planning horizon, the savings, acreage and capital gain increment 
used, and the constraint which limits equity growth to retained farm 
earnings. There may be some combination of short planning horizon and 
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tax rate for which the present value of the capital gains deduction tax 
benefit is large enough to affect land holding, saving, and nonland 
inputs. The capital gains deduction may provide some incentive to hold 
more land, but it may not be large enough to justify owning 80 acres 
more. 
The argument about the capital gains deduction in agriculture 
usually centers on investments by nonfarmers who seek to shelter income 
from taxes. Equity growth for these investors is not limited to retained 
farm earnings. It is precisely because they have other sources of funds 
which they wish to shelter from taxation that they are interested in farm 
assets. As it stands, the DP algorithm does not handle equity investment 
from nonfarm sources, so the impact of the capital gains deduction on the 
tax shelter investor is not well tested. 
Sufficiency of the theoretical solutions 
The numerical solutions are generally consistent with those derived 
in the theoretical model, though the capital constraint, limited land 
availability, and the lumpiness problem sometimes dampen or eliminate the 
theoretical response to various land price paths. The solutions show a 
tendency toward larger land holdings and reduced nonland input use when 
capital gains are larger. The simple step function approximation to the 
debt supply function eliminates some flexibility in credit used, but 
nonetheless debt use increases in the model when capital gains are sub-
stitutable for equity, and the comparison of models with higher and lower 
maximum leverage levels shows that the incentive to use higher leverage 
increases with capital gains. The consistency between the numerical and 
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theoretical solutions suggests that the proposed theoretical decisions 
are good candidates for optimality. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The primary conclusion of this research is that the responses of the 
wealth maximizing decision maker to capital gains and losses identified 
in the theoretical model can be observed under the parameter values 
prevailing in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s. The tendency toward 
larger land holdings in an environment of capital gains is dampened by 
the capital constraint, especially when land values are high, but it is 
often observable in decisions to buy land earlier when land prices are 
rising more rapidly. This allows purchase at a lower price and a greater 
capital gain. Nonland input use is reduced when land prices rise more 
rapidly because it is impossible to finance both the earlier land 
purchases and nonland inputs. 
In low leverage situations and when unrealized capital gain is not 
substitutable for equity, the incentive for greater land holdings and a 
lower nonland input level is rapidly dissipated. The high cost of buying 
land and the financial constraint combine to dampen acreage expansion and 
increase the incentive to use nonland inputs. With higher leverage 
ratios and the ability to borrow against unrealized capital gains, firm 
expansion in the high capital gains case is comparable to that found in 
the constant land price models. Because expansion plans can be 
maintained in the face of rising land prices, the incentive to use higher 
leverage is much greater when land prices are increasing rapidly. 
292 
In scenarios which involve capital losses at the end of the horizon, 
planned land purchases are rescheduled or eliminated and higher nonland 
input levels are specified. The nonland inputs provide a cushion in 
models where borrowing against unrealized capital gain is permitted. 
When land prices fall and the borrowing capacity of the firm is reduced, 
nonland inputs can be liquidated to allow the financial constraint to be 
met. 
The empirical model solutions do not suggest that the ability to 
borrow against unrealized capital gain or to substitute that capital gain 
for current income is necessary for land price increases to affect farm 
decisions. The additional cash flow from realization of the capital gain 
at the end of the horizon can be enough to increase land holding and 
reduce nonland asset levels. The substitutability of unrealized capital 
gain for income increases incentives and at times is the key element in 
the choice between land and nonland inputs. 
For the land price scenarios considered, the substitution parameters 
do not have a major impact on the first period choices. The impact on 
the second and third period decisions suggests, however, that for some 
land price paths and for some sets of initial endowments the ability to 
borrow against unrealized capital gain or to recognize unrealized capital 
gain as current income will make the difference between an input choice 
focused on earning current income with a relatively high nonland input 
proportion and an input decision to concentrate on earning capital gains. 
For instance, there is some multiple of the forecast land price for which 
the capital gain effect occurs for positive substitutability parameter 
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values, but not when both parameters are set to zero. Similarly, 
decisions in models with varying levels of initial unrealized capital 
gain levels may vary widely. 
This exploratory research suggests that the asset and financial 
restructuring that occurred in U.S. agriculture in the 1970s and early 
1980s can be explained as a rational response to an environment of large 
farmland capital gains. îfore land is acquired to earn more capital 
gains. More debt is incurred to purchase the additional land and to 
maintain nonland input levels. The comparison of high and low leverage 
solutions suggests that the ability of farmers to borrow against 
unrealized capital gains may have been crucial in allowing the 
restructuring to proceed. Without the ability to substitute unrealized 
capital gain for equity, the incentive for acquiring a farm acreage 
larger than that indicated by production relationships is short lived. 
Although this research leaves many questions unanswered, especially 
in the area of response to land price risk, it does shed some light on 
the decisions that led to the farm financial stress of the mid-1980s. 
The farm operator's decision process can be viewed as repeated runs of 
the model. Few farm operators explicitly perform the complex calcula­
tions like those of the computer algorithm, but the correspondence 
between the solutions and observed values suggests that the model 
captures many of the important decision criteria that are implicitly used 
by farmers to evaluate production and finance choices. The model is 
based on expectations. When new information becomes available, expecta­
tions are revised and plans adjusted to fit the new environment. Farm 
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financial stress can be seen as a situation in which that adjustment 
becomes very difficult or in some cases impossible. For instance, 
consider the case in which there is a large amount of accumulated 
unrealized capital gain and it is anticipated that land prices will 
continue to rise rapidly. The exact optimal solution will depend on 
output prices, interest rates, and other variables, but it may be to 
acquire as much land as possible by reducing the holding of liquid assets 
and incurring additional debt. If borrowing against unrealized gain is 
permitted, the debt may rise substantially. If land prices were then to 
fall unexpectedly, there may be no feasible solution to the model. There 
may not be enough nonland assets to absorb the loss in borrowing power. 
The amount of debt required to finance just the land may exceed the 
credit available under the lower land price. Selling land may be the 
only alternative. Even if a feasible solution exists, the adjustment may 
be difficult. Selling nonland inputs at the same time when everyone else 
is making the same adjustment may mean enormous liquidity losses. 
The parameters of the model may be changed in the new environment of 
farmland capital losses. The lender who formerly accepted unrealized 
capital gain as an addition to equity may now view the much reduced 
amount of accumulated capital gain with skepticism, thereby further 
reducing borrowing power. In short, the farm financial stress of the 
mid—1980s can be seen as an adjustment from a period of rapid land price 
increases to a period of more stable or declining values. Among the 
substantial proportion of farmers that are not undergoing financial 
stress, the model leads to the hypothesis that there are at least some 
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who had land price expectations that differed from their peers and who 
made the adjustments suggested by the perfect foresight and land price 
bubble models toward smaller land holdings and greater investment in 
liquid assets. 
Expectation formation 
If this view of farm financial problems is accepted, then the forma­
tion of the parameter values in the agricultural decision framework is 
involves a crucial policy question. If the important parameters are 
formed primarily on the basis of the decisionmaker's own observations and 
utility function, then the public responsibility for those actions is 
small. Public policy may focus on minimizing the loss to the economy in 
general, but there is little obligation to resecure failing firms. Such 
a view of the situation implicitly underlies much of the questioning of 
government responsibility in refinancing debt that has been incurred by 
"consenting adults" (Anthan, 1985, p. 6s). If, on the other hand, 
important parameters are exogenously formed by lenders or government, for 
instance, then in fairness these external institutions might be expected 
to bear some of the adjustment burden. In addition, the role of those 
who advise farmers, such as the extension personnel and researchers of 
land grant universities, in the formation of expectations must be 
questioned. Do the advisors bear any responsibility for decisions 
directly based on expectations that they helped to create? 
The results of this research suggest that the land price expecta­
tions, the substitutability parameters, and the maximum leverage ratio 
can have important consequences for production and finance decisions. 
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The formation of these expectations and parameter values have not been 
extensively studied, but it seems clear that the personal observations 
and characteristics of the individual decisionmaker are crucial in this 
process. Farmland markets tend to be localized. State or regional 
average land prices may be available only annually and may not be 
relevant to the price structure in a particular community. When prices 
are changing rapidly, the decisionmaker is almost forced to depend on 
personal observation to form expectations. Similarly, the substitut-
ability parameters appear to depend heavily on personal characteristics 
and observation. The risk attitude of the individual is likely to be 
important. If the decisionmaker perceives the capital gain as relatively 
certain and is willing to take the risk of future losses, then the sub-
stitutability of unrealized capital gains for both income and equity is 
likely to be increased. When the maximum leverage ratio is a result of 
internal capital rationing, the individual's risk aversion is probably a 
primary determinant of the level. The fact that not all farmers are in 
financial trouble, though all were subject to very similar exogenous 
influences, suggests that individual factors are important in the 
decision making framework. 
The individual does not operate in a vaccum, however. The lender, 
for instance, determines the supply of credit and influences the role of 
unrealized capital gain in the financial negotiation. When external 
credit rationing is a binding constraint, the lender determines the 
maximum leverage level. Even internal capital rationing may not be 
independent of the lender's influence. For instance, the internally 
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imposed limit may be set as some proportion of the external limit. If 
the lender is willing to accept more unrealized gain as equity, then the 
internal debt limited will also be higher. To guard against future 
capital losses, the risk averse decisionmaker may assume that a smaller 
proportion of unrealized capital gain is substitutable for equity than 
would be acceptable to the lender. The decisionmaker cannot, however, 
assume a larger value than the lender does. Plans based on greater 
borrowing against unrealized gain than is allowed by the lender would be 
unfeasible because they would tend to call for greater debt use than is 
available. Many agricultural lenders are trusted financial advisors, in 
addition to being a source of credit. In this advisory role, the lender 
may create a climate of increased certainty about treating unrealized 
capital gains as an addition to equity, or may reinforce overly 
optimistic land price path expectations. 
Government action may affect virtually all the parameters. Govern­
ment regulations affect the supply of debt. For the Federal Land Bank, 
the maximum percentage of the land value which may be lent is specified 
by law. Raising the percentage, as occurred in the Farm Credit Act of 
1971, effectively increases the supply of credit to farmers and may 
increase the impact of capital gains on farm decisions. Bank examiners' 
view of farm assets as collateral affect the lenders' willingness to 
extend credit to agriculture- For instance, if bank examiners had 
insisted that farm balance sheets use the valuation rule used in most 
nonfarm businesses, that is the value is the lower of cost or market 
value, then agricultural lending and hence farm decisions in the 1970s 
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would probably have been different. Similarly, if examiners in the mid-
1980s are more skeptical of unrealized capital gain as collateral than 
they were in the 1970s, then farm adjustment problems will be increased. 
In addition to the decline in real estate market value, the proportion of 
that market value which could serve as a base for borrowing would 
decrease. 
Government price support programs may affect the land price expecta­
tions and the reliability of cash flows. Incorporating the land value 
into inflation indexed price supports, as was discussed in the late 
1970s, would tend to create expectations of continued capital gains 
(Harris, 1977). The interaction of inflation and tax effects may create 
farmland capital gains (Feldstein, 1980). Price supports in a period of 
technological change may create land price increases as profits from 
increased productivity are bid into land. 
Plaxico and Kletke (1980) argue that the substitutability of 
unrealized capital gain for current income depends on the reliability of 
cash flows (p. 263). Unrealized capital gain cannot be used to meet cash 
obligations, so if cash flow is a problem, the weight given capital gains 
in the decision process will be reduced. By increasing the reliability 
of cash flows, price support programs may tend to encourage decision­
makers to view a larger proportion of capital gains as a substitute for 
current income. Similarly, the growing unwillingness of Congress and the 
executive branch to support farm prices in the mid-1980s may cause 
downward revision in the income substitutability parameter because farm 
income is likely to be less reliable in the future. Such a revision 
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would tend to increase the size of the downward adjustment required to 
meet the new situation. 
Land grant universities are in the business of expectation forma­
tion. This role is most explicit in the marketing of grains, oilseeds, 
and meat animals. Extension economists regularly publish price forecasts 
and discuss the factors influencing these market. In land prices, this 
role is not quite so obvious. Some universities regularly survey and 
publish state and area land price averages, but explicit forecasting is 
not usually part of this activity. Some agricultural economists have 
been active in informing farmers about methods which could justify the 
land prices of the 1970s, for instance, by including future capital gains 
in the calculations of land value or by averaging recently purchased 
higher priced land with low cost land to achieve some reasonable average 
land cost. Unfortunately, the variance of land prices has not been 
widely treated. The possibility of downside land price risk was not 
emphasized in extension communications. It is possible that the actions 
of land grant university extension personnel and researchers reinforced 
the expectations of continued capital gains. 
Policy implications 
Documentation of farmer expectation formation is beyond the scope of 
this research, but casual observation suggests that there is ample 
evidence to show that while decisionmaker characteristics and observa­
tions are important in expectation formation, other institutions and 
individuals may play an instrumental role. What does this recognition 
imply for those other individuals and institutions? How may it affect 
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their role in the current financial problems and their policy in the 
future? 
This research suggests that by permitting borrowing against 
unrealized capital gains and expanding the supply of credit, lenders 
enabled farmers to restructure their balance sheets in ways that left 
them financially vulnerable. The model suggests that without the ability 
to borrow against unrealized capital gains, long-term restructuring may 
not have been possible during the 1970s. In this context, farm bankrupt­
cies and other financial problems of the 1980s are signs of the 
inadequacy of past lender policy, as well as indications of poor farm 
level decisions. Lenders should, therefore, expect to bear part of the 
adjustment cost. The principal write down in the Farmers Home 
Administration debt restructuring and guarantee plan for commercial 
lenders can be seen as the lender's share of the cost of bad decisions. 
This study does not quantify the magnitude of the lender's share or 
suggest the principal write down is too large or too small, but supports 
the general principle of lender responsibility in the financial crisis. 
A clear temptation to lenders and their regulators in the mid-1980s 
is to immediately discourage all borrowing against unrealized capital 
gains. If the ability to substitute unrealized capital gain for equity 
tends to make farm firms financially unstable, one can argue that lenders 
should eliminate the practice. Rapid transitions from lending on market 
values to cost based valuation would, however, exacerbate the adjustment 
problems because it would increase the required adjustment in farm plans. 
In the longer term, a policy of no borrowing against unrealized capital 
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gains would force farmers to sell land to realize any benefit from land 
price increases. This would increase transactions cost and would require 
repeated adjustments in the farm business as land holdings were sold and 
new tracts acquired to monetize capital gains. This may tend to discour­
age long-term investments in land productivity, such as soil conservation 
improvements. Instead of instinctively reacting against borrowing on 
market values, an improved lender policy is likely to include some recog­
nition of the possibility of long-term real capital gains in agriculture 
and of the role of these price increases in building equity, but with a 
recognition that market prices have variances and that the variability of 
land prices over the long term can be particularly wide. This recogni­
tion of land price variability might take a variety of forms, including 
looking at the borrower's balance sheet under several land price path 
assumptions or requiring borrowers to have a contingency plan for dealing 
with capital losses. 
The argument for government responsibility in the farm financial 
problems of the 1980s is similar to that for lender responsibility. 
Government actions expanded credit supply, helped create an expectation 
of rising land prices, and stabilized cash flows, thus encouraging the 
substitution of unrealized capital gains for current income in making 
farm decisions. This research suggests farmers reacted to these stimuli 
in an economically rational manner by increasing land holding, incurring 
debt, and cutting investment in liquid assets. Farm financial problems 
are not simply contracts between "consenting adults" gone awry, but the 
result of decisions made under certain limitations and incentives created 
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in part by government. The magnitude of government responsibility is a 
more difficult question. To what degree is there an implied guarantee 
with government programs that protect the participant and the sector in 
general against adverse side effects of the policy? Should farmers have 
been more wary of government programs and the expectations they created? 
Increased skepticism of government programs will probably be a result of 
the 1980s financial crisis in agriculture if government is seen as having 
abandonded farmers in a mess that it helped create. This distrust of 
government would make future farm programs more difficult to administer 
and probably less effective. 
This research adds to the evidence that suggests that the price 
support and credit programs carried out by the U.S. government in the 
name of preserving the family farm may have been counter productive (see 
U.S.D.A., 1981, for other evidence). The government programs appear to 
have destructive side effects that leave family farmers vulnerable to 
cash flow crises and insolvency. There is no standard definition of the 
fasily farm, but often mentioned characteristics include: a relatively 
small acreage, depending primarily on family labor and capital, owner 
operation, and intensive management. This type of operation does not 
appear to be well-adapted to the economic environment created by govern­
ment price supports and credit programs. In particular, it is not likely 
to be successful in a situation involving large farmland capital gains. 
As long as land prices rise, the larger more heavily leveraged operations 
will tend to be more successful. The short-term price supports and 
credit programs may make life more comfortable for the family farmer, but 
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this research suggests that in the longer run these policies tend to 
undermine the system that they are created to preserve. 
The development and testing of alternative policies is beyond the 
scope of this study, but the research does suggest some questions that 
should be asked about newly-proposed programs and program modifications: 
1) can the program benefits be capitalized into the value of land or 
other assets? 
2) does the policy create incentives Co increase farm business size 
beyond that indicated by production relationships, market prices, 
and conservative financial management? 
3) does the program encourage asset or debt restructuring in ways 
that increase financial risk? 
It is often assumed that higher prices or farm incomes will strengthen 
the family farm system. If benefits can be capitalized into land values, 
the program will be an inefficient means for achieving this goal. The 
ultimate beneficiary will be the landowners, many of who are not farmers. 
Who actually receives the government payment is irrelevant because the 
benefits can be bid directly into land or they can be transmitted to the 
real estate purchase market through rents. Entry for new farmers may be 
more difficult because of increased capital requirements. In addition, 
this study shows that capital gains can provide incentives for agricul­
ture to move away from the family farm toward larger farms, more exten­
sive land use, and higher leverage. 
Almost all the price and income support programs that have been 
tried in the U.S. can potentially create capital gains because they are 
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tied to the volume of production or to the acreage itself. The type of 
program can affect the pattern of the capital gains. For instance, if 
acreage allotments are tied to certain farms, as they have been for 
peanuts and tobacco, then capital gains will be concentrated on the farms 
with the large allotments. In contrast, if commodity prices are 
supported by a loan and storage program, government purchase of 
commodities, acreage set asides, export subsidies, or deficiency 
payments, the capital gain is likely to be spread over all land capable 
of producing the product. Allowing the allotment to be sold separate 
from the farm does not solve the problem, but merely creates another 
asset which can earn capital gains or losses. 
Theoretically, it may be possible to design a program which elimi­
nates or at least minimizes the capital gains or loss side effects, but 
such policies have major administrative and political drawbacks. 
Farmland capital gains and losses occur because there is in the U.S. a 
free market in land. If the land market were rigidly controlled, as Lt 
is in some parts of Europe, then land price change could also be 
controlled. This option is unlikely to be politically feasible in the 
U.S. where government intervention in the real estate market is not well 
accepted. Strict payment limitations could reduce the capital gain and 
loss problem. For instance, if benefits for Midwestern grain producers 
were limited to the average yield on 160 acres, then the incentive to bid 
up the price would be reduced. The program benefits could be bid into a 
farmer's first 160 acres or it could be averaged out over all the land 
farmed. Payment limitations have, however, not been particularly 
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successful in the past. The political will required to create and 
enforce these limits is great and the benefits are visible primarily in 
the long term. 
U.S. price and income support policies can generate capital gains 
and losses because they are tied to the volume of production or the 
acreage. It would be more difficult to capitalize benefits that were 
tied to labor and management. For instance, instead of deficiency 
payments calculated on some average yield per acre, the benefit could be 
based on average yield per operator. To sever the connection between the 
payment and farm size, the average yield could not be based on the 
operator's personal production record, but must be some state or county 
figure. There would be administrative problems in defining who was 
eligible for the program. Should the definition concentrate on produc­
tion of some minimum amount of the commodity? Will resource raisalloca-
tions result if farmers must produce minimum amounts of some commodities 
to qualify. There may also be maximum production limits established on 
the argument that large-scale operations can be expected to fend for 
themselves, but there is a public interest in aiding moderate size family 
farms. 
Linking the loan based deficiency payment to a bundle of commodities 
may provide a better indication of farm earning power and produce better 
resource allocation. Eligibility could be defined by producing any one 
of the alternative commodities. For instance, in Iowa the payment might 
be based on a weighted average of corn, soybean, hog, and cattle prices. 
Production of some minimum amount of any agricultural commodity could be 
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used to establish eligibility using the argument that alternative or 
specialty enterprises must be competitive with the four basic commodi­
ties. With a deficiency payment based on a bundle of commodities, the 
farmer could choose the most profitable alternative without jeopardizing 
eligibility. 
Because it would increase farm income, a labor based income support 
could still be bid into land prices, but the problem would be greatly 
reduced. The value of additional land beyond the acreage required to 
produce the amounts on which the payment is based would have to be based 
primarily on expected market prices. Extra program benefits could not be 
captured by acquiring additional land. 
The second question concerning incentives to increase farm business 
size is closely tied to the first because capital gains can encourage 
expansion. By helping to generate land price increases, price and income 
support programs can provide incentives to expand. Credit programs 
reinforce this tendency by creating a greater supply of funds to use in 
expansion and by expanding the ability to borrow against unrealized 
capital gains. In addition, price and income policies may tend to 
increase the value of capital gains by stabilizing cash flows. Plaxico 
and Kletke have argued that cash flow uncertainty reduces the ability to 
recognize capital gains as current income. Price and income stabiliza­
tion may also have broader effects. The theoretical work on land price 
risk suggests that uncertain land values can provide incentives to keep 
farm acreage relatively small, limit debt use, and encourage intensive 
farming. Does uncertainty about yield and other prices have a similar 
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effect? Traditionally, the strength of the family farm has been its 
flexibility- It can cope with low income periods by reducing consumption 
expenditures. A more industrialized operation with employees on a fixed 
wage schedule would have a much harder time making labor cost adjust­
ments. The family farm can change production plans or adopt innovations 
without clearing the decision through a management hierarchy. But, when 
risk is reduced, the flexibility becomes less valuable. In the more 
certain environment, economies of scale or the ability to raise large 
amounts of capital may outweigh flexibility in the competition for firm 
survival. It is not immediately clear that society benefits by public 
programs which absorb farm risks and allow these larger-scale units to 
develop. Even with significant economies of scale in production or 
finance, large-scale units may reduce overall efficiency compared to 
smaller, more flexible units that can potentially handle risk at a lower 
cost. Disaster payments, income insurance, and other stabilization 
measures may make life more pleasant for family farmers in the short run, 
but reduce their ability to compete in the long run. 
The impact of government policies on asset and financial structure 
is the concern of the third question. This research suggests that some 
government policies may have encouraged restructuring toward more risky 
combinations than would have been chosen on the basis of market 
conditions alone. Farmland capital gains provided incentives to purchase 
more land and hold smaller amounts of liquid, nonland capital. Expansion 
of the credit supply and allowing greater borrowing against unrealized 
capital gains facilitated the restructuring and created heavier debt 
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loads. In addition, there has often been the implicit assumption in 
government credit and tax policies that the more capital intensive farm 
is the more efficient unit and, therefore, capital use should be encour­
aged. This assumption does not allow for the increasing financial risk 
that often accompanies increased capital use, because of the greater debt 
load. The high capital costs of the 1980s suggest that the capital labor 
substitution arguments underlying the assumption that capital intensive 
farms are efficient should be reexamined. Unfortunately, the incentives 
embedded in government programs do not change quickly with market 
conditions. The subsidy inherent in FmHA lending and in the PCS implied 
agency status, the expansion of credit supplies by the operation of 
government sponsored or associated lenders, and the investment incentives 
in the tax code may be creating and preserving farms that are over­
capitalized, too large, and vulnerable to price and financial risk. At 
the same time, market conditions may indicate that the future belongs to 
relatively small firms that can adapt quickly to changing conditions and 
which can supply their relatively small capital requirements through low 
leverage financial structures. 
In short, the three questions help identify areas in which long-term 
destructive side effects of government involvement in agriculture may 
appear. The questions help answer the more general query of whether or 
not the proposed policy will do more harm than good. It should be noted 
that though the ideal policy would allow one to answer no to all three 
questions, the best practical course may allow other responses. For 
instance, on the basis of this and other research one might decide that 
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the best government policy for agriculture is no special policy. 
Government should provide infrastructure and facilitate communications as 
it does for all parts of the economy, but prices and credit allocation 
should be left to the market. The adjustment from the current situation 
of heavy government involvement to that minimal government situation may, 
however, require an extended period of second best policies, which may 
generate capital gains or encourage expansion. In that case, it would 
still be useful to identify the situation which minimizes the long-term 
cost. 
This study also has implications for the activities of land grant 
universities. Research suggests that the expectations held in the 1970s 
may go a long ways in explaining why some farm firms in the mid-1980s are 
financially strong and others are on the verge of collapse. Land grant 
university extension and research personnel had a role in creating these 
expectations. Was this financial crisis at least partially a result of 
poor or misunderstood information and advice? If it was poor advice, 
could these recommendations be traced to a good system that simply could 
not foresee all possible contingencies? Or are there flaws in the system 
that led agricultural economists to overlook certain possibilities? 
Land price formation 
Though the model used here is microeconomic in focus, it does 
suggest how a land price boom and bust cycle might be generated. If the 
model captures the important decision criteria for the bulk of 
participants in some farmland market, then land price increase expecta­
tions, once formed, would tend to become self-fulfilling. As capital 
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gains increase, farmers and other buyers desire to own more land. But, 
land is in limited supply so this drives "the price up even more. This 
cycle of capital gains generating demand and that demand creating land 
price increases is eventually dampened by the inability to finance 
purchases at high prices. When the capital gains decrease, the demand 
for land also drops and the land price weakens. This can form a downward 
price spiral. As the price drops, buyers attempt to economize on land 
use to avoid capital losses and this drives the price even lower. The 
downward price movement may be halted when the current income from land 
ownership becomes favorable relative to the potential capital loss. This 
turning point at the bottom of the cycle may be far below the equilibrium 
suggested by conventional models of land price formation that rely on the 
present value of current income from land because the expected capital 
loss offsets the current income. 
The model suggests that with an expanded credit supply and the 
ability to borrow against unrealized capital gains, the boom would tend 
to last longer and the price would go higher. With greater borrowing 
against unrealized capital gain, the land price bust would tend to be 
more disastrous because farmers would have incurred debt further beyond 
the level suggested by their invested equity than they would incur 
without the ability to substitute unrealized capital gain for equity. 
This research suggests that modest capital gains may not be enough 
to set off a boom and bust cycle. Small capital gains increase the 
incentive to own land, but the incentive is not great enough to overcome 
the lumpiness of acquiring real estate tracts. This suggests that during 
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the long period of modest capital gain on fairmland from the 1940s through 
the early 1970s, the price increases had only a small impact on produc­
tion and finance decisions. If some exogenous event increases capital 
gains expectations, a boom may be triggered. The increased export demand 
for U.S. farm products in the mid—1970s can be identified as a possible 
triggering event. Earlier in this century, the commodity demand 
generated by rising U.S. population and World War I is probably the 
crucial expectation altering event. 
Would a better understanding of land price cycles and their causes 
and effects, eliminate them? It probably would not. The hog cycle is 
well-known and reasonably well-understood and yet it continues unabated. 
One can hope, however, that if farmers understood the downside risk in 
land prices that they would not leave themselves financially vulnerable 
as they did in the 1980s. 
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MAIN:PROCEDURE OPTIONS (MAIN); 
DECLARE F0RE(0:50,9) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
/* COLUMN 1=AFTER TAX DISCOUNT RATE 
2=INTEREST ON DEBT 
3=0UTPUT PRICE 
4=INPUT PRICE INDEX 
5=LAND PRICE PER ACRE 
6=PR0PERTY TAX 
7=N0NREAL ESTATE INTEREST 
8=CUMULATIVE CAPITAL GAIN WITH IN PERIOD 
9=CAPITAL GAIN PER PERIOD *J 
/* ROWS ARE PERIODS 0-50 */ 
DECLARE MAXM(5,10) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
/* ROW 1=MAX LAND IN EACH PERIOD 
2=MIN EQUITY IN EACH PERIOD 
3=MAX EQUITY IN EACH PERIOD 
4= MIN ACCUMULATED CAPITAL GAIN EACH PERIOD 
5=MAX ACCUMULATED CAPITAL GAIN EACH PERIOD 
6=UNUSED 
COLUMNS ARE FOR DECISION PERIODS 1-10 */ 
DECLARE IN(4) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
/* COLUMN 1= INITIAL LAND INCREMENTS 
2= INITIAL EQUITY INCREMENTS 
3= INITIAL UNREALIZED CAPITAL GAIN INCREMENTS 
4= UNUSED */ 
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DECLARE DECIS(8,5) FIXEDC15,4) DEC EXTERNAL; 
/* THE MATRIX OF PARAMETERS IS: 
LAND CAPITAL GAIN 
INCREMENT INCREMENT INCREMENT 
UNUSED 
BEGINNING 
TIME 
NUMBER 
DECISION 
PERIODS 
YEARS PER 
PERIOD 
MAX LAND 
PURCHASE 
PER PERIOD 
UNUSED UNUSED UNUSED DEBUGGING 
OUTPUT=0 
ELSE>0 
RENT LAND=1 RENT MAX 
ELSE=0 ELSE=0 
MAX LAND UNUSED 
DEBT PERCENT 
X EXPONENT UNUSED X LAND 
INTERACT 
X YEAR 
INTERACT 
INTERCEPT LAND 1 
TERM 
LAND QUAD LAND YEAR 
TERM INTERACT 
TAU TERMINAL TAU PSI DELTA 
UNUSED 
ADJUST 
DEBUG2 
0UTPUT=0 
ELSE>0 
DEBUGS 
Y QUAD 
TERM 
YEAR 
TERM 
EPSILON 
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PHI OMEGA LEVERAGE NONLAND RENT 
CUTOFF CAP RATIO PERCENT*/ 
DECLARE (DISCOUTC*,*), DEBTCST(*,*,*), GAIN(*),REVENUE 
ANNUITY(*,*),LENDINGC*,*)) 
FLOAT DEC (10; EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE PC*,*,*,*) FLOAT DEC(10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (S(*,*,*),REMAIN(*,*,*)) FLOAT DEC (10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (TAX, CAPTAX, HORIZON, PERIODS, 
INLAND,UNIQUE,OMEGA,PHI, 
BUYLAND,CAPINC, LANDING, GAINING,ANNUAL) EXTERNAL 
FLOAT DEC(10); 
DECLARE (RANGE,NUMBER,ZMAX,ZMIN,YEAR) FLOAT DEC(10); 
DECLARE (LINDEX,EXP, EXP2,EXP3,XINDEX,TEMP) FLOAT DEC(IO); 
DECLARE (U,I,J,K,L,M,N,T,W,V) FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE (LEVER,DEBUGl,DEBUG2,RENTIN, RENTOUT,NONLCAP, 
DEBUGS,RENTPER,ADJUST,BEGIN) FIXED DEC(6,2) EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE (ALPHAS,ALPHAS,ALPHA9,LR) FIXED DEC(10,4) EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE X FLOAT DEC(10) INIT(O); 
DECLARE RECURR ENTRY; 
DECLARE OUTPUT ENTRY; 
DECLARE TRANS ENTRY; 
DECLARE BOUNDS ENTRY; 
DECLARE AA FILE OUTPUT; 
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OPEN FILE (AA) OUTPUT STREAM PRINT LINESIZE(132) ; 
DO 1= 0 TO 50; 
GET EDIT ((FORE(I,J) DO J= 1 TO 9))((8)F(9,2),F(8,2)); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('*-"-*MAXM***') (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
DO 1=1 TO 6; 
GET EDIT ((MAXM(I,J) DO J=1 TO 10))((10)F(8,0)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((MAXM(I,J) DO J=1 TO 10)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(10)F(6,0)); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***INITIAL***')(SKIP,X(5),A); 
GET EDIT ((IN(I) DO 1=1 TO 4))((4)F(20,0)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((IN(I) DO 1=1 TO 4))(SKIP,X(2),(4)F(10,0)); 
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PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***DECISION***')(SKIP,X(5),A); 
DO 1=1 TO 8; 
GET EDIT ((DECISCI.J) DO J=1 TO 5))(C5)F(16,4)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((DECIS(I,J) DO J=1 TO 5)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(5)F(16,4)); 
END; 
/* CALCULATE COMMONLY USE VALUES */ 
PHI=DECIS(8,1); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('PHI=',PHI)(SKIP,A(4),F(8,2)); 
TAX= 1-DECIS(7,1); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('TAX=',TAX)(SKIP,A(4),F(8,2)); 
CAPTAX=1-PHI-DECIS(7,2)*DECIS(7,3); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('CAPTAX=',CAPTAX)(SKIP,A(7),F(8,2)); 
H0RI20N=DECIS(2,2)*DECIS(2,3); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('HORIZON='.HORIZON)(SKIP,A(8),F(8,2)); 
CAPLOSS=DECIS(7,2)*DECIS(7,5)/FORE(HORIZON, 1) ; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('CAPLOSS='.CAPLOSS)(SKIP,A(8),F(8,2)); 
I* CAPLOSS=TERMINAL TAU * ANNUAL DEDUCTION LIMIT 
DIVIDED BY THE TERMINAL DISCOUT RATE */ 
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LANDINC=DECIS(1,1); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LANDINC='.LANDING) (SKIP,A(8) ,F(8,2)) ; 
CAPINC=DECIS(1,2); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('CAPINC =',CAPINC )(SKIP,A(8),F(8,2)); 
GAININC=DECIS(1,3); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('GAININC='.GAINING)(SKIP,A(8),F(8,2)); 
N0NLINC=DECIS(1,4); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('NONLINC='.NONLINC)(SKIP,A(8).F(8.2)); 
INLAND=IN(1); 
0MEGA=DECIS(8,2); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('OMEGA ='.OMEGA )(SKIP,A(8),F(8.2)); 
BUYLAND=DEGIS(2,4); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('BUYLAND='.BUYLAND)(SKIP,A(8) .F(8.2)); 
UNIQUE=0; 
PERI0DS=DECIS(2.2); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('PERIODS^'.PERIODS)(SKIP,A(8).F(8.2)); 
ANNUAI^DEGIS(2,3); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('ANNUAL =',ANNUAL )(SKIP,A(8).F(8,2)); 
LEVER=DECIS(8,3); 
DEBUG1=DECIS(3,4); 
DEBUG2=DEGIS(3.5); 
DEBUG3=DEGIS(4,S); 
N0NLCAP=DEGIS(8,4) ; 
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RENT0UP=DECIS(4,1); 
RENTIN=DECIS(4,2); 
KENTPER=DECIS(8,5); 
ADJUST=DECIS(2,5); 
BEGIN=DECIS(2,1); 
ALPHA6=DECIS(5,1); 
ALPHA8=DECIS(5,3); 
ALPHA9=DECIS(5,4); 
LR=DECIS(4,3); 
/* CALCULATE CUMULATIVE UNREALIZED CAPITAL GAIN WITHIN THE 
DECISION PERIOD */ 
DO 1= 1 TO PERIODS; 
DO U= 1 TO ANNUAL; 
FORE ( ( I -1 ) *ANNUAL+U, 8 ) =FORE ( ( I -1 ) *ANNUAL+U, 5 ) 
- F0RE((I-1)*ANNUAL,5); 
END; 
END; 
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I* CALCULATE ANNUAL CAPITAL GAIN PER ACRE *{ 
DO I = 1 TO 50; 
F0RE(I,9)= F0RE(I,5)-F0RE(I-1,5);; 
END; 
PUT FILE CAA) EDIT ('***FORECASTS***' ) (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
DO 1= 0 TO 50; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((FORE(I,J) DO J= 1 TO 9)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(9)F(8,2)); 
END; 
/* CREATE ARRAYS OF DISCOUNT AND INTEREST TERMS */ 
ALLOCATE DISCOUT(PERIODS,ANNUAL) INIT(((PERI0DS)*ANNUAL)1) , 
DEBTCST(PERIODS,ANNUAL,2) INIT(((PERIODS)*2*ANNUAL)0), 
ANNUITY(PERIODS,2) INIT((PERIODS)O),LENDING(PERIODS, 
ANNUAL) INIT((PERIODS*ANNUAL)0); 
DO T^  1 TO PERIODS; 
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DISCOUTCT,1)=1/(1+FORE((T-1)*ANNUAL+1,1)) ; 
IF ANNUAL>1 THEN DO 1=2 TO ANNUAL; 
DISCOUT(T,I)=DISCOUT(T,I-1)/( 1+FORE((T-1)*ANNUAL+1,1)); 
END; 
DO 1= 1 TO ANNUAL; 
DEBTCST(T, 1,1)=F0RE ( (T-1 )*ANNUAL+1,2)*TAX*DISC0UT(T, I) ; 
DEBTCST(T,1,2)=F0RE((T-1)*ANNUAL+1,7)*TAX*DISC0UT(T,I) ; 
LENDING (T, I )=FORE ( (T- 1)*ANNUAL+1,1)*DISC0UT(T, I) ; 
END; 
END; 
DO 1 TO PERIODS; 
ANNUITY(T,2)=1; 
DO 1= 1 TO ANNUAL; 
327 
ANNUITY(T,1)=ANNUITY(T,1) + DISC0UT(T,I); 
END; 
END; 
/* CREATE AND ARRAY OF UNREALIZED CAPITAL GAIN TERMS */ 
ALLOCATE GAIN(PERIODS) INIT((PERI0DS)0); 
DO T= 1 TO PERIODS; 
DO 1=1 TO ANNUAL; 
IF PHI>0 THEN DO; 
GAIN (T)=FORE ( (T-1 )*ANNUAL+1,9 )*DISCOUT(T, I)+GAIN (T) ; 
END; 
END; 
END; 
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/* PRINT OUT DISCOUT.DEBTCST, ANNUITY AND GAIN ARRAYS FOR 
CHECKING */ 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***DISC0UT****)(SKIP,X(5),A); 
DO 1=1 TO PERIODS; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((DISCOUT(I,J) DO J=1 TO ANNUAL)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(ANNUAL)F(9,4)); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***LENDING***' ) (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
DO 1=1 TO PERIODS; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((LENDING(I,J) DO J=1 TO ANNUAL)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(ANNUAL)F(9,4)); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ( '***ANNUITY***' ) (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((ANNUITY(1,1) DO 1=1 TO PERIODS)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(PERI0DS)F(9,4)); 
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PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***GAIN***') (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((GAIN(I) DO 1=1 TO PERIODS)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(PERI0DS)F(9,4)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***REAL ESTATE DEBTCOST***' ) (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
DO 1=1 TO PERIODS; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((DEBTCST(I,J, 1) DO J=1 TO ANNUAL)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(ANNUAL)F(9,4)); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***NONREAL ESTATE DEBTCOST***' ) (SKIP,X(5) ,A) ; 
DO 1=1 TO PERIODS; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((DEBTCST(I,J,2) DO J=1 TO ANNUAL)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(ANNUAL)F(9,4)); 
END; 
/" CREATE AN ARRAY OF DISCOUNTED REVENUE BEFORE INTEREST FOR EACH 
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POSSIBLE LAND LEVEL IN EACH PERIOD */ 
ALLOCATE REVENUE(HORIZON,INLAND:(INLAND+PERIODS*BUYLAND* 
(1+RENTIN)),3) 
INIT((HORIZ0N*3*(1+PERI0DS*BUYLAND*(RENTIN+1)))0); 
U=0; 
W=l; 
DO T=1 TO HORIZON; 
U=U+1; 
IF U=ANNUAL+1 THEN DO; 
U=l; 
W=V+1; 
END; 
DO I=MAX(INLAND,0) TO INLAND+W*BUYLAND*(1+RENTIN) ; 
IF I>0 THEN DO; 
YEAR=BEGIN-1+T; 
EXP=DECIS(6,2)+DECIS(6,3)*L0G(I*LANDINC); 
EXP=EXP+DECIS(6,4)*L0G(YEAR); 
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EXP3=DECIS(5,1) 
+DECIS(5,3)*L0G(LANDING*!) 
+DECIS(5,4)*L0G(YEAR); 
EXP2=DECIS (6,5 )+DECIS (5,5 )*LOG (YEAR) ; 
TEMP=DECIS(6,1)*(I*LANDINC)**EXP* 
YEAR**EXP2; 
REVENUE (T, 1,1) =FORE (T, 3)*TEMP ; 
REVENUE (T, 1,2 )=(FORE (T, 4 )/(REVENUE (T, 1,1 ) 
*EXP3))**(1/(EXP3-1)  ; 
XINDEX=F0RE(T,4)*( 1+FORE(T,7)*N0NLCAP) ; 
REVENUE(T,I,3)=(XINDEX/ 
(REVENUE(T,1,1)*EXP3) )** 
(1/(EXP3-1)); 
IF DEBUG1=0 THEN DO; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT (*TEMP= *,TEMP,' LAND=', 
I,' TIME=',T,'EXP=',EXP,'EXP2=',EXP2, 
*EXP3=',EXP3) 
(SKIP,(2)(A(6),F(8,4)),A(6),F(4),A(4), 
F(9,4),C2)(A(5),F(9,4))); 
END; 
END; 
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ELSE DO X=1 TO 3; 
REVENUE(T,I,X)=0; 
END; 
END; 
END; 
IF DEBUG1=0 THEN DO X=1 TO 3; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***REVENUE%X,'***') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(10),F(1),A); 
RANGE=PERIODS*BUYLAND; 
NUMBER=TRUNC(RANGE/10); 
DO U=0 TO NUMBER; 
ZMIN=INLAND+U*10; 
ZMAX=MIN(INLANIH-U*10+9 .INLAND+PERIODS-BUYLAND-(1+RENTIN)  ; 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('LAND EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
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ZMAX)(SKIP.X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO T =1 TO HORIZON; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ((REVENUE(T,J,X) DO J= 
ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,X(2),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)F(8,0)) ; 
END; 
END; 
END; 
/* BOUNDARY CONDTION */ 
ALLOCATE REMAIN(INLAND:MAXM(1,PERIODS+1), 
MAXM(2,PERI0DS+1):MAXM(3,PERIODS+1), 
MAXM(4,PERI0DS+1):MAXM(5,PERI0DS+1)); 
DO 1= INLAND TO MAXM(1,PERI0DS+1); 
DO J= MAXM(2,PERI0DS+1) TO MAXM(3,PERIODS +1); 
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IF MAXM(5,PERIODS+1)>0 THEN DO; 
DO K=MAX(1,MAXM(4,PERI0DS+1)) TO MAXM(5,PERI0DS+1); 
REMAINd, J,K)=CAPINC*J+ 
K*GAININC*CAPTAX; 
END; 
END; 
IF MAXM (4, PERIODS+1) <=0 THEN DO K= 
MAXM(4,PERI0DS+1) TO MIN(0,MAXM(5,PERIODS+1)); 
IF DECIS(7,5)>0 THEN EXP= 
DECIS(7,4)*K*GAININC/DECIS(7,5); 
ELSE EXP=0; 
REMAINd, J,K)=CAPINC*J+ 
( 1 -PHI)*K*GAININC+CAPLOSS* ( 1-
(1+FORE(HORIZON,1))**EXP); 
/* THE CAPITAL LOSS TERM ASSUMES THE MAXIMUM 
ANNUAL DEDUCTION WILL BE TAKEN UNTIL THE 
ALLOWABLE CAPITAL LOSS DEDUCTION IS EXHAUSTED. 
IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE FIRST DEDUCTION OCCURS 
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ONE YEAR AFTER THE SALE, WHICH OCCURS AT THE 
BEGINNING OF THE TERMINAL YEAR. THE DISCOUT 
IS ASSUMED TO STAY CONSTANT AT TERMINAL LEVEL. 
END; 
END; 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***BOUNDARY CONDITION IS THE SAME', 
' FOR ALL LAND LEVELS***')(SKIP,X(5),A(33),A) ; 
RANGE=ABS(MAXM(5,PERIODS+1)-MAXM(4,PERIODS+1)); 
NUMBER=TRUNC (RANGE/10); 
DO U= 0 TO NUMBER; 
ZMIN=MAXM(4,PERIODS+1)+U*10; 
ZMAX=MIN(MAXM(4,PERI0DS+l)+U*10+9, 
MAXM(5,PERIODS+1)); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
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DO J=MAXM(2,PERI0DS+1) TO MAXM(3,PERI0DS+1); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITY=',J*CAPINC, 
(REMAIN(INLAND,J,K) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX))(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5), 
(ZMAX-ZmN+l)F(10,0)) ; 
END; 
END; 
/* RECURRENCE RELATION */ 
DO T= -PERIODS TO -1; 
CALL RECURR(-T); 
FREE REMAIN; 
CALL OUTPUT(-T); 
FREE P; 
CALL TRANS(-T,INLAND); 
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FREE S; 
END; /* T LOOP */ 
CLOSE FILE (AA); 
END MAIN; 
*PROCESS('S'); 
RECURR:PROCEDURE(TIME); 
DECLARE FORE(0:50,9) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE MAXM(5,10) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE IN(4) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE DECIS(8,5) FIXED(15,4) DEC EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE (DISCOUT(*,*),REVENUE(*,*,*)) 
FLOAT EXTERNAL DEC (10) CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE P(*,*,*,*) FLOAT DEC(10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (S(*,*,*),REMAIN(*,*,*)) FLOAT DEC (10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (CONTROL(*,*,*,*),LEVEL(*,*,*,*)) FLOAT DEC (10) CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (LAND_B,GAIN_B, CAP_B) FLOAT DEC(10) INIT(O); 
DECLARE (LAND_LB,GAIN_LB, CAP_LB) FLOAT DEC(10) INIT(O); 
DECLARE (MAXL, MINM, MANNUAL,EQUITY, 
DEBT) FLOAT DEC(IO); 
DECLARE (ZMAX,ZMIN,NEXTLAND,NEXTCAP,NEXTGAIN) FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE (TAX,UNIQUE,OMEGA,PHI,INLAND, 
BUYLAND,CAPINC, LANDING, GAINING,ANNUAL) EXTERNAL 
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FLOAT DEC(10); 
DECLARE (LEVER,DEBUG1,DEBUG2,RENTIN, RENTOUT.NONLCAP, 
DEBUGS.RENTPER,ADJUST,BEGIN) FIXED DEC(6,2) EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE (ALPHA6,ALPHAS,ALPHA9,LR) FIXED DEC(10,4) EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE (RENT,TAXES,LAND,RATIO,ASSETS,XINDEX) FLOAT DEC (10) INIT(O); 
DECLARE (APPR,INTEREST,CURRENT,TEST,SAVING) FLOAT DEC (10) INIT(O); 
DECLARE (GAINING,EXP,YEAR,CAPGAIN,EQUITYl,XCAP,DR,DNR,INCOME) 
FLOAT DEC(10) INIT(O); 
DECLARE (TEMP,FLOW,RR,RNR) FLOAT DEC(IO) ; 
DECLARE (U,I,J,K,L,M,N,T,¥,V) FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE X FLOAT DEC(IO) INIT(O); 
DECLARE TIME FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE BOUNDS ENTRY; 
ALLOCATE S(INLAND:MAXM(1,TIME) ,MAXM(2,TIME) :MAXM(3,TIME) , 
MAXM(4,TIME) :MAXM(5,TIME)) ,P(INLAND:MAXM(1,TIME) ,MAXM(2,TIME) : 
MAXM(3,TIME) ,MAXM(4,TIME) :MAXM(5,TIME) ,8) ; 
DO I=INLAND TO MAXM(1,TIME) ; 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIh£); 
DO K=MAXM(4,TIME) TO MAXM(5,TIME); 
s(i,j,k)=-999999999; 
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P(I,J,K,l)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,2)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,3)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,4)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,5)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,6)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,7)=-999999999; 
P(I,J,K,8)=-999999999; 
/«DETERMINE THE MAXIMUM LAND PURCHASE THAT CAN BE 
FINANCED IF ALL AVAILABLE CAPITAL IN LAND */ 
DR=LEVER*(J*CAPINC+K*OMEGA*GAININC); 
MAXL=J*CAPINC+K*GAININC+DR; 
DR=MIN(DR,LR*MAXL); 
MAXD=J*CAPINC+K*GAININC+DR; 
MAXL=MAXL/FORE((TIME-1)*ANNUAL,5); 
MAXIfTRUNC(MAXL/LANDINC)-I; 
MAXL=MIN(BUYLAND,MAXL,(MAXM(1,TIME+1)-I)); 
IF MAXL<0 THEN MAXL=0; 
DO L=0 TO MAXL; 
DO W=-(I+L)-RENTOUT TO 
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RENTIN*BUYLAND*TIME; 
IF DEBUG1=0 THEN DO; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('MAXL',MAXL,'LAND'.I,' CAP',J, 
'GAIN',K)(SKIP,A(4),F(8,0),A(4),F(8,0),A(4), 
F(8,0),A(4),F(8,0)); 
END; 
/* MAXL CALCULATED FROM: 
D/K+OMEGA*G=LEVERAGE CUTOFF WHEN ALL CREDIT USED=L 
IMPLIES D=L*(K+OMEGA*G) 
ALSO CAPITAL ABSORBED MUST EQUAL DEBT PLUS EQUITY 
THAT IS: BETA*LAND=D+K 
IMPLIES LAND=(K+G+L*(K+OMEGA*G))/BETA 
DETERMINE MINIMUM SAVING OR MAXIMUM DISAVING. 
EQUITY LEVEL MUST NOT GO BELOW THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT 
NEEDED IN THE COMING PERIOD USING THE SAVINGS PLAN*/ 
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MINM=-999999999; 
YEAR= (TIME)*ANNUAL ; 
LAND=(I+L)*LANDINC*FORE (YEAR, 5 ) ; 
TEMP=(LAND-
C1+LEVER*0MEGA)*K*GAININC)/(1+LEVER); 
TEMP=^ 1AX(TEMP,LAND*(1-LR)) ; 
MINM=MAX(MINM,TEMP); 
/* MINIMUM CAPITAL WHEN ALL CAPITAL DEVOTED 
TO LAND CALCULATED AS: 
K=(LAND*BETA-L*OMEGA*G)/(1+L) 
SINCE D/(K+OMEGA*G)=L AND 
D+K+G=BETA*LAND 
IMPLIES D=BETA*LAND-K-G 
IMPLIES BETA*LAND-K-G=L*(K+OMEGA*G) 
IMPLIES BETA*LAND-G-L*0MEGA*G=(1+L)-K */ 
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MINM=TRUNC (MINM/CÂPINC) - J ; 
MINM=MIN(MINM,(MAXM(3,TIME+1)-J)); 
MINM=MAX(MINM,(MAXM(2,TIME+1)-J)); 
IF DEBUG1=0 THEN DO; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('MINM',MINM,'LAND',I, 
' CAP',J,'GAIN',K,'RENTED',W) 
(SKIP,A(4),F(8,0),A(4),F(8,0),A(4), 
F(8,0),A(4),F(8,0),A(6),F(8)); 
END; 
DO M=MINM TO (MAXM(3,TIME+1)-J); 
INTEREST=0; 
TAXES=0; 
RENT=0; 
INC0ME=0; 
MANNUAL=M/ANNUAL; 
SAVING=0; 
GAINING=0; 
DO U=0 TO ANNUAL-1; 
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year=(time- 1)*annual+u ; 
land= ( i+l)*landinc*fore (year ,5); 
if u=0 then capgain=k*gaininc; 
else capgain=k*gaininc+(l+i)* 
landinc*f0re(year,8) ; 
equity1=(j+u*mannual)*capinc 
+capgain; 
equity=equity1-(1-omega)*capgain; 
if (i+l+w)>0 then do; 
exp=alpha6+alpha8*l0g(i+l+v)+ 
alpha9*l0g(year+begin-1); 
end; 
x=revenue(year+1,1+l+w,2); 
xindex=x*fore(year+1,4); 
xcap=xindex*nonlcap; 
dr=land+xcap-equity1 ; 
if dr<0 then dnr=0; 
/•first try only real estate debt -/ 
if dr>0 then do; 
if dr<=lr*land & 
dr<=lever*EQUm then 
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dnr=0; 
/*IF THIS LOOP IS ENTERED THEN REAL 
ESTATE DEBT ALONE IS ADEQUATE. ALL 
X FINANCED WITH EQUITY. */ 
ELSE DO; 
IF DR>LEVER*EQUITY THEN 
DR=LEVER*EQUITY; 
IF DR>LR*LAND THEN 
DR=LR*LAND; 
IF EQUITY1+DR<LAND THEN 
DO; 
X=0; 
XINDEX=0; 
XCAP=0; 
DNR=0; 
INTEREST=999999999; 
/* IF THIS DO GROUP ENTERED, LAND CAN 
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NOT BE FINANCED, EVEN WITH X=0 */ 
END; 
ELSE DO; 
RECALCULATE X ASSUMING NONREAL 
ESTATE DEBT USE */ 
X=REVENUE CYEAR+1,1+L+W,3); 
XINDEX=X*FORE(YEAR+1,4); 
XCAP=XINDEX*NONLCAP; 
DNR=LAND+XCAP-EQUITY1-DR; 
IF DNR<0 THEN DO; 
INTERIOR OPTIMUM WITH NONREAL ESTATE 
DEBT USE IS LOW ENOUGH THAT NON REAL 
ESTATE DEBT IS NOT REQUIRED. THEN USE 
ALL X THAT CAN BE EQUITY FINANCED */ 
DNR=0; 
XCAP=EQUITY1+DR-LAND; 
XINDEX=XCAP/NONLCAP; 
X=XINDEX/FORE(YEAR+1,4); 
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END; 
IF (DNR+DR)>LEVER*EQUITy 
THEN DO; 
/* X IS AT MAXIMUM THAT CAN BE FINANCED */ 
DNR=LEVER*EQUITY-DR; 
XCAP=EQUITY1+DNR+DR-LAND; 
XINDEX=XCAP/NONLCAP; 
X=XINDEX/FORE CYEAR+1,4); 
END; 
END; 
END; 
END; 
IF DR>=0 & (EQUITY1+DR)>=LAND THEN 
DO; 
RR=TAX*DISCOUT(TIME,U+1)* 
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FORE(YEAR+1,2); 
RNR=TAX*DISCOUT(TIME, U+1 )* 
FORE(YEAR+1,7); 
TEMP=RR*DR+RNR*DNR; 
INTEREST=TEMP+INTEREST ; 
END; 
IF DR<0 THEN INTEREST= 
DR^ FORE(YEAR+1,1)* 
DISCOUT(TIME ,U+1)+INTEREST; 
/* NEGATIVE DEBT EARNS AT THE DIS 
RATE */ 
IF X>0 THEN 
TEMP=X—EXP; 
ELSE TEMP=0; 
TEMP=REVENUE(YEAR+1,I+L4V,1)* 
TEMP-XINDEX; 
INCOME=TEMP*TAX* 
DISCOUT (TIME ,U+1 )+INCOME ; 
RENT^ RENT+DISC0UT(TIME,U+1)* 
W*LANDINC*RENTPER*TAX 
*FORE ( (TIME -1 )*ANNUAL+U ,5); 
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TAXES=TAXES+DISCOUT(TIME,U+1)* 
(I+L)*LANDINC*TAX 
*F0RE((TIME-1)*ANNUAL+U+1,6); 
SAVING=MANNUAL*CAPINC*DISCOirT(TIME,U+1) 
+SAVING; 
GAINING=(L+I)*LANDINC*FORE(YEAR+1,9) 
*PHI+GAINING; 
IF U=0 THEN X1=X; 
IF DEBUG1=0 & L<DEBUG3 THEN DO; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT 
('RENT^ '.RENT,*TAXES=',TAXES, 
'DR =',DR,'LAND=',LAND, 
'DNR =',DNR,'XINDEX=', 
XINDEX,'TEMP=',TEMP, 
'SAVING='.SAVING) 
(SKIP,A(5),F(8,0),A(6), 
F(8,0),A(6),F(8),A(5),F(8), 
A(7),F(8),A(7),F(8),A(5).F(8), 
A(7),F(8)); 
END; 
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END; 
/* ADJUSTMENT COST NOT DISCOUNTED BECAUSE 
IT IS AN UP FRONT COST, NOT PAYABLE AT 
THE END OF THE YEAR */ 
CURRENT=INCOME-INTEREST 
-SAVING-RENT-TAXES-ADJUSr~L**2; 
NEXTLAND=I+L; 
NEXTCAP=J+M; 
APPR=CI+L)*LANDINC* 
FORE((TIME)*ANNUAL,8)/GAINING ; 
NEXTGAIN=TRUNC(APPR); 
IF (APPR-NEXTGAIN)>=0.5 THEN 
NEXTGAIN=NEXTGAIN+1; 
IF (APPR-NEXTGAIN)<=-0.5 THEN 
NE3CrGAIN=NEXTGAIN-1 ; 
NEXTGAIN=NEXTGAIN+K; 
CALL BOUNDS(NEXTLAND,NEXTCAP, 
NEXTGAIN,CURRENT,LAND_B,GAIN_B, CAP_B, 
LAND_LB,GAIN_LB, CAP_LB,TIME); 
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IF CURRENT>=0 THEN DO; 
TEST=CURRENT+GAINING; 
TEMP=REMAIN(NEXTLAND,NEXTCAP, 
NEXTGAIN); 
TEMP=TEMP*DISCOUT(TIME,ANNUAL); 
TEST=TEST+TEMP; 
END; 
ELSE TEST=-999999999; 
IF DEBUG1=0 THEN DO; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('DEBT*,DR+DNR, 
'INTEREST',INTEREST,'CURRENT', 
CURRENT,'TEST',TEST,'APPR',APPR, 
'NG'.NEXTGAIN,'R',REMAIN(NEXTLAND, 
NEXTCAP,NEXTGAIN)) 
(SKIP,A(4), 
F(10.0),A(8),F(10,0),A(7), 
F(10,0),A(4),F(10,0),A(4), 
F(6,2),A(2),F(6,2),A(8),F(10,0)); 
END; 
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/* CURRENT IS THE VALUE OF CURRENT 
PRODUCTION INCOME AFTER INTEREST 
AND TAXES. BECAUSE EQUITY INVESTMENT 
IS LIMITED TO RETAINED EARNINGS, 
CURRENT MUST BE POSITIVE FOR RELEVANT 
SOLUTIONS. */ 
IF TEST>S(I,J,K) THEN DO; 
S(I,J,K)^ ST; 
P(I,J.K,1)=L; 
P(I,J,K,2)=M; 
P(I,J,K,3)=W; 
P(I,J,K,4)=X1; 
END; 
/^ RECORD NONUNIQUE CONTROL PATHS. 
ONLY ONE RECORDED BECAUSE THAT SHOWS 
THE CONTROL PATH IS NOT UNIQUE, BUT 
DOES NOT REQUIRE MUCH STORAGE. */ 
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ELSE IF TEST=S(I,J,K) & TEST>-999999999 
THEN DO; 
IF L>P(I,J,K,1) I L<P(I,J,K,1) I 
M>P(I,J,K,2) I M<P(I,J,K,2) I 
X>P(I,J,K,4) I X<P(I,J,K,4) I 
W>P(I,J,K.3) I W<P(I,J,K,3) 
THEN DO; 
P(I,J,K.5)=L; 
PCI,J,K,6)=M; 
P(I,J,K,7)=tf; 
P(I,J,K,8)=X1; 
UNIQUE=UNIQUE+1; 
END; 
END; 
END; /* M LOOP */ 
END; /* W LOOP */ 
END; /* L LOOP */ 
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END; /* K LOOP */ 
END; /* J LOOP */ 
END; /* 1 LOOP */ 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('PERIOD IS', TIME)(SKIP,A(9),F(8,0)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND AT BOUNDS', LAND_B,' TIMES') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(14),F(8,0),A(7)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT (' CAP AT BOUNDS', CAP_B,' TIMES') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(14),F(8,0),À(7)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('GAIN AT BOUNDS', GAIN_B,* TIMES') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(14),F(8,0),A(7)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND AT LOWER BOUNDS', LAND_LB,' TIMES') 
(SKIP.X(5),A(20),F(8,0),A(7)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT (' CAP AT LOWER BOUNDS', CAP_LB,' TIMES') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(20),F(8,0) ,A(7)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('GAIN AT LOWER BOUNDS', GAIN_LB,' TIMES') 
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(SKIP,X(5) ,A(20) ,F(8,0) ,A(7)) ; 
END RECURR; 
*PROCESSC'S'); 
OUTPUT:PROCEDURE(TIME); 
DECLARE MAXM(5,10) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE P(*,*,*,*) FLOAT DEC(10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (S(*,*,*) ,REMAIN(*,*,*)) FLOAT DEC (10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE (RANGE, NUMBER, ZMAX, ZMIN) FLOAT DEC(10); 
DECLARE (UNIQUE,INLAND,GAPING) FLOAT EXTERNAL DEC(10); 
DECLARE TIME FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE (U,I,J,K,L,M,N,T,W,V) FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE X FLOAT DEC(10) INIT(O); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***S MATRIX PERIOD ' ,TIME, '***') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(19),F(6,0),A); 
RANGE=ABS(MAXM(5,TIME)-MAXM(4,TIME)) ; 
NUMBER=TRUNC(RANGE/10); 
DO I=INLAND TO MAXM(1,TIME); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND EQUALS',I) 
(SKIP,X(2),A(12),X(2),F(6,0)); 
DO U= 0 TO NUMBER; 
ZMIN=MAXM(4,TIME)+U*10; 
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ZMAX=MIN(MAXM(4,TIME)+U*10+9, 
MAXM(5,TIME)); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),FC5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITY=',J*CAPINC, 
(3(1,J,K) DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX))(SKIP, 
A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)F(10,0)); 
END; 
END; 
END; 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('***P MATRIX PERIOD '.TIME,'***') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(19),F(6,0),A); 
DO I=INLAND TO MAXM(1,TIME); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND EQUALS ',1)(SKIP,X(2),A(12), 
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X(2).F(6,0)); 
DO U=0 TO NUMBER; 
ZMIN=MAXM(4,TIME)+U*10; 
ZMAX=MINCMAXM(4,TIME)+U*10+9, 
MAXM(5,TIME)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND PURCHASES')(SKIP,X(2),A); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITY=',J*CAPINC,(P(I,J,K,1) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('SAVINGS')(SKIP,X(2),A) ; 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2) , 
357 
A(2),X(2),FC5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITY=',J*CAPINC,(P(I,J,K,2) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND RENTED')(SKIP,X(2),A); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2). 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITY=',J*CAPINC,(P(I,J,K,3) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('NONLAND INPUTS') (SKIP,X(2) ,A) ; 
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PUT FILECAA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX) (SKIP,X(2) ,A(13) ,X(2) ,F(5,0) ,X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5.0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITy=',J*CAPINC,(P(I,J,K,4) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),f(8,0) ,X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(f(10,0))); 
END; 
END; 
END; 
/-NONUNIQUE CONTROL PATHS PRINTED OUT */ 
if unique>0 then do; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('***NONUNIQUE CONTROL PATHS IN PERIOD' ,TIME,'***') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(36).F(6,0),A); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('UNIQUE EQUALS*.UNIQUE)(SKIP,A(13),F(6,0)); 
unique=0; 
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PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('***P MATRIX PERIOD '.TIME,'***') 
(SKIP,X(5),A(19),F(6,0),A); 
DO I=INLAND TO MAXM(1,TIME); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND EQUALS ' ,1)(SKIP,X(2),A(12), 
X(2),F(6,0)); 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND PURCHASES' ) (SKIP,X(2) ,A) ; 
DO U=0 TO NUMBER; 
ZMIN=MAXM(4 ,TIME)+U*10 ; 
ZMAX=MIN(MAXM(4,TIME)+U*10+9, 
MAXM(5,TIME)); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITy=',J*CAPINC, (P(I,J,K,5) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
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(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('SAVINGS')(SKIP,X(2),A); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3.TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT (*EQUITY=',J*CAPINC,(P(I,J,K,6) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('LAND RENTED')(SKIP,X(2),A); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS'.ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0),X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
361 
PUT FILE CM) EDIT ( ' EQUITY= ', J*CAPINC ,(P(I,J,K,7) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
PUT FILE (AA) EDIT ('NONLAND INPUTS')(SKIP,X(2),A); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('GAIN EQUALS',ZMIN,'TO', 
ZMAX)(SKIP,X(2),A(13),X(2),F(5,0) ,X(2), 
A(2),X(2),F(5,0)); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
PUT FILE(AA) EDIT ('EQUITY=',J*CAPINC,(P(I,J,K,8) 
DO K=ZMIN TO ZMAX)) 
(SKIP,A(7),F(8,0),X(5),(ZMAX-ZMIN+1)(F(10,0))); 
END; 
END; 
END; 
END OUTPUT; 
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*PROCESS('S'); 
TRANS :PROCEDURE(TIME,LAND); 
DECLARE MAXM(5,10) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE (S(*,*,*),REMAIN(*,*,*)) FLOAT DEC (10) EXTERNAL CONTROLLED; 
DECLARE LAND FLOAT DEC(10); 
DECLARE TIME FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE (I,J,K,U) FIXED DEC(6,0); 
ALLOCATE REMAIN(LAND:MAXM(1,TIME),MAXM(2,TIME):MAXM(3,TIME), 
MAXM(4,TIME):MAXM(5,TIME)); 
DO I=LAND TO MAXM(1,TIME); 
DO J=MAXM(2,TIME) TO MAXM(3,TIME); 
DO K=MAXM(4,TIME) TO MAXM(5,TIME); 
REMAINd, J,K)=S(I, J,K) ; 
END; 
END; 
END; 
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END TRANS; 
*PROCESS('S'); 
BOUNDS : PROCEDURE (NEXTLAND, NEXTCAP, NEXTGAIN, CURRENT, 
LAND_B,GAIN_B, CAP_B, 
LAND_LB,GAIN_LB, CAP_LB,TIME) ; 
DECLARE MAXMCS.IO) FLOAT EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE (LAND_B,GAIN_B, CAP_B) FLOAT DEC(10) ; 
DECLARE (LAND_LB,GAIN_LB, CAP_LB) FLOAT DEC(10) ; 
DECLARE (NEXTLAND,NEXTCAP,NEXTGAIN) FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE (CURRENT) FLOAT DEC (10) ; 
DECLARE DEBUG2 FIXED DEC(6,2) EXTERNAL; 
DECLARE TIME FIXED DEC(6,0); 
DECLARE INLAND FLOAT DEC(10) EXTERNAL; 
IF NEXTLAND>MAXM(1,TIME+1) THEN DO; 
NEXTLAND=MAXM(1,TIME+1) ; 
LAND_B=LAND_B+1; 
END; 
IF NEXTCAP>MAXM(3,TIME+1) THEN DO; 
NEXTCAP=MAXM (3 ,TIME+1 ) ; 
CAP_B=CAP_B+1; 
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END; 
IF NEXTGAIN>MAXM(5,TIME+1) THEN DO; 
NEXTGAIN=MAXM(5,TIME+1); 
GAIN_B=GAIN_B+1; 
END; 
IF NEXTLAND<INLAND THEN DO; 
CURRENT=-999999999; 
NEXTLAND=INLAND; 
LAND_LB=LAND_LB+1; 
END; 
IF NEXTCAP<MAXM(2,TIME+1) THEN DO; 
NEXTCAP=MAXM(2,TIME+1); 
CURRENT^ -999999999; 
CAP LB=CAP_LB+1; 
END; 
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IF NEXTGAIN<MAXM(4,TIME+1) THEN DO 
NEXTGAIN=MAXM (4, TIME+1 ) ; 
CURRENT=-999999999; 
GAIN_LB=GAIN_LB+1; 
END; 
END BOUNDS; 
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APPENDIX B 
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Because the number of farm size classes in the 1957-1963 period 
differs from the that in later years, the error component estimation 
method outlined by Judge et al. (1982), does not exactly fit the 
situation. This appendix outlines the adaptation of the error component 
method to a case in which the number of classes differ. This exposition 
will generally use the notation and framework of Judge et al. 
The complete set of observations can be written in matrix notation 
as : 
Yl 1^ ®1 
(Bl) = Xt^ g + 
"Ti-'Ni 
+ 
\j+l \j+l 
®T 
where: 
= the vector of dependent variable observations 
for the t*"^  year, 
= the matrix of independent variables for the t^  ^year. 
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= Che scalar error term specific to the t^  ^year, 
e^  = the vector of general error terms for the t^ y^ear 
= the number of classes within a year in the first years, 
N = the number of classes in the years T^ +l to T, 
2 
T = the total number of years, 
= the number of year with classes, 
Tg = the number of years with classes 
Jjj = a vector of I's, where the subscript denotes the size of the 
vector and 
3 = the vector of regression coefficients. 
In all there are obervations. The dimensions of the Y, X 
and e vectors are assumed to be comfortable to the J vectors, hence not 
all Y, X and e vectors have the same dimensions. Expression B1 can be 
more compactly written as: 
N 1 (Bl.l) Y = Xg + + e 
2 
where: 
Y = a vector of the Y^  vectors, 
X = a vector of the X^  matrices, 
e = a vector of the e^  vectors 
Uj = a vector of the year errors 1-T^ , and 
Ug = a vector of the year errors T^ +^l-T^ . 
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The symbol 8 denotes the Kronecker product, which is the product of each 
element of the U vector with the J vector. Assumptions used in finding 
the covariance matrix of the error in expression (Bl.l) are: 
(B2.1) E[U^ D^ '] 
(B2.2) EtUgUg'] = a^ \ 
(B2.3) E[ee'] = 
(B2.4) E 
^ « V 
e' =0 
Equality (B2-4) states that the general and year errors are independent, 
then following Judge et al. (1982) the covariance matrix will be: 
4 = E 
1^ « -^ N. 
2^ 8 
+ e 
1^ ® 
"2 8 
+ e 
= Ou 
Tj-
+ <je 
'«1^ 1 ° 
0 I 
N2T2 
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4, « 
The block diagonal property of the disturbances vector arises because the 
errors between years are uncorrelated, but errors within years are 
related by the common year error. 
The GLS estimator is then: 
g = XH~^ Y 
By the rules for finding the inverse of Kronecker products and partioned 
matrices, the inverse of the covariance matrix can be written as: 
where: 
,-l 
IT,' 'i' 
-1 
V 
-1 \ w 
 ^ Nj(Njau^ +Oe^ ) oe^  N^ ce^  
W \ v2' 
2 „ f„ _ 2 _ 2i _ 2 „ 2 N^ tNgOu -KJe ] Oe N^ oe 
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The transformed variables are: 
Y = PY = 
*2 
where: 
P = the transformation matrix such that P*P = $ , 
ffe b^ = (l •) and 
2 2 N^ Gu +oe 
bg = (l - ffe 
2 2 
Ngffu +oe 
As a result of the differing class number the weights in the transforma­
tion matrix differ between the early and later observations. 
The remaining problem caused by differing class sizes concerns the 
r 2 2 
estimation fo the term under the radical in the b weights (,îîjOu +oe or 
2 2i N^ Ou -KJe J , This term is estimated from the mean square error of 
regression of the mean output over farm sizes on the mean inputs over 
farm sizes (Judge et al., 1982, p. 483). If there were data for a large 
number of years relative to the number of independent variables in each 
group, then the observations could be split into two groups by the farm 
size class number and separate regression run. Unfortunately, the number 
of years with each class number are not adequate for such a strategy. In 
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the 1957-1969 data, the first six years have four classes and the last 
seven years hav- five classes. With four independent variables, that 
leaves the mean square error estimate with only two or three degrees of 
freedom. The problem with using the mean square error term from data 
with both sets of farm size classes is that it is theoretically some 
average of the value which would be derived using the class number from 
each group. This introduces an additional level of approximation into 
the estimation. 
To avoid the unreliable estimates from the separate regressions on 
an inadequate number of observations and the added approximation in using 
the unadjusted estimate from the combined data set, the exact expected 
value of the mean square error from the combined regression was 
derived and the bias identified. The expected value expression was then 
used to find an improved estimate of the year variance [ou^ ), which was 
in turn used in calculating the b weights. The model for the regression 
on the mean values can be stated. 
(B3) 
where : 
W 
e^  = the vector of errors from the years l-T^  and 
e^  = the vector of errors from the years T^ ^^ -T. 
Y = BX + W 
U, 
U, 
Sl'^ N, 
®i'V 
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Under the assumptions (B2.1-2.4) the covariance matrix of the error term 
(W) is: 
1. ( au 2 oe 
B4) E[WW'] = 
N 1 
It [ou 
2^ 
2 Oe 
The regression residual from model (B3) may be written (Johnston, 1972, 
p. 128): 
Z = Y - X6 
= [i? - x[x'x) "^x']w 
The residual sum of squares can then be written: 
35) Z'Z = W'[ - X(X'X)~^ X']W 
because the matrix (l-x(x'x) X^*) is symmetric and idempotent. 
The expected value of the sum of squared residuals can be expressed 
as the expected value of the trace of the right hand side of equation 
(B5) because the sum of squares is a scalar and the trace of a scalar is 
equal to itself: 
e[z'z] = e[TrW'(l^  - x(x'x)~^x')w] 
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By the circular cumulative property of traces and the usual regression 
assumption that the Xs are known without error; 
By noting that the expected value of the error term (W) can be written as 
a sum of the year variance multiplied by an identify matrix of dimension 
T, and the general variance multiplied by a matrix with reciprocals of 
the farm class number along the diagonal, and that the trace of a sum is 
the sum of the traces, the expected value of the square residuals 
e[z'z] = e[ww'(i^ - x(x'x)"4*)] 
= e[ww](i^ - x(x'x)"^x') 
il 
0 (au^ +^ )^ 
2^ 2 
(i^ -x(x'x]"^ xO 
becomes : 
B6) E[Z'Z] = trau^ I^ (l^  - x(x'x)"^ x) 
+ troe 
0 
(i^-x(x'x)"^x'] 
0 
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The first term in expression (B6) follows the classic OLS pattern and 
collapses to the variance multiplied by the degrees of freedom: 
tr0u^ l^ l^ -x(x'x)"^ x') = au^ (T-K) 
where: 
K = the number of independent variables including the intercept. 
The second terra can be expanded to: 
troe 
— I 
Ni T^  
— I 
*2 
- trce 
i— I 
Ni T^  
— I 
Nz T2 
where the trace of the product of the general variance and the diagonal 
matrix is: 
trOe 
— I 
 ^"l 
A_ I 
 ^^2 
but the trace of the term in the X matrices is not easily evaluated in 
general. With an estimate of the general variance (ae^ ), the X matrix 
term can be calculated for specific cases from the data. An estimate of 
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the general variance term can be derived from the dummy variable model. 
The expected value of the sura of square residuals is then: 
x(x'x)-^ x} 
This expected value can be solved to yield an improved estimate of the 
year variance: 
x(x'x)- 4} 
which is in turn used to calculate the b weights. 
T T 
E[Z'Z] = Ou (T-K) + Oe - tr 
1 2 
— I 
Ni T^  
— I 
N2 T^  
2 T T 
„ 2 _ Z'Z AE I 1 ^ 2 
" T-K " T-K - tr 
— I 
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GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
These three studies suggest that capital gains and losses may have a 
major impact on production and finance decisions. Capital gains provide 
an incentive to increase use of the appreciating asset, incur greater 
debt to buy the asset, and decrease holdings of items that are consumed 
in the production process. Capital losses tend to have the opposite 
effects as decision makers attempt to economize on the use of the 
depreciating asset. Various constraints may dampen or eliminate the 
capital gains and loss effects from observable decisions. These 
constraints include limited availability of the appreciating resource and 
the inability to raise equity capital from outside sources, beyond the 
decisionmaker's own funds. 
The theoretical model indicates that if borrowing against unrealized 
capital gains is permitted, the optimal farm decisions may be affected by 
land price risk. When uncertain unrealized capital gains can be 
substituted for equity, the leverage ratio becomes a random variable. 
Solutions to the stochastic optimal control problem suggest that the main 
result of land price uncertainty is to force added financial flexibility. 
More liquid assets may be held and less debt incurred to allow for the 
possibility that borrowing power may be eroded by unanticipated capital 
losses. 
The exploratory empirical work suggests that the capital gains and 
loss effects may be observable under the economic conditions of the 1970s 
and 1980s. The model has the potential of explaining much of the asset 
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and financial restructuring that occurred in U.S. farm firms during the 
1970s. This restructuring involved increasing investment in long-term 
assets, such as land, and decreasing holdings of liquid assets, such as 
financial assets, grain inventories, and livestock (Boehlje and Sidman, 
1983, p. 937). Debt use increased substantially during the period. 
Within the framework of this model, the asset and financial restructuring 
is consistent with the decisions that would be undertaken in an environ­
ment of large capital gains. The larger land investment and smaller 
nonland holdings allow more capital gain to accrue, but it also leaves 
the farm firm financially vulnerable in times of lower output prices and 
unexpected farmland price declines. The model indicates that if farmland 
price decreases are anticipated, the growth in farm acreage will tend to 
be smaller and more nonland inputs will be used. Debt use is not 
decreased in the simple model used for the exploratory research when land 
prices are expected to decline, but the increased holdings of liquid 
nonland assets allows greater flexibility in coping with the financial 
effects of capital losses. 
The empirical work in the third study has only begun to explore and 
test the implications of the theoretical model outlined in the first two 
sections. Research on the impact of capital gains and losses on 
enterprise choice would be a straightforward extension of the existing 
model. Adjustment cost and availability of rental land would make the 
empirical work more realistic. The issue of land price risk is important 
in both farm management decision making and in the formulation of public 
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policy. Extension of the model to a stochastic framework would help in 
examining land price uncertainty effects. In a more general framework, 
the theoretical framework could be extended to other situations in which 
capital gains and losses occur, such as urban real estate, art, or 
antiques. 
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